Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I find it unfortunate that some of my colleagues think we should talk about something else. I, too, would have liked to talk about something else, but the motion before us is Mr. Fortin's. It still talks about point 3, which reads, “The Committee confirms that it has not released these witnesses from their obligation to appear”.
I would like to come back to Mr. Smith's comments.
“Apparently they”—politicians, I think of all stripes—“are not too concerned about the whiff of hypocrisy that surrounds these demands (possibly because that may require a dose of shame that pretty much every politician seems to be lacking in this day and age).”
He was quite honest when he made this comment. It's a way of telling the hon. members that they should be careful with the traditions of Parliament, that they don't belong to them, that they belong to the Canadian people and that their mission is to protect them.
We're just looking after these traditions and we try to act as best we can.
I'm far from an expert in this area. I did a little research. The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat submitted a report to Parliament. I think it was in 2005. This report was an overview of the responsibilities of ministers, officials and senior staff. I'll read it to you.
There is, in “Overview of accountability in responsible government”, the following:
Any discussion of accountability in our constitutional system—the Westminister system of parliamentary democracy—must be informed by an understanding of how the system functions and why. Although the Westminister system developed incrementally, rooted in evolving democratic values rather than an abstract or static concepts, it has deep integrity, and the roles of different players complement each other in a fine balance.
That's what's very important. I feel fortunate to be a Quebecker and to have been educated in Quebec, especially for some of my studies. I studied our history, but also the evolution of our parliamentary system and the legislative system, which is different in every province. There is common law in the rest of Canada and the Civil Code in Quebec. What is interesting, as my colleagues from Quebec know very well, is that everything is written down in the Civil Code. That kind of system has a lot of value, but in the rest of Canada, as in our parliamentary system generally, it is really the evolution of traditions that allows us to keep up with our day‑to‑day affairs.
Ministers, who together as the ministry form the government of the day, exercise executive authority in this system.
It's very important to understand that it's the government, cabinet, that has this executive power.
These ministers, who act largely through the work of a non-partisan public service, are accountable to Parliament both individually and collectively. All accountabilities in Canadian government flow from ministers' individual and collective accountability to Parliament.
Although Parliament does not exercise executive authority, it is the principal guarantor of the government's accountability, scrutinizing the government's policies and actions and holding it to account.
I don't need to describe that to the opposition members; they do it very well.
Parliament has a spectrum of tools for doing this, ranging from its role in the passage of legislation to the review and approval of public expenditure to the interrogations of Question Period.
I'm going to come back to question period a little later.
But while the specific tool may vary, the environment remains constant—that of partisan politics. Parliament and its processes are inherently political.
And there is nothing wrong with that. It's exactly the nature of partisan politics that each party presents, to my mind, a different set of options and alternatives, a different vision to the Canadian people.
The political responsibility of ministers, or accountability to Parliament, is an important element of electoral democracy. However, political responsibility is not the mechanism that ensures accountability on the part of public servants—that mechanism is managerial.
Again, we're emphasizing the fact that it's very important for ministers and the government be responsible for managing the government as a whole.
Political responsibility is also not the means of determining civil or criminal liability for unlawful conduct—that is the justice system.
If employees commit a criminal offence, there is recourse through the justice system.
I'll wrap up by saying what I have to say about point 3. I'll read it:
3. The Committee confirms that it has not released these witnesses from their obligation to appear;
I think I made it clear that this committee really had no reason to compel these individuals, who are mere employees, to appear before it. I clearly explained that the government's obligation to answer questions was met by Mr. Rodriguez, who testified before the committee. Moreover, had the committee decided to allow her to testify, Ms. Fortier could have fulfilled that obligation. That's why I'm opposed to point 3 of the motion.
Some may think that the appearance of ministers isn't important. I'll read point 4.
4. The Committee also noted the absence of the Prime Minister, who was given the option of appearing in place of these witnesses in the motion of March 25, 2021;
Again, as I indicated in my speech today, the Prime Minister has every right to delegate responsibilities to ministers. In fact, he must, because he cannot do everything.
This is indicated on page 10 of the document published in 2015 by the Treasury Board Secretariat.
This speaks to the collective responsibility of cabinet. “Collective ministerial responsibility refers to the convention requiring coherence and discipline of the ministry in deciding policy, managing government operations, and speaking to Parliament with a single voice.”
We're not talking about the Prime Minister or the ministers, but all members of cabinet, who speak with one voice. I think it's a convention and not a rule, but if a cabinet minister ever disagrees with the decisions made by the Prime Minister, that person must simply resign. We see an example of this convention during question period. I'll talk about it later.
I noticed in the report that there was a reference to political staffers. I think this is interesting information for the members of the committee.
On minister’s exempt staff, it says:
One area that merits specific mention is the appropriate role of the minister’s office in communicating and transmitting instructions to the department. In Canada, political staff (also known as “exempt” staff), while partly occupied with parliamentary and constituency work, also play an important but limited role in the operation of the department. Gordon Robertson, a former clerk of the Privy Council, described the role of the Prime Minister’s Office, which can be extrapolated to all ministers’ offices, as partisan, politically oriented, yet operationally sensitive.
The role of political staff is to provide strategic, partisan advice....
Partisan here does have the meaning that we've all come to associate with it now:
partisan questions or comments.
It's about representing your party. It's about representing the party that is in power, that is in government. That's really the only way to be transparent. It would be very deceptive if a party ran on a certain platform, saying one thing, and then did something completely different. That is not what Canadians expect.
The report continues:
...partisan advice to the minister that complements the professional, expert, and non-partisan advice that comes from the deputy minister and the Public Service at large.
Exempt staff are not part of the executive.... Accordingly, exempt staff have no authority to give direction to public servants.... Exempt staff...transmit the minister’s instructions.... It should also be noted that the minister is accountable for anything done in his or her name by exempt staff.
It is therefore the minister who must be heard.
If anyone is interested, I found that on the website for the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.
I mentioned earlier that this evolution of parliamentary traditions was interesting. The way the Quebec government has adopted these same traditions by adapting them to the particular reality of Quebec is also very interesting. Its approach is often forward‑thinking and points in a new direction.
Just out of personal interest, I consulted the website of the Quebec National Assembly to see if these same principles were present in the Quebec government and, yes, they are. It includes the principle of individual ministerial responsibility: “Ministers are individually responsible for the management of their departments”.