I'm going to follow a different line now. We've gone from the policy directives and hopefully the recommendations for legislation to what I believe to be an existing gap in oversight, which is what my colleagues have talked about—the police policing the police.
In the sample warrant that was provided, there was a section on interceptions by on-device investigative tools that talked about oral communications intercepted using an ODIT. The monitor who subsequently reviews the communication “must cease reviewing the communication as soon as the monitor determines that no person in paragraph 3a is a party to the communication”.
Essentially, we have the situation set up where this is placed on a device; it's being monitored and we're supposed to take their word for it even though, as described by the RCMP, they have no processes in place for auditing or performance evaluation of the sort. My concern is that, left unchecked, without explicit guardrails as to when and how this can be used, the comprehensive nature of the capture of data seems to be susceptible to unlawful search and seizure of subjects and materials outside of the purview of the warrant.
Do you have any comment on that and the ways we might be able to provide oversight?