Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
It's good to be back on this committee. The last time I was on the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics was for the Cambridge Analytica and Facebook study, and I found that we did some very good cross-partisan work on that issue.
This is, of course, an issue that concerns me very deeply. I'd like to direct my first question to Professor Deibert. As you know—and I think we're both on the World Movement for Democracy steering committee—I've long been an admirer of much of the work that Citizen Lab has been doing globally, both on disinformation and on cyber harassment of human rights activists. I think you've raised some very concerning points with regard to how authoritarian regimes are using these kinds of tools.
In terms of what this committee is looking at specifically, I know that some of the things you mentioned, particularly when you're talking about the digital transnational repression and other things, might more suitably be discussed at the foreign affairs committee or even the Subcommittee on International Human Rights, on which I sit. I think there would be significant interest in looking at that, including things like export controls.
My question for you is more specific. I think you'll agree that when the RCMP are using these tools in a very narrow scope—I think you mentioned things like “proportionate” and “necessary”—with judicial oversight and warrants, that's a very different thing than how regimes like China or Iran are using this kind of technology. Setting aside issues like the vendors and the export controls, you mentioned something that I think was interesting. You talked about having thresholds. Could elaborate a little bit about what those kinds of thresholds to prevent abuse of these kinds of powers would look like?