Information & Ethics Committee on Feb. 14th, 2023

[Siobhán Vipond]

Yes, absolutely. We know that the chilling effect can happen. It can happen not just to folks who are worried. Sometimes it's because they don't know the rules, and then someone told them that this could happen, so it's just easier not to participate. That's a real danger.

For us in the labour movement, we also want people who want to be active in their unions to be active in their unions. This will also have a chilling effect there. That's terrifying, to be quite honest, because that shouldn't be the reason people decide to participate or not.

The chilling effect is absolutely a danger in this.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

We're looking at this from the point of view of the benefit to the politician of volunteers on a campaign.

I've seen some young people grow tremendously and gain skills. I started volunteering on campaigns when I was 15. I think the skills I learned then as a young person are part of the reason I'm still in politics today.

What would this do in preventing some people from being able to get those benefits of working on a campaign, with the camaraderie, the sense of purpose, the skill sets and the experience? What would this do to our democratic system?

Mr. Thurlow, go ahead.

[W. Scott Thurlow]

Well, there are some people who will do it regardless—God bless them. There are some people who will choose not to.

I am more worried about the marginal voter, the person who's not as likely to participate, the person who needs a ride to the poll, the person who isn't registered but is legally allowed to be registered.

It's those volunteers, who, if five of them decide not to do it, how many people then didn't get onto the roll as a direct result of that? Volunteers are the scrutineers who make sure that votes are counted properly. Do they have access to the candidate? Absolutely, they do. That's important work. We need to have those scruntineers to make sure that democracy functions the way that we expect it to.

[Siobhán Vipond]

Yes, being a volunteer on campaigns means a lot of different things to a lot of different people. Sometimes it's part of journey in terms of the type of work that they're going to go into. Sometimes it's maybe just about learning more skills and making more connections in their community. I've been with new Canadians who are volunteering. It's a great idea. They're just interested and want to know more.

I think we should be scared of this chilling effect because, my goodness, this is going to cut out a whole bunch of other opportunities for them. Our democracy depends on people's participation in all of that. We shouldn't be putting up barriers to that.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

So how do we fix it?

[W. Scott Thurlow]

I would—

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Give a very quick response, please.

[W. Scott Thurlow]

I would go back to our old code. Should we have a conflict of interest provision? Absolutely. Should we take something, expand it and add pages and pages of examples, carve outs and different limitations? That's just adding to the confusion.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Thurlow and Ms. Vandenbeld.

I now give the floor to Mr. Villemure for two and a half minutes.

Go ahead, Mr. Villemure.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

All the discussions we had today show that there is an underlying lack of trust. There is cynicism towards the political class and towards certain activities, such as lobbying.

When people lose trust in a body, they end up developing distrust. That’s what we are hearing today, behind the various opinions, which are quite opposed to each other.

The next step is defiance. Defiance means rejecting the system. We definitely want to avoid a rejection of the system; that’s why we are looking to restore trust.

Trust is often underestimated in society. We often think it’s a given and that that’s how it should be. We tend to normalize trust by codifying it.

It’s not rules that make people good. The Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct will be an instrument for building trust, but it can’t be the only one. People have to see that there is a will. Earlier, Mr. Dalton talked about leaders and the Prime Minister. Yes, the fish rots from the head, as Confucius said. I think that we all, together, have to have this willingness to restore trust, to go for what is right beyond the code. It’s fine to have a code, but Mr. Thurlow told us about many ways to get around it. Sometimes, it’s possible to follow the rules and still be wrong.

I think we should all be working to rebuild trust. We would all benefit from doing so.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you for your statement, Mr. Villemure.

Mr. Green, you have two and a half minutes to conclude this discussion.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Okay, I'm going to take another shot at this.

Mr. Conacher, you spoke, and I think you raised an important point around proactive disclosure on reporting mechanisms for investigations. I want to give you a brief moment to reflect on that and ways in which you would see an enhanced version of proactive reporting as it relates to investigations or outcomes. I'd just like any of your thoughts on that.

[Duff Conacher]

Sure.

Parliament's in violation of the Lobbying Act by failing to refer to this committee or another committee the review of the Lobbying Act for the last 10 years. It's supposed to be done twice. It should be reviewed, and one of the things that should be put in is that the Commissioner of Lobbying is required to issue a public summary of every single review or investigation of any situation or complaint that comes before her. If she finds the person not guilty, the person wouldn't have to be identified, but at least we would know whether she's doing the job at all, and it would summarize when the situation arose, when the complaint was received, when the investigation started, when it concluded, what the conclusion was and what the commissioner did.

Then we would know, like we did with Karen Shepherd, the former commissioner. She found more than 100 lobbyists guilty of violating the Lobbyists' Code, and she let them all off in secret without identifying any of them and issuing a report to Parliament, so we still don't know who they are, those 100 lobbyists who are likely out there still lobbying unethically.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I have limited time, sir.

In your mind, what would be appropriate penalties or compliance measures after the fact, should somebody be found guilty?

[Duff Conacher]

Of violating the Lobbyists' Code?

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Correct.

[Duff Conacher]

Administrative monetary penalties should be put in place, like the Commissioner of Canada Elections has. The Commissioner of Lobbying has called for them. It should be on a sliding scale, and I believe in the concept of ability to pay, so it should be higher if you have a higher income. More and more scholars are advocating for that in the U.S. It's been implemented in some places. The penalty should mean the same to the person, and that means that if you have a higher income, it should be a higher penalty for you because you can afford to pay more.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

In the case of a corporation, then, it would also slide up to be appropriate for the scale of the corporation.

[Duff Conacher]

Yes, if you want to discourage violations, then the penalty has to mean something.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I agree.

You recommended that compliance measures should be added at the end of the proposed rule 2.2 to require disclosure of confidential information in the form of a record to the appropriate authorities.

Do you have any recommendations for compliance measures with regard to confidential information that has been received in forms other than government records?

[Duff Conacher]

There should be disclosure that the public official has disclosed it to someone outside of the government. Really, they're the ones who are supposed to be upholding the public trust and respecting the confidentiality of information, so they should pay the highest penalty.

If someone then uses it for their lobbying, the penalty should be very high, as well, because that's just a “who you know” system, people doing favours for you inside secretly. The penalty should be very high because it's so easy to hide it. If you are actually caught—there would be a huge likelihood that you wouldn't ever be caught—you should really pay a very high penalty for that.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Conacher.

That concludes our round of questioning.

There are two things I want to mention, but first, I want to ask a question.

The committee has made a commitment to the Commissioner of Lobbying to get some information back to her based on the testimony that's been provided.

I'm going to ask all three witnesses very quickly. Is there anything you provided today that would be new information to the Commissioner of Lobbying? Notwithstanding the fact that maybe she didn't agree with, or didn't put into the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct what you propose, is there any new information you provided to this committee today that you have not already provided to the Commissioner of Lobbying?

The CLC is first.

[Siobhán Vipond]

No. We came today with what we have provided.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Mr. Thurlow.

[W. Scott Thurlow]

There is, possibly in the exchanges with the questioners, but not from my de novo testimony.