Absolutely.
I think, particularly in relation to this conversation, we recorded various acts of political influence and elite capture. These activities are aimed at powerful people in this country, particularly at the lower levels of governance, such as school boards, municipalities and regional governance. The goal is not necessarily to advance certain candidates but to achieve a more favourable environment for Beijing. That includes the private sector in China.
Another is the information and this narrative-discursion strategy. I think Cheuk earlier spoke about the astroturfing that exists in community spaces. That type of astroturfing happens in the media and in public discourse. United Front agents aim to present themselves as the sole voice and the sole authority on Chinese communities. They try to dominate the conversation and turn it into a more favourable narrative for Beijing.
Another very key section that this committee should definitely review is the United Front Work Department. It is not just a state agency but actually a party agency of the Chinese Communist Party. It aims to influence and expand the loyalty towards Beijing. It is occurring at all levels of government. It is happening globally, as well. We can learn from our partners on the global stage where and when we can counter United Front activities.
The other ones I think are pretty obvious: the harassment and intimidation facing diaspora communities. This continues to be a very huge challenge and concern for us. We'll see whether there will be safety for diaspora communities after they speak out. It's quite concerning.
The last one I would like to go over quickly is academic influence and vulnerability on intellectual property transfer. Due to the vulnerable funding environment in Canada, a lot of the time the CCP utilizes its capital and resources so that it is able to fund specific research in Canadian institutions. In the end, it'll be able to trade the intellectual property for a very low cost.