Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to come back to what was said by my colleague Mr. Stanton. I want to thank Mr. Ho, Mr. Chiu and Mr. Manthorpe for telling us about their experience with foreign interference. I believe it is absolutely essential to listen to what the Chinese community and the other communities targeted by this interference have to say and to hold an effective discussion so we can address and restrict the harmful activities of foreign governments.
During more than 30 years in the public sector I was able to observe how governments work from numerous angles. As director general of international affairs and border policy at Public Safety Canada, I negotiated security agreements with the United States. I was director general of security and intelligence at what is now Global Affairs Canada. I was an ambassador to a NATO ally and director general of intelligence operations at the Canadian Communications Security Establishment. I am therefore intimately familiar with the functioning of the Canadian security and intelligence community.
I have been a consumer of intelligence and have managed intelligence production. I have done so with a focus on equity, diversity and inclusion. The complexity of foreign interference requires us to understand the links between a wide range of interconnected issues. Foreign interference by hostile state actors such as the People's Republic of China is a profound challenge, as we have heard. The security and intelligence community has been responding and speaking about this threat for years. Nevertheless, as my colleagues have so clearly pointed out, much more can be done to address this threat.
I'm glad we're having this national conversation on foreign interference, and we need to listen, as I said, to the lived experiences of affected communities and individuals. What is regrettable is how we got here and how this conversation is unfolding. The illicit disclosure of intelligence, the awkward response by some in government, and hyperbolic accusations against government and its institutions have resulted in a toxic environment that has impeded our ability to address the threat. The tone and content of the conversation has further shaken Canadians' confidence in our democratic institutions. The debate has been reduced to sound bites and tweets. It has become a vehicle for partisanship rather than a forum where we can work together to confront foreign interference, build resilience in our institutions, and restore the shaken confidence in our democracy.
Disclosures may have focused national attention on foreign interference, but they have also caused damage to our efforts to confront the threat and are incompatible with defending democracy. When, as public servants, we gain access to classified information, we swear an oath of secrecy. It is an oath to follow the law and a range of compliance measures. To violate that oath with little understanding of the predictable consequences of disclosures is profoundly irresponsible and likely illegal.
While I completely understand the frustration about the pace of addressing foreign interference, the disclosure of classified intelligence is illegal for a reason. It compromises techniques. It compromises sources and makes them less likely to co-operate with security intelligence officials.
When government officials leak intelligence, it undermines the human rights of the individuals named. As this is the committee responsible for access to information, privacy and ethics, I think that would be of particular concern to the members of this committee, Mr. Chair. That information is released without due process, without a presumption of innocence, and with no ability for them to effectively defend themselves.
All of this impedes both specific investigations themselves as well as the ability to nurture sources in the long run. It is also fundamentally anti-democratic. You cannot say that you are defending democracy while breaking the laws passed by Parliament.
As the former assistant deputy minister for people, equity, diversity and inclusion at CSE, I know operational security is essential to persons with origins in hostile states. For them, it is a matter of personal and family safety. Disclosures affect them directly and profoundly.
Because of these questions, I have supported the calls for a public inquiry. We need an impartial inquiry to examine what has happened and to make sure we have the necessary tools to preserve the resilience of our democratic institutions.
During that inquiry, we would have the opportunity to examine classified information. The inquiry would have to be coordinated with the reviews being done by other bodies, such as the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. It should also make recommendations that take into account the entire threat, not just what happened in 2019 and 2021.
The threats to our democracy are complex. Foreign interference is evolving. An inquiry will provide Parliament with options to mitigate the threats and ensure that Canadians have confidence that their representatives reflect our popular will. The only ones benefiting from what is happening now are the enemies of democracy.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.