Thank you very much.
I am very happy to see you again.
The strategy is the same for Russia and China in this aspect. The first problematic element for the integrity of the state is the capture of the elites, and therefore the networks. One of the strategies of these two countries is to turn themselves, for example, into providers of golden pensions for our senior leaders and officials. This compromises the integrity of the decision-making process. When you are at the top of a state and you have to make a decision, if you have the retirement prospect of being paid by Huawei, you will not make decisions that are hostile to Huawei or to Chinese interests as a whole.
We have really pushed for legislation against the phenomenon of revolving doors or collusion, in other words, with authoritarian regimes hostile to our principles and interests. This assumes one very simple thing: a Canadian company is not the equivalent of a company in the Chinese communist system. Yet, on paper, they are both private companies. The only problem is that when a Chinese private enterprise reaches a certain size, it is no longer private, in reality. It is dependent on the Communist Party, it has to be subject to the National Intelligence Law and it has to have a representative of the Communist Party on its board of directors. So in fact, they are no longer private actors; they are actors in a hostile state system.
The second element that concerns the integrity of the state is the question of institutional ties. We have realized the extent to which institutional co‑operations, including decentralized ones, enable espionage. There are many other situations of the same type. That said, the problem is even more acute for the Australians, for example, than for the Europeans.