Information & Ethics Committee on April 21st, 2023

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Good morning, everyone.

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting No. 65 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members can therefore attend in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application. Should any technical challenges arise, please advise me immediately. Please note that we may need to suspend a few minutes as we need to ensure all members are able to participate fully.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, the committee resumed its study of foreign interference and threats to the integrity of democratic institutions, intellectual property and the Canadian state.

Madam Clerk, all the required connection tests have been completed.

I would now like to welcome our witness today, Mr. Raphaël Glucksmann.

He is the chair of the special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament.

Mr. Glucksmann, welcome to the committee.

The floor is yours for five minutes.

[Raphaël Glucksmann, Chair, Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament, European Parliament]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, all honourable members, for the invitation.

Thank you so much for your invitation.

The special committee I chair began its work in 2020, and since then, we have methodically analyzed foreign interference in all European democratic processes.

After hundreds of hours of hearings, interactions with European security services, whistleblowers, investigative journalists, experts and diplomats, but also after dissecting various confidential or public memos, various reports published by the different institutions in the countries of the European Union, and after conducting missions on the ground, our verdict against European leaders is quite dire.

For too many years, our leaders and governments have given free rein to the efforts of hostile countries within our own nations. These efforts can be categorized under two types of interference objectives.

On the one hand, there are countries, governments, regimes that interfere in our democratic life to promote their interests, to obtain agreements that are favourable to them, or to prevent emerging criticism against their attitude and behaviour.

On the other hand, some regimes may also attempt to discredit geopolitical opponents. In this category, we place Qatar, for example, which has used corruption within the European Parliament itself to promote its interests, obtain favourable agreements, or discredit the United Arab Emirates. That is classic interference.

There are also two other players whose goals are different. Their goal is not so much to advance their interests, but rather to destabilize and weaken our democracies as such. Their specific goal is to hinder our democratic functioning. Those players are Russia and China.

We have thoroughly analyzed Russian and Chinese actions in Europe. I will begin with Russia, knowing that I must be brief.

Russia's goal is to sow chaos in our democracies. It's a true hybrid war that was unleashed against the European Union. For a very long time, there was no reaction to this war. When I say “hybrid war”, I mean cyber-attacks on our hospitals in the middle of a pandemic. Not far from my office is the Centre hospitalier Sud Francilien, in Corbeil-Essonnes, in the Paris region. It was attacked by Russian hackers and was unable to function for weeks.

This is about cyber-attacks against our institutions, but also the penetration of social networks, with Mr. Prigojine's armies of trolls and bots that, in all the European Union's languages, aim to promote the most extreme points of view and polarize our societies.

We have analyzed how, for example, in Spain, Russian actors favour both the Catalan independentists and the ultranationalists of the extreme right-wing party Vox, that is, completely opposite poles of the political debate, with the aim of polarizing debate and making it chaotic.

Interference also takes the form of corruption and the capturing of elites. We analyzed how the German energy system was reoriented to Russian interests by Schröder, the social democratic chancellor, and by people who worked with him, all of whom ended up working for Gazprom.

It is also the financing of extremist political movements.

Finally, it is also the use of non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, or ultra-reactionary think tanks, which question the existence of European institutions.

All this creates an ecosystem whose goal is the destabilization of democracies.

Other than Russia, the actor that has most occupied our work is China.

For a long time, China belonged to the first category, that is, its goal was to promote Chinese interests. In recent years, it has been inspired by the Russian authorities' modus operandi and the methods employed by the Russians.

We have seen that, since the pandemic, China's goal has also become destabilization. Chinese methods are quite similar to those of the Russians. The main difference is the importance attached to economic actors as opposed to political actors. We also realized that, for example, in the European Parliament and in the European institutions, the Chinese authorities had no need to hire lobbyists since the major European companies, which need the Chinese market for their sales and whose manufacturing needs the Chinese production apparatus—so they are completely linked to China—were doing the lobbying and penetration instead of the Chinese authorities on their behalf.

So we have—

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Mr. Glucksmann, thank you for your opening statement.

Committee members have many questions for you.

Each member has six minutes for questions and answers.

Mr. Gourde, from the Conservative Party, will begin the first round of questions.

Mr. Gourde, you have six minutes.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witness for being with us.

Your presentation was really very interesting.

I have many questions about how the European Community is dealing with its dire need for energy. You talked about Russia and China's efforts to destabilize governments. You know that a government reacts slowly. The other countries are not democracies, but dictatorships that may have more or less hidden agendas, as you said. So they react more quickly.

Is there a way to be more effective? How should our democracies respond to these giants who want to destabilize Europe, and even the Americas?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Thank you very much for your question.

What should our reactions be? They should already be much faster and much harsher. What has allowed these repeated assaults is, first of all, the absence of sanctions, the absence of consequences. In fact, as soon as there is an attack on a strategic infrastructure, as soon as there is evidence of corruption, there must be a sanction. In the European Union, there have been no sanctions.

And then the big issue for us, in particular, as you mentioned, Mr. Gourde, is our dependence on energy. Until now, we were totally dependent on Russian energy, and we realize how dependent we are today on Chinese production, including in the most strategic sectors.

If you want to assert European sovereignty, you must work to reduce your dependencies. This is what the European Commission calls risk mitigation. In my view, this is our great task in the coming years. In fact, we had very specific recommendations in that regard.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Perhaps Canada could contribute to supplying some of Europe's needs, which would, presumably, reduce dependence on the countries you mentioned.

On the other hand, there is a lot of resistance in our country from organizations that don't necessarily want to see energy development in Canada.

Do you believe that these organizations may be infiltrated by countries such as Russia and China, who may be funding them to prevent the development of our resources and our exports to Europe?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

You will understand that I obviously have no information on Russian or Chinese infiltration in Canada. On the other hand, I do know that in Europe there was an attempt to infiltrate all the actors who were promoting favourable interests.

On the energy issue, I would invite you to look at the German phenomenon, since that has been the key element. This is not limited to Gerhard Schröder. There was a kind of in-depth examination of the German government of the time. There were almost immediate reconversions right up to the top bureaucrats. Then they went to work for Gazprom International.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Is Europe's openness to other sources of supply serious, and can countries like ours be considered in the long term?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

It is certain that we will never again be dependent on Russia for our energy. We have succeeded on a European scale in turning away from Russia, but it has taken too long and it has cost us dearly. Moreover, the course set by the European Commission is the diversification of suppliers and, above all, the Green Pact for Europe, which means that the development of renewable energies remains the major issue facing European countries. They don't all feel the same about the place of nuclear energy in this equation.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Will renewables be able to meet the entire energy demand or will you have to rely on imports anyway?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

For now, it is obvious that renewable energies cannot cover all countries. That is why there is the very important issue of nuclear power. On the other hand, it is also obvious that imports will allow us to meet this need and that they will be necessary. We will not become energy independent in the years to come. On the other hand, we must not repeat the same mistake, the same strategic failure as in previous years; we must no longer depend almost exclusively on an authoritarian regime.

Today, if we need even Azerbaijani gas, we must not make ourselves dependent on a regime that does not share the same principles and values as the European Union, that is certain.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

We understand that Europe wants to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels anyway, but the use of fossil fuels will continue for a few more years. How many years do you think Europe will need fossil fuels? Is it 10, 15, 20 or 30 years, or even longer?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Based on the needs, it would be more, but, what is certain is that these needs must be reduced. In fact, the reduction will be gradual and we will need less and less, but we still need it for now.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

You have 30 seconds left, Mr. Gourde.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Would an international commission on energy security to support the transition from fossil fuels to renewables be interesting? Countries need to talk to each other.

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

It would be very interesting to discuss this, given that the European Union's transpartisan priority, obviously, is ecological transformation and the transition to carbon neutral energy.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Glucksmann. For your information, I will name the party of each person who asks you a question. The next one is Mr. Fergus from the Liberal Party.

Mr. Fergus, go ahead, please.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Good morning, Mr. Glucksmann. Thank you very much for being here today. We are enormously grateful to you for sharing your insights and expertise in this area.

In your introduction, you said that some countries, such as China and, in particular, Russia, are trying to drive a wedge into democracies.

Several witnesses who appeared before the committee said that Russia and China have been conducting activities, especially on social media, for quite some time.

What are your observations on this, in hindsight and based on your investigations? When do you think Russia and China began their cyberpropaganda or cyberterrorism activities?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

I thank you for the question, Mr. Fergus.

In our view, the tipping point was 2007, when massive cyber-attacks were conducted against Estonia. Estonia was one of the first European countries to switch to all-digital for its government. In 2007, Russian hackers coordinated and attacked Estonian institutions, making the country almost ungovernable for a while. In our view, this date marked the beginning of hybrid warfare and massive virtual attacks.

Then, on social networks, there was a gradual evolution of Russian propaganda. In 2012 or 2013, with the creation of the Internet Research Agency, in St. Petersburg, it became massive and, above all, structured and thought out in a systematic way. These are the two dates that marked Russia's tipping point in the hybrid war against our democracies.

I insist on one thing: the analysis of these campaigns is fundamental to understanding the situation. When one is a European, Canadian or American democratic leader, it is difficult to understand that political leaders can have as their objective not to defend their interests to the maximum, but to sow chaos in other countries. One understands this by pragmatically studying different campaigns that have been conducted.

In France, for example, there were campaigns on the issue of police violence. Russian agents explained that the police were committing violence and railed against police violence, while the same troll farms in St. Petersburg encouraged the police to shoot into the crowd. The two poles are always fed simultaneously.

The contradiction in this kind of campaign is not a problem; it is the campaign itself.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Indeed, and we've seen this in the United States as well, where they've tried to polarize the issue of race.

So much for Russia. As for China, you say that they focus mostly on cyberterrorism, particularly on the economic side.

Can you tell us more about that? When did China begin its cybersecurity attacks against economic institutions?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

For us, China's action has gone through a progressive radicalization and the establishment of structures in China that we have been able to discover. It is really Xi Jinping who is developing this strategy and thinking. The shift, in terms of disinformation campaigns, manipulation of information and destabilization of social networks, occurred during the pandemic, a moment of radicalization whose goal was no longer so much to promote a narrative line, but to make ungovernable, especially on the health issue, the European countries in which we conducted the studies.

Targeting the economic side has been a strategy of the Chinese government from the beginning. Indeed, this government believes that globalization will eventually allow large European multinationals to become fundamentally Chinese companies, because their interests will be in China first, before they are in Germany.

When you take a company as large as Volkswagen and analyze their sales and production figures, you understand that, ultimately, Volkswagen has a much higher turnover in China than in Germany and that Volkswagen is dependent on the Chinese government. Moreover, even when there are scandals, such as the presence of Volkswagen factories in the Uyghur region, where the Chinese communist regime practises systematized slavery, the company is still present there. It would be in Volkswagen's economic interest to get out of this region. However, this car company is hostage to the Chinese government, because Volkswagen is hostage to the Chinese market and the Chinese production apparatus.

So the Chinese government can decide where Volkswagen will open or close a plant. It's no longer a choice made by a private actor, it's now a choice made by an economic hostage, if you will, a voluntary choice, obviously, because the goal is to make money. This is recurrent and this is what allows the penetration of the European debate.

There is also the issue of strategic infrastructure. This is really a strategy that involves Chinese investment first. In our opinion, the key date is 2008‑09, at the time of the debt crisis in the European Union and, in Greece, the sale of the port of Piraeus to Chinese investors.

Since then, we have seen how this is a strategy to gradually take control of strategic infrastructure.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you very much.

I will have many more questions later. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Fergus and Mr. Glucksmann.

Mr. Villemure, you have the floor for six minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Glucksmann, for being with us this morning.

In the report, you talked about different types of interference.

The purpose of our committee is to assess or observe China's interference in terms of state integrity. Your report included a section on political funding from foreign actors or donors.

I would appreciate it if you could shed some light on this.

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Thank you very much.

I am very happy to see you again.

The strategy is the same for Russia and China in this aspect. The first problematic element for the integrity of the state is the capture of the elites, and therefore the networks. One of the strategies of these two countries is to turn themselves, for example, into providers of golden pensions for our senior leaders and officials. This compromises the integrity of the decision-making process. When you are at the top of a state and you have to make a decision, if you have the retirement prospect of being paid by Huawei, you will not make decisions that are hostile to Huawei or to Chinese interests as a whole.

We have really pushed for legislation against the phenomenon of revolving doors or collusion, in other words, with authoritarian regimes hostile to our principles and interests. This assumes one very simple thing: a Canadian company is not the equivalent of a company in the Chinese communist system. Yet, on paper, they are both private companies. The only problem is that when a Chinese private enterprise reaches a certain size, it is no longer private, in reality. It is dependent on the Communist Party, it has to be subject to the National Intelligence Law and it has to have a representative of the Communist Party on its board of directors. So in fact, they are no longer private actors; they are actors in a hostile state system.

The second element that concerns the integrity of the state is the question of institutional ties. We have realized the extent to which institutional co‑operations, including decentralized ones, enable espionage. There are many other situations of the same type. That said, the problem is even more acute for the Australians, for example, than for the Europeans.