The one I want to go back to is CSIS uncovering a Chinese plan to donate to the Trudeau Foundation. This appeared in the Globe on February 28 of this year. It was based on an anonymous source, apparently not based on a document. This is intelligence.
Intelligence is different from evidence, and I'm going to tell you something some of you may have heard from David Morrison. When he appeared at the other committee, at the House committee, he said, “intelligence rarely paints a full, concrete or actionable picture”. It's not truth; it's often inaccurate or partial or incomplete. In fact, we don't know what happened to that intelligence. We don't know where it went. We don't know who was briefed on it. We don't know if anybody was briefed on it. We don't know if it was taken seriously or not. I wasn't briefed on it.
There is a question, and it's a policy question as to how far CSIS should go outside the government when they become aware of something that might affect another non-government Canadian organization. I understand that there are limits on them with respect to revealing sources or methods, but maybe they need to be a bit more proactive in speaking and letting people know—and this is not just CSIS but the whole security community. What is the public interaction and the transparency of the Canadian security community?
I didn't know about this. I don't think anybody knew about this until February 28, and to say that nobody believes me, frankly, I'm insulted by that.