Information & Ethics Committee on Sept. 15th, 2025

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I call the meeting to order.

Good morning, everyone. Welcome back.

This is meeting number two of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h), the committee will proceed today to a briefing session with the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, followed by a briefing session with the Information Commissioner.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room, and I don't believe we have anybody on Zoom.

Before we continue, I'm going to ask all the participants to consult the guidelines that are written on the cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of our participants, including the interpreters. You'll also notice a QR code on the card, which links to a short awareness video.

I'd also like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members.

Please wait until you're recognized by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference—if there is anybody—click on the microphone to activate it.

I will remind you that all comments need to be addressed through the chair.

For members in the room, please raise your hand if you wish to speak.

After saying that, I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the first hour today.

From the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, we have Mr. Konrad von Finckenstein, who is the commissioner.

Sir, it's good to see you. It's been a long time, but we're finally again in front of each other.

We also have with us Lyne Robinson-Dalpé, director, advisory and compliance, and Melanie Rushworth, who is here again and is the director of communications, outreach and planning.

Commissioner, welcome to the committee. You have five minutes for your opening remarks. Please go ahead.

[Konrad von Finckenstein, Commissioner, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner]

Mr. Chair, as you mentioned, I am joined by Lyne Robinson‑Dalpé and Melanie Rushworth.

I'm pleased to review the role and mandate of the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner.

We administer the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons and the Conflict of Interest Act for appointed federal officials. Given the committee's mandate, my remarks will focus on the act.

Individuals subject to the act are called “public office holders”. They fall into two categories.

Those appointed to full-time positions are called “reporting public office holders”. They must follow the act's general conflict of interest rules, plus its reporting and public disclosure provisions. This means they must give the commissioner's office detailed personal and financial information about themselves and, in some cases, their families. The office keeps most of that information secret. However, we are required by the act to disclose some specific information. We do that in a reductive form. It is posted on the registry that forms part of our website.

Those appointed to part-time positions are referred to simply as public office holders. They have to follow the act's general rules, but they do not have reporting requirements.

Confidentiality and transparency are both key to our work. Confidentiality encourages public officials to communicate freely and openly with us, and to ask us for advice when faced with a situation that may put them in a conflict of interest. Transparency means we are as open as possible with Parliament and Canadians. This helps ensure the credibility of the act and its administration.

Our work really supports three key objectives.

First of all, we foster public confidence that the actions of elected and appointed federal officials are free from conflicts of interest. Second, we enable the most competent and qualified people to move in and out of the public service without any problems by helping them manage their conflicts of interest. Third, we examine and report on allegations of conflict of interest that involve elected or appointed federal officials.

Our tools include one-on-one interface with public officials, live educational sessions, online training and investigations. A lot of the office's work is outlined in our latest annual reports that were tabled in Parliament in June. The report under the act identifies six legislative changes that could help it function more effectively and administer the act more efficiently.

First, we suggest you allow the lobbying commissioner to step in temporarily if there is no conflict of interest commissioner—i.e., if I get run over by a truck tomorrow, there will be somebody to do my job: the lobbying commissioner.

Second, add the notion of “apparent” conflict of interest to the general duties of public office holders to arrange their affairs in a way that avoids the appearance of conflict of interest.

Third, allow some assets to be designated as exempt assets if they pose no risk of conflict of interest. For instance, exchange-traded funds pose no conflict, but they are prohibited under the act right now.

Fourth, allow public office holders to participate in matters affecting the private interests of their friends and relatives if those interests are the same as those of other members of the broad class of which they are part. This would make the act consistent with the code.

Fifth, allow the commissioner to approve outside activities that don't conflict with a public office holder's official duties but are presently forbidden. An example is teaching at university in a subject they know something about.

Sixth, raise the maximum administrative monetary penalties to stress the importance of the reporting requirements of the act. Right now, they're extremely low and they look like traffic offences.

That's my presentation. I will be happy to answer any of your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Commissioner.

As I said at the outset, it's been a while, so we have lots to get caught up on. We're going to start our round of questioning with six minutes. I'm going to go to Mr. Barrett.

You have the floor, sir. Go ahead.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

Thank you.

Good morning, Mr. Commissioner.

It's a pleasure to have you back at committee. It's been a year. A lot has gone on since then.

I'll get right to it. Canadians can see which companies a designated public office holder held shares or options in before entering office, but not the value of those holdings. Does that level of disclosure give the public enough information to assess a potential conflict, or would value ranges better serve the public interest?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

The crafters of the act already decided it's important for the public to know what a person owns, and it leaves it up to the commissioner to make a decision as to what to do with those things. Most of the things they own that are of consequence are either disposed of or placed in a blind trust. It's only items that are below a minimum threshold that people can hold.

It seems to me that the legislature took this decision to say that we want to respect the privacy of people and we want to encourage people to come, and therefore they don't have to disclose everything they own and how much. They have to deal with it in such a way that there's no conflict of interest, and that's a choice the legislature took.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

Would you suggest that a review of the act by Parliament should consider that question? You said that this decision to leave it alone at its inception was taken by Parliament at its last review. There are no value ranges, and so they go into the blind trust, but if it's a high-performing stock, the trustee is not going to liquidate that. They're going to leave it in there, and the public office holder knows what they put in.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

First of all, it's in a blind trust. The public office holder has absolutely no idea what the trustee will do with it, and he cannot give him direction, so the trustees, most of them, will just hold it. They can trade. That's their privilege, obviously, and they will do that, but they also have to account later on to the person who placed the things in trust. The best course is to basically just be a passive holder, and that's what most of the trustees do, but they don't have to be restricted to that.

Second, the public office holder obviously knows what he placed in the trust, and if he makes decisions that could be germane to what's in the trust, in those cases, we establish what's called a screen. In effect, we make sure that a decision-maker does not make decisions regarding this very valuable asset that he has in the portfolio, which will be directly affected by his decision, and it is an asset that is specific; it's not covered by general legislation or covered by a class.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

Would mandatory divestment and independent reinvestment remove the perception and simplify compliance?

The issue with the blind trust is that.... Let's take, for example, a prime minister who would have the Clerk of the Privy Council, which is a political appointment, and their chief of staff, which is a political appointment, as the overseers of that blind trust, and there's no public indication of when that screen has been used. There wouldn't be a need for a screen if the funds were simply divested and then reinvested by an expert financial manager.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

You're right, but that's a pretty simplistic solution. Imagine.... You're suggesting that somebody who enters public service sell all their assets, incur a great tax liability, obviously, for that year, and only then leave it up to a trustee to do what the trustee thinks is best with the assets.

It's something that can be done. I certainly wouldn't recommend it, because I think it would very much discourage people from entering into public service. It would—

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

If I may, Commissioner—

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

—create a tax liability and also very much interfere in the personal—

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

If I may, sir, the objective here isn't to encourage folks to run for office or to avoid tax liability so much as it is to ensure that Canadians have confidence that the decisions taken by these public office holders are in the best interests of the public. There can be no appearance of a conflict, no perception that they're taking decisions that are going to enrich themselves. That's the root of my previous question.

These conflict screens can cover dozens or hundreds of companies. Does your office have any ability to independently verify that the screen is triggered when required, or is it simply up to the political appointees of the designated public office holder to inform you?

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I need a quick response.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

Let me correct you on your assumption.

The act specifically sets out five purposes. The last two are to “encourage experienced and competent persons to seek and accept public office” and to “facilitate interchange between the private and public sector”. The second is to “minimize the...conflicts...between the private interests and public duties...and provide for the resolution of those conflicts”.

Part of my job is exactly that: making sure that the best people can get into the public service, and out of it, with the least amount of conflict of interest.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Barrett.

Ms. Lapointe, I'm also going to give you a little more time, since the answer was a little too long.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

It's a great pleasure to see you again after the summer. I hope that everyone had a good, restful summer, and that you're ready to get to work.

Thank you very much, Commissioner, for being with us this morning and for taking the time to come and explain to us what you have studied and what we should perhaps amend.

In your annual report, you recommended amendments to the Conflict of Interest Act and the Parliament of Canada Act. What process led you to suggest these legislative changes in particular?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

It was my experience in this position over the last year and a half that led me to propose these amendments.

For example, I recommend that the employment rules for people who are appointed to a position or who are elected are changed. There's an example I always see: Someone who works in government and who has a lot of knowledge in certain fields wants to share it with students at a university, such as the Université de Montréal or the University of Ottawa. The university thinks that's fabulous, but it tells them that they have to become their employee in order to do so, even if they won't receive a salary. In fact, the agreement it reached with the union requires that all people teaching at the university be employees. However, that person can't become an employee of the Université de Montréal, because that would technically be a violation of the act even if there's no conflict of interest.

So why not give me the discretion to authorize such a person to share their knowledge and experience with university students?

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

I want to make sure I understand what you're telling me, Commissioner.

As elected officials, if a university invites us to give a speech to its students or to teach a course, and we want to share our knowledge with them, we're not allowed to do so.

Is that correct?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

I'm referring primarily to senior public office holders, such as deputy ministers or people who are part of a minister's team. These people are subject to the Conflict of Interest Act and can't accept an offer of employment from outside the government, which means that they can't share their knowledge with students at a university that would like to have them, even if there is no conflict there. That's not permitted at this time.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Okay.

So you would like to see that changed.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

Yes.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Would you like us to review the act?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

No, I would like to be given the discretion to determine whether or not there is a conflict. If the person concerned is willing to teach at a university without pay, solely to perform a public service, why not? Obviously, if there is a perceived or actual conflict of interest, this doesn't work.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

What process led you to suggest that to us? What did you look at?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

I suggested it, but it's not up to me to change the act; it's up to you and the committee to do so. I felt it necessary to point out in my annual report that this issue comes up often and that I'm a bit frustrated that I can't do anything about it.