Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to speak to the subamendment put forward by Mr. Barrett. I want to take a step back to provide some context on what is before this committee.
The subamendment put forward by Mr. Barrett would mandate that the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office disclose to the committee every time a decision is made with respect to the Prime Minister's ethics screen. It's important to note that the ethics screen was set up at the insistence of the Ethics Commissioner in the face of the Prime Minister's extensive conflicts related primarily but not exclusively to Brookfield.
The Prime Minister's chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council came before this committee last fall and provided the assurance that the screen was being robustly used and that an assessment tool had been created within the PCO and the PMO to guide the Prime Minister's chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council, both of whom are charged with the responsibility of administering the screen, to do so effectively.
The assessment tool, which they tabled a copy of with this committee, contains a step-by-step analysis. It sets out the matters that must be included in the screen, and the matters that must be included relate to “Any direct engagement by Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation, or Stripe Inc and the companies listed in Annex A of the Prime Minister’s Conflict of Interest Screen.” In other words, it's the companies the Prime Minister has declared a conflict in relation to.
We know the Prime Minister has other conflicts that are not in the screen that he didn't disclose, but that's a separate issue. There are 103 companies, or 103 conflicts listed in annex A. The matters that must be included in the screen relate to any direct engagement with respect to those companies listed.
The tool the PCO and PMO designed then goes on to set out the matters requiring assessment. The tool notes that certain sectors warrant specific attention, including real estate, mortgage insurance, the airline industry, the expansion of the nuclear industry and the expansion of and investment in the renewable energy sector, including solar, wind and hydro, as well as the credit card industry.
Upon identification, is one of the listed companies captured by a matter that the Prime Minister could be engaged in? Does it relate particularly to any of these areas, given the Prime Minister's declared interest, where he has interests in relation to real estate, mortgage insurance, the airline industry, the nuclear industry, the renewable energy sector and the credit card industry, which are the sectors that have been specifically identified as red flags?
There is then an analysis undertaken if it is triggered. This is the threshold question:
1. What is the Prime Minister’s involvement/What decision is being sought from the Prime Minister/What matter is he being asked to discuss or engage on?
That's the threshold question. That's what must be answered.
The tool then provides matters that must be included in the screen:
2. Does the decision or discussion involve direct engagement between Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation, Stripe Inc. or any of the Companies listed in Annex A and the Government of Canada (e.g. contracting for goods and services, applications for funding, meetings)?
Then there are the matters requiring assessment:
3. Are the interests of one of the Companies involved in the decision or discussion, and if so, in what way?...
4. Is the decision or discussion in relation to a matter of general application?...
5. Does the decision or discussion involve the interests of at least one of the Companies as a member of a broad class of persons or entities?...
6. If the decision or discussion applies to a broad class, is the interest/benefit of at least one of the Companies disproportionate to those of the other members?...
7. If the decision or discussion is (1) not of general application and does not apply to a broad class or (2) there is a disproportionate interest/benefit despite being applicable to a broad class, is there a direct link between the Prime Minister’s involvement and the opportunity to further one of the Company’s interests?
Then the tool provides examples to assist with the assessment. Examples include questions of a general application:
If the decision or discussion applies to an undetermined group of people or companies, then the matter is of general application.
If the decision or discussion applies to a regulated activity and to an [indefinite] group, then the matter is not of general application.
If the decision or discussion applies to a particular entity, person or group of entities or persons, or to a particular situation then the matter is not of general application.
Further examples to assist with the assessment include questions related to a broad class:
If the decision or discussion applies to a larger number of entities or people, who may have different characteristics, but share at least one important characteristic, such as teachers, homeowners, lawyers, financial services companies, etc., then the matter applies to a broad class.
If the decision or discussion applies to a small group, then the matter does not apply to a broad class.
If the decision or discussion applies to a larger group, but one of the Companies has a disproportionate interest/benefit...then the matter does not apply to a broad class. A disproportionate interest/benefit refers to an imbalance in proportion to others.
This is the tool that is being used. These are the questions that are supposedly being analyzed to determine whether a matter can appropriately be put before the Prime Minister or should not be put in front of the Prime Minister and be kept at arm's length from the Prime Minister.
For the purpose, we were told, of transparency and accountability, this analysis is documented. It's documented in a two-page template that is filled in. Upon that two-page analysis, the Prime Minister's chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council make a decision as to whether the screen applies or does not apply. If they can't make a decision, they then, pursuant to the tool, seek more information. Those are three options. They can make a decision that it applies or that it doesn't apply, or they need further information.
In the event they request further information, presumably that information is provided. Then a yes or no decision is made. The subamendment by Mr. Barrett simply provides that this committee be able to see these two-page analyses that are conducted every time there is a red flag—the red flag being the Prime Minister maybe having a conflict of interest in relation to a matter. It's not that he does. It's that he might.
What the Liberals seem prepared to do is say that they'll provide us with the times when the screen is invoked and when a determination is made that the Prime Minister has a conflict on a matter that isn't of a general application. Of course, that kicks in when a decision disproportionately impacts Brookfield's interests, relative to other companies, as part of a broad class or otherwise. However, they won't provide us with the times when this form is filled out and when the Prime Minister's chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council say they don't believe he has a conflict, so he can engage on the matter, even if the matter involves Brookfield or one of the companies listed in annex A, which relates to companies with which he has a declared conflict.
The rationale is really unclear. Why do the Liberals seem so strongly to want to resist this common-sense subamendment by Mr. Barrett? It would go a long way toward providing the transparency Canadians deserve, so they can know the Prime Minister is not making decisions where he has a conflict of interest. It's so they can have the assurance that the ethics screen—which is supposedly a safeguard to prevent the Prime Minister from engaging in matters in which he has a conflict of interest—is being invoked appropriately. Frankly, if the Prime Minister wants to stand behind the ethics screen, and if we're to accept that everything has been done in such a robust way....
I would have thought the Prime Minister's Office and the Liberals on this committee would be very eager to say, “Here it is. Here are the times when red flags were raised. Here is the analysis that was undertaken. In light of the analysis, here is the decision that was made by the chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council, one way or another.” Yes, it's good to know the times when the Prime Minister has.... I won't say “recused himself” because the ethics screen is designed so that it isn't—supposedly—put in front of the Prime Minister. That's so he won't have to recuse himself. He would supposedly have no idea a matter is before his government.
If it were used in the way that the Prime Minister's Office and the Clerk of the Privy Council say it's designed to be, and as the Ethics Commissioner asked that it be designed to do, it would completely shield the Prime Minister from those decisions. That's fine, but we need to know when that happens.
I would argue that it is relevant, if not more relevant, to know the times that a red flag was issued and the decision was made that the Prime Minister could weigh in, even though it relates to a matter in which he has some sort of declared conflict—in all likelihood related to Brookfield given the companies and entities that are listed in annex A, although not necessarily.
I spoke a few times to this at the last meeting, on Monday, and said several times to Liberal members that if there's something I'm missing here, something that would clearly explain why it's impossible or problematic to disclose the times that a decision is made by the chief of staff and the clerk that the Prime Minister doesn't have a conflict that rises to the threshold to invoke the ethics screen, provide what those reasons are. However, no reasons have been offered, or at least to the degree that some rationale has been put forward. There seems to be a completely inadequate explanation as to why this committee shouldn't be made aware of the times that a decision is made to not invoke the ethics screen in the face of a red flag relating to a conflict.
One of the explanations that was provided was that it was cumbersome. Precisely that word might not have been used, but that was effectively one of the arguments that was made. It's not clear to me how it could be cumbersome, because we know that back in the fall, when the clerk and chief of staff came before this committee as we undertook a review of the Conflict of Interest Act, we were told that the tool had been triggered 13 times, and decisions had to be made about whether to apply the screen or not apply the screen. On seven occasions, a decision was made not to invoke the screen, and six times the decision was made to invoke the screen. It could have been the reverse of that, but there were 13 occasions when there had been a red flag and a decision one way or another had been made.
That would have been, as of the fall, documents that amount to 26 pages, with 13 different summations—13 different occasions when the chief of staff and the clerk signed off on the tool to answer this question, ultimately: Do you concur that this issue engages or does not engage the application of the Prime Minister's conflict of interest screen? What is cumbersome about that? What is difficult about that?
We know from the update that has been provided to this committee that, not surprisingly, other conflicts have been flagged given that other decisions have come forward, and that there were 14 occasions when the screen had been applied—that a decision was made that, yes, in fact, it does engage the Prime Minister's application of the conflict of interest screen and therefore he should be shielded from having any knowledge or any involvement in respect of the matter.
In the fall, a total of 13 matters came before the clerk and the chief of staff, and there were 14 times when it was applied after several months had passed. We couldn't be talking about hundreds of other occasions when there was a red flag. We're probably talking about 14, 15 or maybe 10 to 20 times that a decision was made that the screen did not apply.
The notion that it is somehow burdensome is just not genuine. It's not a reasonable explanation for saying that we as a committee, an oversight committee, the ethics committee, shouldn't be privy to knowing the occasions when a decision is made that the screen should not be involved.
Another argument that was put forward was in essence—again, I'm paraphrasing—that that's not how it works. I'm sorry, but is that not how it works? A Liberal member said that we have the Ethics Commissioner and the Conflict of Interest Act, and that if matters arise in which it's thought that the screen should have been invoked because the Prime Minister was in a conflict, there is a process in place through the Ethics Commissioner to deal with breaches of the Conflict of Interest Act. Yes, it's true that we have an Ethics Commissioner, but it goes without saying that it becomes more difficult for members of Parliament—opposition members and Liberal members, assuming that they are also interested in oversight—to work to provide appropriate oversight when there isn't full and complete transparency.
How can one scrutinize whether the Prime Minister was in a conflict or not in a conflict when it's entirely possible, absent disclosure, that members of this committee and Canadians are left in the dark about decisions that he may, in fact, be involved in making? To say there is a process—that there's an Ethics Commissioner and that if there is a possibility the act was violated, we can write to the Ethics Commissioner and the Ethics Commissioner can undertake an investigation—isn't an adequate explanation for that either.
If we were to accept the submissions of the clerk and the Prime Minister's chief of staff, the whole purpose of the ethics screen is to avoid exactly that type of scenario. I take it that's exactly what the screen is supposed to do to prevent breaches of the act. If we don't know when red flags have been raised and decisions are made that the Prime Minister can proceed, then there's a major transparency gap, one that the subamendment put forward by Mr. Barrett seeks to close.
I would cite the Ethics Commissioner in his 2023-24 annual report, in which he states on page 22 that transparency is “a pillar of the Conflict of Interest Act and, indeed, of all effective conflict of interest regimes.” Precisely in order for there to be confidence that the ethics screen is being applied appropriately, there has to be transparency.
What the Liberals are saying is that they'll give us transparency selectively, but they won't give us transparency in those cases where there are certainly questions about the Prime Minister's conflict of interest and a decision is made that he has the green light to proceed. In those cases, they're going to keep this ethics committee, members of Parliament and Canadians in the dark. All that will be left for us to do is our digging, and if we stumble across something or find something, well, there's a process. Until then, unless that happens, it's effectively “too bad, so sad”.
They may characterize it in other ways, but that is what they are doing. That's the consequence of not adopting the subamendment brought forward by Mr. Barrett, which is the position of Liberal members of Parliament on this committee. It begs the question I keep asking: Why? I continue to invite Liberal members opposite to help me better understand the rationale, because it isn't too cumbersome. Saying that it's not the way things work and that there's the process of going through the Ethics Commissioner is, again, totally inadequate for the reasons I've outlined.
Without any further explanation beyond what are totally disingenuous, illegitimate, inadequate and not persuasive explanations, the inference I am left drawing is that, first of all, we have a Prime Minister's Office that really isn't interested in transparency. They created the facade of transparency, but on matters that are clearly material to whomever the Prime Minister is involved with or engaged in—matters in which he has a conflict of interest—the posture, the position, of the PMO is to effectively tell this committee and Canadians to pound sand. They won't say that or use those terms, but that is one thing we are learning from this debate and from the resistance we're seeing from Liberal MPs, no doubt based on the input from the Prime Minister's Office.
The other thing, putting aside the general contempt, really, for transparency that we're seeing, is that this raises questions about how robustly the ethics screen is being applied. How many times has the ethics screen not been applied when it should have been applied? Maybe it's never. Maybe it has always been applied when it should have been, but perhaps not. If the Prime Minister's Office is so confident that everything is above board and has been applied robustly, then show us the analysis. Show us the times that the Prime Minister's chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council signed off and said, “No, the Prime Minister can proceed; there isn't a sufficient conflict of interest here.”
I don't have a lot of confidence in the ethics screen and the way in which it is being administered. As a starting point, we have an ethics screen to avoid conflicts of interest on the part of the Prime Minister being administered by persons who have a conflict of interest, insofar as the clerk and the chief of staff both serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. They're not independent. Regardless of the extent to which they're acting fully in good faith and trying to apply the ethics screen, they're not independent. They're in a conflict. That's a problem, but it's a problem that seems to be accepted by the Ethics Commissioner. I'll concede that.
It underscores all the more why there needs to be some level of transparency. We have no mechanism to know when and how often the screen is being invoked or not invoked on matters in which there have been red flags. In fact, before this committee undertook the study in the fall on reviewing the Conflict of Interest Act, we were left completely in the dark. We had no idea how it was being used. We got some answers as to how many times—13—the tool had been used and an analysis had been prepared. We got a copy of the tool, but we have no other information.
Of course, matters that likely warrant scrutiny, or could warrant scrutiny, from this committee are not in cases where the screen has been invoked, because it's been invoked, so the Prime Minister has no involvement in the matter. It's on matters where he is involved. Some of those areas could be grey areas. Some of them could be areas where he has a blatant conflict of interest but for whatever reason, the Clerk of the Privy Council and the chief of staff signed off and said, “Go ahead, Prime Minister.”
Then there could be unlikely or other instances where the answer, as any reasonable objective person would say, was, “Well, no, they got it right; it shouldn't be invoked.” All Mr. Barrett's subamendment is saying is, “Show us those times and be transparent.” If you're so confident in the ethics screen and if this is the answer or solution to guarding against a Prime Minister making decisions in which he has a conflict of interest—a Prime Minister who doesn't have an ordinary number of conflicts of interest by the standard of former prime ministers but the most conflicts of interest because of the roles he played prior to being elected to this place and serving as Prime Minister....
We have, as a backdrop to all of this, of course, documented cases where the Prime Minister has met with Brookfield, notwithstanding that those executives were executives of companies listed in annex A. I will rephrase that. Based on everything we have seen over the past year, there have been multiple instances where the Prime Minister has not abided by the advice of the Ethics Commissioner to stay away from Brookfield. In fact, he's done the opposite in several instances, which, again, raises the question of how many times this screen has not been invoked on matters relating to Brookfield and other conflicts that the Prime Minister has declared and does have.
It's quite disappointing that Liberals are being directed by the Prime Minister's Office to not support Mr. Barrett's subamendment. It raises questions about exactly what the Prime Minister's Office is hiding. By hiding, I mean they are hiding. They're hiding these reports from this committee and from Canadians. Why?
Just before I got to this committee, I was in question period, and I put forward some questions to the government on a matter involving the 200 million tax dollars that have gone to a company called Maritime Launch Services for a so-called spaceport in Nova Scotia. I asked some very straightforward questions today about how the Liberals entered into a lease with a nearly bankrupt company—a company whose independent auditor's report specifically flagged or questioned whether the company was a going concern.
The Liberals nonetheless proceeded to enter into a lease for a so-called spaceport with a nearly bankrupt company. They entered into the lease in March of this year but backdated the lease to April 1, 2025. They backdated it by a full year without any work having been undertaken by Maritime Launch Services. There was no proof of value for tax dollars, even though Maritime Launch Services got $20 million because the lease had been backdated. I said there was no work, and all you have to do to see that is look at the site, which consists of a poorly designed concrete slab and a gravel parking lot.
The Liberals handed Maritime Launch Services 20 million tax dollars by backdating the lease. Then we found out that the chair of the board, immediately upon the lease being entered into, a lease in which $20 million was funnelled to Maritime Launch Services, decided to sell three million shares that were previously worthless or nearly worthless and raked in $1.8 million.
Normally, in the private sector, there would be a lock-up agreement in place to prevent exactly that sort of thing from happening. Why the Liberals didn't insist upon a lock-up agreement is beyond me, other than that the whole thing is one big pump and dump scheme in which an insider got pretty rich. Getting $1.8 million is a pretty good deal if you can get it with worthless shares—if suddenly you get $20 million for work that was never done to bail out your nearly bankrupt company. “Here are my shares. I'm selling them, and I'll rake in a cool $1.8 million.”
For the official opposition, those are the types of questions that Canadians want answers to to hold the government to account. It is necessary to get answers to questions like this: Why did $200 million go to a company that doesn't own land and is making a 1,300% profit off Crown land that it then flipped back to the federal government for a concrete slab and gravel pit in respect of a lease that was backdated by a year for no work and no value, a company through which the chair of the board walked off with $1.8 million after selling shares immediately after his nearly bankrupt company got a $20-million cash infusion from Mark Carney's Liberals?
What I saw in the House was the Minister of Natural Resources laughing about the matter. He thought it was funny. The member from Cape Breton, Parliamentary Secretary Mike Kelloway, in answer to a follow-up question from Greg McLean, called it a conspiracy theory.
I cite what happened in the House a little over an hour ago as one illustration of how the Liberals operate, of the complete and utter contempt they have for accountability and of the extent to which they go to gaslight, to dismiss and to laugh off what on the surface appears to be cronyism and corruption of the worst kind in the case of this so-called space pad.
Bringing it back to the subamendment put forward by Mr. Barrett, we saw a lot of the same gaslighting at the last meeting of this committee, as well as a lot of the same approach, which is to effectively thumb their nose at transparency and accountability.
I know that the Prime Minister and those who repeat the talking points provided by the Prime Minister's Office, whether they be parliamentary secretaries or backbench Liberal MPs, often call this Canada's new government, but it's the same old Liberal government, the same old Liberal approach. It's the same old Liberal government that has a long history of cronyism, conflict and corruption.
I sat on this committee in the last Parliament. The litany of scandals surrounding the same old Liberal government is too much to keep track of. It was endless.
There's a reason Justin Trudeau left office. He announced his resignation in January 2025. He had an approval rating in the range of 15% to 16%, the lowest approval rating of any prime minister in 35 years.