I'm impressed by the public service that every one of you has done. I see that one of you has experience with the Canadian military. My dad was a soldier in World War I. He served at Vimy Ridge. When he returned, he earned a dental degree at the University of Toronto, and during summers, he worked on a ship in the Thousand Islands, which I think two of you represent in different constituencies.
One of you represents a riding in Saskatchewan, where my dad was born. Although I grew up in Alberta and I got my undergrad degree from the University of Alberta, I attended Bishop's University in Sherbrooke, Quebec, on exchange for a year; I learned to love Quebec. One of you has a degree from the University of Toronto, which is where I earned my Ph.D. studying our justice system.
The motion that set up today's meeting asks whether changes are needed to the Conflict of Interest Act regarding the disclosure of assets of public office holders and whether changes are needed regarding blind trusts or ethics screens. In his annual report for 2024-25, Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein made recommendations for changes, which I agree with and will discuss in more detail in a few minutes.
I'd like to begin by emphasizing that the principle of mutual respect is the fundamental principle underlying all ethics standards in successful democracies. Mutual respect also underlies our basic constitutional principles of the rule of law, legislative supremacy and fundamental justice.
The precise application of these principles based on mutual respect cannot be etched in stone but evolves over time. Sometimes the evolution is positive as we achieve higher levels of civilized behaviour; sometimes it's negative as we abandon the lessons of history because of ignorance, hubris or human frailty.
I'd like to let you know how I became engaged in the study of ethics in politics.
My interest in these subjects was kindled in 1968, when I was the campaign manager for Bob Thompson, who had jumped ship from the Social Credit Party to the Progressive Conservatives. My two qualifications for this job were that I had just finished the second year of a political science degree and my dad was Bob's dentist. I was 20—too young to vote in those days, but not too young to learn about the challenges of ethics in politics. I spent at least 10% of my time as campaign manager trying to stop unethical behaviour by either my campaign workers or those of other parties.
In 1972, I was the assistant to an Alberta cabinet minister. He was the chair of an all-party legislative committee investigating whether discriminatory legislation aimed at the Hutterian Brethren could be legally or ethically justified. The committee concluded that discrimination could not be justified, and a liaison committee was set up to promote mutual respect. It worked.
A few years later, my Ph.D. at the University of Toronto centred on how to improve the justice system by minimizing unnecessary delays. I've always considered unnecessary delay in courts an ethics issue.
I was hired at York University in 1985 to teach courses on the Charter of Rights, public administration and public service ethics.
The late 1980s was a time of numerous political scandals federally, provincially and municipally in Canada that I feared threatened our democracy. In our country, it was a period of polarization and venom not unlike what is currently going on in the U.S. I conducted a study of media stories about conflicts of interest in federal, provincial and municipal politics. I had to take breaks from my study because after reading hundreds of media stories about conflicts of interest, I often felt sick.
In 1987, the Ontario government appointed John Black Aird, the former lieutenant governor, to investigate and report. He recommended the creation of Canada's first independent ethics commissioner. Aird wrote that most people in public life think they behave ethically, but they don't always understand ethical standards in the same way. He wrote that an independent ethics commissioner is necessary to clarify the standards and to advise and support members of the legislative houses.
After further research, I found that after the appointment of Ontario's independent ethics commissioner in 1988, conflict of interest scandals in Ontario became stunningly less frequent. As well, MLAs eventually came to see the commissioner as a friend—someone who, through sound advice, would keep them from making mistakes.
I then began to publish articles and books on ethics and, especially, conflict of interest. Since that time, I've written or co-written four books.
I found that Ontario's model soon spread to all the other provinces, but Parliament was the last holdout. Part of the delay in creating ethics commissioners for the House of Commons and the Senate was caused by an attempt by the Chrétien government to create one commissioner for both chambers. Quite rightly, the Senate objected and held out for a separate commissioner.
Finally, the Conflict of Interest Act for public office holders, as well as the code of conduct for MPs, came into effect in 2006. The Conflict of Interest Act, the code of conduct for MPs and the Senate conflict of interest regime have substantially reduced the incidence of conflict of interest scandals at the federal level. However, the incidence of conflict of interest scandals for federal cabinet ministers and MPs has been above the provincial level on a proportionate basis.
Eight provinces require annual meetings between the ethics commissioner and individual members of provincial legislatures. According to my interviews with provincial ethics commissioners, these meetings are critical to prevent conflicts of interest. Required meetings occur in the Canadian Senate, and, according to the former Senate ethics officer, Jean Fournier, they are critical to the success of the Senate ethics regime.
However, conflict of interest scandals have continued to occur in the realm of Canadian cabinet ministers and MPs of all stripes. My analysis is that this is because compulsory annual meetings between individual cabinet ministers and MPs and someone in the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner are not required, but are optional. Currently, there are advisers appointed by the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner for every cabinet minister and MP. Is this enough to prevent conflicts of interest, or should there be mandatory meetings between the adviser and MPs, including cabinet ministers? I think this is an important question that you should look into.
At the September 15 meeting of this committee, the Commissioner stated that the changes to the act to require public office holders to sell assets rather than putting them into a blind trust would be counterproductive. I agree. His comment that this might result in large income tax bills, which would discourage good people from getting into politics, is a good point. Nevertheless, some public office holders will give their trustees the freedom to sell assets and reinvest. What is important is to ensure that an ethics screen is in place to prevent a public office holder from being directly involved in decision-making that might benefit assets that remain in the trust.
In the case of Prime Minister Carney, the ethics screen was set up by the Commissioner and is administered by the Prime Minister's chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council.
First, given Commissioner von Finckenstein's extensive background in business law, the justice system and the Federal Court, I can't think of anyone more qualified to set up an effective screen mechanism.
Second, in Canada there is a strong tradition that the Clerk of the Privy Council is completely non-partisan, so I think his role in the screen is appropriate.
The chief of staff is partisan and is trusted by the Prime Minister. I think it is important for the Prime Minister to have someone involved in the screen mechanism he can trust to make the trust work, and who will likely advise the Prime Minister out of an excess and an abundance of caution.
In his annual report, the Commissioner made a number of recommendations. He proposed adding a provision for the “appointment of an interim commissioner” when no permanent commissioner has been appointed; “adding apparent conflicts of interest” to the definition of conflicts of interest that must be avoided by public office holders; relaxing provisions regarding certain types of assets; harmonizing “the definitions of 'private interest'” in the act and the code; “expanding allowed outside activities”; and “increasing administrative monetary penalties”.
I agree with all of these recommendations and I hope your committee will work to expedite the legislative changes needed to bring them about.
I think that the proposed change that you should examine most closely is the one regarding apparent conflicts of interest.
The current accepted definition of “apparent conflict of interest”, as noted by the Commissioner, is a situation in which “there is a reasonable perception, which a reasonably well-informed person could properly have, that a public office holder's ability to exercise an official power or perform an official duty or function will be, or must have been, affected by his or her private interest or that of a relative or friend.”
Thirty-five years ago there was a consensus among those studying conflicts of interest that apparent conflicts of interest should not be prohibited, because the definition was too vague. Thinking has changed since that time, mostly because of public outrage over the technicalities of the differences between real and apparent conflicts of interest. Apparent conflicts of interest are prohibited by the code, and it makes no sense that they would not be prohibited by the act as well.
This leads to another point I'd like to make. Conflict of interest scandals have been more frequent among federal MPs and cabinet ministers than among those at the provincial level. I think this is primarily because in most provinces, elected members are required to meet with their ethics commissioners within two months of being elected and then on an annual basis after that.
During my career, I've interviewed many of these commissioners. They've all told me how important these meetings are to clarify the conflict of interest rules. The meetings also encourage elected members to consult the commissioner whenever they are unsure about a potential conflict of interest.
For you, these meetings, in my understanding, are optional. However, every MP and cabinet minister has an adviser appointed by the commissioner. I think it would be worthwhile to look into whether the adviser system needs to be beefed up in some way. Should in-person meetings with the advisers be made compulsory?
In 1990 to 1991, the Mulroney government established the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. The commission did great work, which included 12 volumes of research reports. I wrote a paper for the commission about how to determine the maximum amount allowed for individual and corporate donations to candidates and parties. Is it time for another royal commission to look into such complex matters as how to prevent apparent conflicts of interest, how to set up effective blind trusts and how to establish effective ethics screens? These are very complex questions that would benefit from such a thorough study.
I study ethics in politics because the more our system is perceived by the public as ethical, the more likely it is that good people like you will get involved in politics. Please keep up the good work.
