I think when you look at the 17 years preceding August, this market had worked extremely well. We knew there was a debate, and that was a very public debate. We've seen the reports that various rating agencies prepared and issued. DBRS was issuing reports. Other reports were being done. Even the Bank of Canada did a very good report in June 2007, and they talked about the fact that we had a unique market. Then they talked a lot about other features of the market.
Because we had general market disruption liquidity lines, the credit enhancement was greater. For example, you'd put more assets into the vehicle than commercial paper issued. While the liquidity lines were not what you saw internationally, the structures were believed to be more robust, with more assets in the structures. From our perspective, this was known. We had sophisticated investors who are heavily involved in the market presumably knowing about those reports.
It's not a market that we oversee. We've spoken in the past about the kind of work we do, which is focused solely on bank safety and soundness. We would put investor alerts on our website if we saw someone saying it was a bank and taking money from Canadians when it's not really a bank. There would be an investor alert on that. But when you're talking about asset-backed commercial paper and the fact that the market was different from what existed elsewhere, we would look more to other agencies that have responsibility for investor protection.
We were out at conferences explaining that we were not telling banks what type of liquidity line to offer. It was something the market was deciding and investors were deciding.