Hold on. You tried that one with Mr. McCallum before. It doesn't work. It's not a question of what the capital markets did. You keep talking about credit quality. In the same breath you refer to an international crunch. It doesn't work. What happened with this so-called asset-backed security--that terminology in and of itself evoked security, and you went along with that--was that you had to pursue every credit card holder, the owner of the pickup truck, and everything else. This was all bundled together. It had no credit quality because it was not something that could be executed as a debt. And that's the problem here. Through reams of contracts, individual and otherwise, you were supposed to have something that, when bundled together, represented credit quality. Simply put, it did not.
I don't find it honest of you to sit here today and claim that the problem is something in the international markets and not recognize the fact that the DBRS gave a triple-A rating to hogwash, because you couldn't realize on those assets. When you meet the smart people in the world of finance and the world of investment who looked at this stuff, they never invested in it. Jarislowsky is a good example, because, simply put, he realized there was no way to execute on those guarantees.
Are you telling us that the creditworthiness of every individual credit card holder, every individual pickup truck owner who was financing...? Is that the only thing you look at to determine credit quality? You're not looking at the value in terms of the executable quality of what's there as a legal product? That's none of your concern? Is that what you're telling this committee?