Exactly--well, this is in the most extreme versions. Now, the issues we have with that are multiple.
First off, let's just all stop and think about the prospect of having such a fund and it actually being there when it was needed, global or domestic. That's the first point.
Secondly, what would that do to the behaviour of the individual institutions and other market participants, knowing that the state was behind these institutions through a fund?
Thirdly, there are better ways to get this externality. We agree that there's an issue with the size of balance sheets. How do you get at it?
You get at it by having a simple leverage test that just restricts the overall size of balance sheets, which we have in Canada. We need one globally. It's one of our top priorities. You get at it by increasing the amount of capital within a business. You get at it by having differential charges for certain types of activities. Notably, if you want to trade derivatives in the dark, that's fine, but it's going to cost you a lot more from a capital perspective than it does if you do it on a central clearinghouse exchange.
Then, the last aspect is that, again, instead of having a fund globally or domestically over there that probably wouldn't be there when you need it—and I don't want to insult members of the finance committee, but sometimes taxes aren't always ring-fenced for their uses—you have the fund embedded in the actual institution through contingent capital. That is an example, to go back to the first point on OSFI and collaboration, where we are working in extremely close collaboration with OSFI in developing a concrete proposal, which has some support internationally, but there are a lot of details to be worked out still.