Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Serge Charbonneau, and I am here representing the Canadian Institute of Actuaries. I am a member of the government liaison task force on pensions.
The Canadian Institute of Actuaries is the national organization for the actuarial profession in Canada. It has over 3,900 members. Many of them work in the pension field in Canada, in particular in signing valuations certifying the amount of premiums required to fund pension benefits.
Lately, the pension world has been the focus of attention, and for good reason. Over the past few years there have been a series of governmental reviews of pensions and their regulations; other consultations are just starting.
For many years, the Canadian pension system has had to deal with tough challenges, including low interest rates, increased longevity, legal decisions, volatile market yields, rising pension costs, uncertainty over contribution holidays, and plan surplus ownership, as well as a patchwork of pension laws and regulations across the country.
The global economic crisis and recession has made the situation even bleaker. In 2008, large deficits emerged in most defined benefit pension plans. Even though 2009 market returns were more attractive, they did not help very much. Pensioners and workers from companies facing bankruptcy now run the risk of having their pension benefits reduced drastically.
Individuals have seen the values of their accumulated savings in RRSPs and workplace DC pension plans melt away in 2008, and they did not recover much in 2009. Recent changes in pension accounting standards have created volatility in pension plan sponsors' balance sheets, and an imminent transition to international standards could make things even worse. Employers are very reluctant to introduce new plans. Many have terminated existing plans or closed them to new employees. For plans that remain, employers have tended to minimize their contributions.
We believe the time has come for governments to implement fundamental changes to acts and regulations to strengthen pension plans. We believe a large proportion of Canadians need to save more for retirement and they need wider pension coverage. More than three-quarters of private sector workers have no employer pension plans.
Defined benefit plans need to be saved and even encouraged. They are very effective means of providing retirement income as they insulate members from many of the risks associated with increasing longevity, low interest rates, and market volatility. They provide employers with the tools to attract and retain employees.
Please let me focus on the health of federal pension plans by discussing funding rules under the PBSA, the Pension Benefits Standards Act. In November 2009, the CIA released its pension position entitled, “Retooling Canada's Ailing Pension System Now, For The Future.” Our document had been prepared prior to the federal reforms announced last fall. We are pleased that some of our recommendations were included in those changes, but unfortunately others were omitted that we consider crucial.
Our recommendations are aimed at improving funding rules for DB plans in a manner that could benefit plan members and plan sponsors. The following proposals are designed to work together in a coherent whole.
First, enact legislation allowing employers to set up and fund a new type of vehicle that we call pensions security trusts, also referred to as deemed trusts in some cases. It's a type of side fund, separate from but complementary to the current DB pension fund. We see this as a practical solution to the asymmetry in surplus ownership, and it would create an environment to encourage contributions beyond the minimum amount legally required.
Employers gain because they can contribute more than the minimum cost under the going concern valuation, knowing that if a surplus arises in the future, it can be covered. Pensioners and employees also gain because stronger funding will make their benefits more secure. Contributions into the trust will be tax deductible and withdrawals will be taxable.
For your information, the expert panel that studied pension reform in B.C. and Alberta did recommend such a new vehicle.
Second, in conjunction with that pension security trust, we suggest that new legislation be introduced to require each DB plan to have a target solvency margin related to the risks in the plan's assets and liabilities. The recent announcements last fall did stipulate that contribution holidays would only be permitted if pension plans are more than fully funded at 5% above 100% of liabilities.
It's a good starting point, but we believe there should be flexibility to reflect the risk. The CIA produced a study describing how those calculations could be done. For example, some plans could have a margin of only 2% to 3%, while others could be 8%, 9%, 10%. We think that plans that implement strategies to minimize risk should not be imposed as much of a margin as plans that don't manage risk.
Third, we were pleased that the announcement increased the Income Tax Act's threshold for surplus up to 25%. However, we note that the pension reform proposed did not include a pension security trust. In our opinion, without that security trust, the proposed increase to 25% will accomplish virtually nothing. Few plan sponsors have funded to the 10% limit in the past, and we expect virtually nobody to use the additional 15% in the future. However, if the pension security trust that we propose is implemented, we would expect many sponsors to use that extra room.
We encourage governments to act on that integrated package of initiatives. We think if those proposals had been in place before the recent crisis, the funds would have been in a much healthier situation and relief measures might not have been needed at all. Certainly the risk for members would have been drastically reduced.
With respect to other federal reforms announced last fall, we know that the proposed rules on solvency valuations represent a new approach. They are expected to produce contributions that are higher than the old solvency rule that required amortization of new deficits over five years. Actually, we expect contributions to be between the old five years and the temporary ten years that was introduced recently.
This might be considered a reasonable compromise between employers and unions that have opposite demands. But we reiterate that having the new pension security trusts would greatly encourage some employers to contribute more than those minimum amounts.
We also looked at the new rules allowing letters of credit on a permanent basis, instead of a temporary basis, as in the past. We think those are useful ways of increasing benefit security, and they help employers who are reluctant to build surplus in case of a market turnaround. While we are in favour of a letter of credit approach, we still prefer our proposed pension security trusts.
Another aspect of pension reform related to benefit security is for crown corporations. We know they cannot go bankrupt, and therefore when the rules were changed from five to ten years, they did not need to submit letters of credit as did other employers. In fact, we think the whole solvency approach might not even be relevant for the purpose of protecting the security of plans for members of crown corporations since their employer has no bankruptcy risk. This has already been recognized under several provincial laws that exempt public sector plans from solvency valuations. We suggest the federal government consider the possibility of exempting from solvency valuations certain types of employers who have no bankruptcy risk.
We also would like to highlight the fact that solvency valuations involve certain problems with respect to calculation of liabilities for retirees. Legislation requires actuaries like me to determine the cost of purchasing insured annuities, knowing very well that in many cases it would be impossible to purchase them if a very large plan were to terminate. This type of difficulty also arises in the case of pensions that are indexed to inflation, because there is only a very limited supply of real return bonds. The CIA would be very interested in examining alternative approaches for valuing retiree benefits for solvency or wind-up purposes. For example, this might involve the possibility of creating new schemes through which the funds attributed to retirees could remain invested for a number of years, allowing a gradual transition to the insured annuity market.
We note that other issues of great importance to the pension issue will be addressed in subsequent meetings over the next few weeks. We would point out that the institute has examined the possibility of having new types of pensions that would be facilitated by the state. In fact, we will be releasing a white paper on that topic later this week. We would be delighted to discuss our findings at upcoming meetings of your committee.
Ladies and gentlemen, that completes my presentation. I will be pleased to answer your questions.