Okay, perhaps we'll come back to some of these issues.
First, in terms of the Greek measures, obviously in times of difficult structural adjustment—major fiscal austerity, and the tough decisions that governments, such as the Greek government, are contemplating—it is imperative that there be widespread support, broad democratic support, for those measures, because they will unfold over a period of time. And if it's the judgment of the Greek government that this is the best approach to validate that support, we fully respect that. Obviously, it's Europe's decision about the future there.
Let me say one thing, though, in terms of the role of the FSB or Canada. The European decisions were important decisions. They are higher-level decisions, though, and there still are, as I reference in the statement, more details to come about the modalities of how they're going to be put in place, both in terms of the structure of the EFSF and the mechanisms for raising bank capital, or deleveraging the banking system across Europe. And there are technical aspects to those where the broader experience of some members of the FSB, whether through that mechanism or only bilaterally, could be relevant to help European partners, if they're interested. It's their decisions. Obviously, they are very sophisticated, but we stand ready to help, as appropriate, as they define the details in order to have maximum impact from the decisions.
Quickly on the bigger issue of inflation targeting, our experience has been that targeting 2% inflation is the best contribution that monetary policy can make to low unemployment and to a stable, growing employment market. The experience of pre-inflation and post-inflation targeting, as you're aware, is that of a dramatic fall in unemployment, a reduction in volatility in the economy and of unemployment and inflation.
I'll say one thing about the household debt issue, and then we can come back. When we look at flexible inflation targeting, which is what we've been practising, we have to take into account some of these bigger issues in terms of the time horizon over which we return inflation to that 2% target. And there is some variability in that time horizon, depending on the scale and nature and persistence of various shocks, which could be related to household debt, could be related to Europe, or could be related to the United States, both positively and negatively. And that's part of our core job.
I'll leave it there.