Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, members of the committee. It is an absolute delight to be here.
I am Finn Poschmann, vice-president of research at C.D. Howe Institute, a non-partisan, non-profit think tank. It is my absolute pleasure to open this conversation this morning on the proposed legislation before us, the budget implementation bill, Bill C-3.
The budget implementation bill has a number of different parts. I am going to focus exclusively on part 7, which introduces an act, the Protection of Residential Mortgage or Hypothecary Insurance Act. This is very much the interesting different and new part of the legislation. It is something that was expressed telegraphically in the two versions of budget 2011, wherein the government of the day proposed to introduce legislation extending a more stable framework for the financing and insurance of residential housing in Canada.
With this proposed act, the government has acted on its stated intention to introduce legislation and a framework for regulating the Canadian mortgage insurance business. This is probably a good thing. It is an important business too.
The mortgage market has made home ownership affordable for many millions of Canadians. The mortgage insurance market has given lenders the security they need to make ownership affordable for millions of first-time buyers and for others with less than a 25% down payment on the purchase of their homes.
The mortgage business--that is, the mortgage lending business and the mortgage insurance business--is very much part of the firmament of the Canadian residential housing system. It's part of our ethos. It has operated roughly as we know it today more or less since World War II.
It is important to get a feel for the size of the marketplace. CMHC alone is the largest insurer of residential mortgages in Canada. CMHC insures mortgages worth a face value of more than $500 billion. That's about one-third of Canada's GDP. That is a huge exposure. It also represents roughly 70% of the mortgage insurance market.
Part 7 of the bill, in the first instance, refers mostly to private insurers, a number of companies that in a typical year operate within roughly the other 30% of the mortgage insurance marketplace. This proposed act expresses in legislation and then regulation an arrangement that already exists in the form of agreements between the Department of Finance and the private mortgage insurers.
Private mortgage insurers, which operate, as I said, in roughly one-third of the residential mortgage insurance market that CMHC does not occupy, have their liabilities guaranteed by the Government of Canada, less a 10% deductible. We could call that a 90% guarantee. This makes it possible for the private insurers to compete in the residential mortgage insurance business with CMHC.
CMHC is a crown corporation, the liabilities of which are backed 100% by the full faith credit of the Government of Canada and therefore the federal taxpayer. This means that CMHC's cost of capital is less than it is for the private insurers. In order words, it costs the private insurers more to go to the market to raise money to underwrite the insurance premiums that they, in turn, write. It costs more because they do not have the Government of Canada's backing. But as I indicated, the system works well enough that the existing private insurers tend to hold about 30% of the market. The system more or less works, however imperfectly it may do so.
Turning to the proposed legislation generally, it is a very good thing to codify in legislation what currently exists as more or less informal practice in the form of agreements between the Department of Finance and the private insurers. This is especially so when the numbers are as large as they are in the mortgage insurance marketplace.
Mr. Chairman, a number of new folks around the committee table may not have heard me on this point: it's often of significant concern when legislation leaves too much of the detail to regulation. That can be a problem, because legislators, parliamentarians, then aren't clear on some very, very important details that determine the outcome of the things they legislate.
That's a common problem in legislation. I think it is not so much a problem in this case. I think the drafters of this tight legislation have done a pretty good job of striking a balance between legislation and leaving space to determine details and parameters in regulation. I think they've done a not at all bad job.
I mention this not just because the devil is always in the details, but because of the critical importance of getting regulation right and getting it right in this instance because it will have a huge impact on the mortgage insurance landscape going forward. What the legislation--again, part 7 of the act before us--imposes or creates is the authority for private mortgage insurers...or rather, it requires them to meet capital adequacy requirements defined by OSFI that other financial institutions must meet. This is nothing new, but we are going to rely for individual stability on capital adequacy requirements on the part of mortgage insurers.
The legislation also says that, by regulation, the minister may collect a fee from the mortgage insurers commensurate with the risk to which the Government of Canada is exposed through the Government of Canada's backing of the mortgage insurers' underwriting of mortgage lending. That is probably a very good thing. As it stands--or to this point--mortgage insurers have been setting aside in an account roughly 10% of the premiums they write to backstop, or rather, to have available in the event of failure.... This formalizes that arrangement. It allows the fees to be set by regulation and to do so ideally on a risk-adjusted basis. In other words, the government will collect fees commensurate with the risks to which Canadian taxpayers are exposed.
So on the face of it, this is a reasonably stable solution. In other words, with capital requirements defining the stability of individual financial institutions with an insurance premium or a reinsurance premium collected by the government and reflective of the risks to which the taxpayer is exposed, we have a potentially stable market outlook or market framework.
So it goes for the private mortgage insurance part of the business. In the last part of part 7, and a significant part of part 7--perhaps the most significant, from my perspective--are the sections dealing with the National Housing Act. These will affect CMHC quite specifically. What this does, in a way, is codify existing practice.
In other words, the legislation says that CMHC shall “provide” or “make available” to the minister, and the minister may make available to the public, any books or records that are relevant to determining the nature and scope of the corporation's activities and, perforce, the risks to which CMHC is exposed through its mortgage underwriting activities. Now, this is a good thing. Again, it represents something that's not very different in form, in face, from current arrangements.
Naturally, the Minister of Finance has an interest in looking at CMHC's books, as does OSFI. There are a number of informal arrangements through which our oversight agencies are able to have a look at what it is that CMHC does and the risks to which taxpayers are exposed through their insurance and securitization activities. However, it is an informal arrangement, not a formal one. It's good to have this in legislation.
The final point on this is that the legislation also grants authority to write regulation that will determine a fee that CMHC may be charged by the Government of Canada, representing the risks to which CMHC's activities expose the federal taxpayer. If this fee is risk-adjusted and matches the risks that CMHC takes on, we're moving into a new framework or a new sort of marketplace, where you have a much more level playing field, as between the private insurers and between CMHC. If the fees that the minister or the Government of Canada may charge CMHC are indeed risk-adjusted and do reflect that CMHC's liabilities are 100% backed by the Government of Canada, as opposed to 90% backed, we have moved or we will have moved--as I've said--into a very different, more competitive, more level landscape in the mortgage insurance business, and this is potentially a very good thing.
I'll stop there.