Thank you. My name is Adam Parachin. I am an associate professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Western Ontario, where I research and lecture in the field of the legal definition and regulation of charity. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, I'm going to bring the committee a distinctly legal lens through which to approach this matter.
A useful starting point is to recognize that any tax regime providing for the recognition of charitable donations has to deal with three key issues. The first is identifying eligible recipients. That raises the complicated issue of the definition of charity, about which I understand there were some questions from committee members on Tuesday.
The second deals with the design features of a donation incentive. Should it take the form of a credit or a deduction, and if a credit, how much? Should it be a two-stage credit, as we have now, or a three-stage credit, as has been proposed with the stretch tax credit?
The final issue a regime dealing with charitable donations needs to deal with is what eligible donations are. What kinds of contributions to charities qualify for donation incentives in the first place? That's the issue I'm going to be making some submissions on.
In a simple world, we could confine ourselves to simple donations—unconditional cash donations. The law does a pretty good job of recognizing those, because frankly, you probably can't get that wrong. But we don't live in a simple world and we don't have the luxury of confining ourselves to simple donation arrangements. There are many other forms of donations that often arise. I can list some examples.
We can contemplate a person creating in his or her will a trust for a charity whereby the charity gets a fixed income entitlement for a period of years. That's not recognized as a gift under current regulatory publications.
We can also think of a scenario in which a donor contributes capital to a trust under which a charity has a fixed entitlement to receive that capital at some determined date in the future. That also might not be recognized as a gift under current law.
We can contemplate a scenario in which there's an estate dispute over the interpretation of a will, and the parties resolve in their resolution to the dispute that a portion of the estate proceeds be given to charity. That will not be recognized as a gift under current regulatory publications.
We can contemplate a scenario in which a donor forgives a debt owed by a charity. Rather than transfer funds, they forget a debt owing. It's not clear that this will qualify either. Neither will necessarily allowing the charity the temporary use of property, such as the free occupation of land, a leasehold, for no charge for a limited period of time. It's not clear that this will qualify under current law, nor will it when a corporation issues shares or stock options directly to a charity.
Until recently, when a donor sold property to a charity—for example, land worth $100,000 for a price of $10,000—most of us would sit here and probable instinctively and intuitively realize that it was the fundamental and functional equivalent of a $90,000 gift. Until recently, that was not recognized as a gift. It took draft amendments to the Income Tax Act to bring about that outcome.
Similarly, incurring expenses on behalf of a charity might not qualify as a gift. I have found this, as a legal analyst, somewhat perplexing.
I think three questions emerge. Why has this happened? Should we do something about it? And if so, what should be the something?
In terms of why this has happened, quickly, I will provide a statement: it is because the Income Tax Act does not define the term “gift”; it has been left to courts to define. The law in the area has developed somewhat haphazardly and somewhat reactively. I would suggest to you that there has been insufficient attention paid in the case law and regulatory publications as to why we have donation incentives in the first place.
The academic and theoretical literature on the point supports the view, and this is the prevailing view, that donation incentives exist to help raise funds for charities. If that's the case, then presumably all donation arrangements that essentially achieve that goal should qualify as tax receiptable donations. If that's what we're trying to achieve, then those are the kinds of donations we're trying to target. But all too often we miss the mark in the law by focusing on variables that frankly lack any policy relevance.
What to do, or rather, should we do something about it? In my submission, we should. Currently, a lot of charitable funds are used to support legal opinion work in this area, where answers should be clear. I shouldn't be complaining, because it means charities have to hire people like me, but that's probably not the best use of charitable funds.
In terms of what we should do, I've proposed in my brief a statutory definition of charitable donations, and I would be happy to take questions on that, should that be of interest to the committee.
Thank you.