There is a series of reforms that are, as you say, technical and relate really to the plumbing of derivatives markets. I think we do well to remember that these are $300 trillion-plus markets in notional size. These are immense markets globally. They bring real, true systemic risk to global financial institutions and back into institutions in Canada. The so-called infrastructure of these derivatives markets was found wanting in the crisis and needs to be fixed.
I'll briefly walk through some of the key elements.
First, we actually want to know what's going on in these markets. In other words, we want to make sure that every trade in every derivatives contract is actually reported to what's called the trade depository, so that regulators and authorities can see the actual level of activity, spot trends, see emerging vulnerabilities, and address them as necessary. That's the first thing. Unlike the equity market, one does not have a central repository of the trades that actually happen in derivatives, and it's not acceptable. It's being fixed. It's the first element. Canada is moving forward on that.
The second thing is that the actual mechanisms of so-called settlement in these markets used to be done effectively on a bilateral basis between you and me. I'm going to pick on you, Mr. Adler. If you were going bankrupt, the concern of all other members of the committee would be who else is exposed to you. Then we would think maybe we should cut off the Chair, for example, with all due respect, or maybe that wasn't the best choice; maybe we should cut off Mr. Brison. If the consequence of that was to freeze the system, if there's a central counterparty in the middle so all our trades are through a central pool and all our collateral is held there, if you have the misfortune to fail, then the rest of us can continue to function because we know the collateral is safe and the system continues.
That is fundamental to ending too big to fail, which is a shared objective certainly of members of this committee and of the G-20. Also, it's fundamental to actually make the system more efficient because by pooling the collateral, there can both be more of it available in the event that you fail to the system as a whole but less of it required as a whole because it is in fact pooled.
What Canada has done—and maybe I'll say, as FSB chair, all G-20 countries have just done—is to decide the direction in which they're going to proceed with central clearing. Those legislative amendments were important for the ability of Canada to make those decisions.