Finance Committee on May 6th, 2014

[Scott Brison, Liberal, Kings—Hants, NS]

Could you check on that and report back to us? That would be helpful. That is your understanding, but are you certain?

[Alexis Conrad]

That section refers specifically to the temporary foreign worker part of IRPA, and the details are specifically targeted at foreign workers.

[Scott Brison, Liberal, Kings—Hants, NS]

Okay, thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Rajotte]

Good.

I want to thank our two officials for being here to discuss this division. We'll see you at clause by clause.

We'll move now to division 23, please.

I am doing my best to get to divisions 29, 12, and 14. I will go as long as the committee allows me.

All right, we have division 23, which amends the budget implementation act of 2009. We have Mr. Rudin back, and we'll go to Mr. Caron.

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first quick question is about the $150 million that is being set aside.

What will that $150 million in division 23 of the bill be for?

[Jeremy Rudin, Assistant Deputy Minister, Financial Sector Policy Branch, Department of Finance]

I'm sorry, Mr. Caron, but I'm having a hard time understanding you.

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Did you put on the listening device?

[Jeremy Rudin]

Sorry, Mr. Caron. Please go on.

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Division 23 sets out an additional $150 million for the Canadian securities regulation regime. How will that money be used?

[Jeremy Rudin]

The law states that it will give the government the power to identify the provinces that decide to participate in the cooperative regime. That is all the law says.

That being said, the agreement in principle signed by the governments of British Columbia, Ontario and Canada contains additional clarification explaining that the federal government is prepared to compensate provinces that lose net revenue because of their participation in the new regime.

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Why is the act being amended instead of just raising the limit, which is still in the clause in the bill? Why amend the act with respect to the limit instead of voting for a new increase?

[Jeremy Rudin]

The idea is just to provide the flexibility to have the option of increasing the limit if that ends up being necessary.

That being said, it would have to be done through a budget bill. We would still need Parliament's approval.

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

I have one last question about this.

We are familiar with the constitutional situation. The Supreme Court gave its opinion on this issue. The government is still pursuing its plan to create a cooperative organization, but for the time being, the only provinces that are interested are British Columbia and Ontario. Quebec and Alberta are steadfast in their objection.

What will the government do to get around the issue of jurisdiction, the constitutional issue? If the government just wants the cooperative support of the provinces, it does not seem to be getting that now.

[Jeremy Rudin]

If I understand correctly, you asked me two questions. The first was about jurisdiction and the second about the plan to encourage other provinces to participate in the regime.

With respect to jurisdiction, the Government of Canada's plan, with British Columbia and Ontario, is of course fully in line with the Supreme Court opinion, which found that Canada's Parliament has a role in securities regulation regarding matters of genuine national importance and scope, including maintaining the integrity and stability of the financial system and preserving fair, efficient and competitive national capital markets. Moreover, and I want to emphasize this, the government must prevent to systemic risks.

The government thinks that the example of Ontario and British Columbia demonstrates the interest of various provinces. It is continuing to work with its provincial partners and invites other provinces to join.

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

I completely understand the Supreme Court's ruling and how it established the federal government's role with respect to systemic risk. However, it also confirmed that, from a constitutional standpoint, this issue falls under provincial jurisdiction.

How long does the federal government expect all the provinces to come on board and create that unique commission, even if it's cooperative, if we're only relying on the provinces to adhere to it or join it?

Right now we have provinces that are completely opposed to it. So what's the point of butting heads with the question of jurisdiction by trying to create that single securities regulator? Isn't there an easier way to try to achieve the objective of simplification and having a de facto single regulator by actually working with the provinces? I understand the rationale on the economic side and also how it is constitutionally impossible to do it. Is the government able to demonstrate it can do it in a constitutional manner? It hasn't demonstrated that it can, because we still see a strong opposition from the provinces.

[Jeremy Rudin]

As you were saying, there certainly are provinces that are on record as opposing. There are two provinces, as I just mentioned, who are clearly in favour. These provinces are quite different in their approach, in the nature of their securities markets, and their approach in some ways to regulation, but they have been able to find common ground. Then we have a large number of provinces that have yet to take a position they're clearly opposed or in favour. With British Columbia and Ontario, we continue to seek the involvement of those provinces.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Rajotte]

Thank you, Mr. Caron.

Thank you, Mr. Rudin. Thank you for being with us.

We'll move to division 29 quickly, please. Again, we'll try to go to divisions 12 and 14 immediately thereafter.

We welcome our two officials to the table. Thank you for being with us here.

We will go immediately to questions. Is that okay? We will go to Mr. Rankin, please.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you, witnesses. I appreciate your being here.

I'm looking at section 5, which says that the new chief administrator is appointed to hold office during pleasure, and the purse strings have been put into the hands of that person responsible directly to the minister.

Is there a concern that this will merely be a political appointment as a consequence of being at pleasure?

[France Pégeot, Special Advisor to the Deputy Minister, Department of Justice]

No. This will be a regular government appointee by the Governor in Council, so if you compare this type of appointment with others, it's very similar. For example, there is the equivalent for the courts of what we're proposing here, which is called the Courts Administration Service. It's an organization that provides all the services that the federal courts need, and the person is also appointed at pleasure. So that's a fairly regular and standard type of appointment for that type of position.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

This administrator would have sort of purse strings responsibility for the independent administrative tribunal, several key federal tribunals, and would also be responsible for recommending changes to legislation and regulations affecting these boards and tribunals.

I'm concerned, I suppose, about the merit-based appointments of the individuals and the concern that tribunals have expressed to me that this could.... Everyone accepts the need for shared services and efficiency, I certainly understand, but there's a concern that the importance of independence is lost.

[France Pégeot]

As with other Governor in Council appointees, there will be an open and public selection process. There will be a selection process that would be open to the public to fill that position, and it's very similar, as I was mentioning, to other similar positions with respect to the Courts Administration Service, for example, which is the same kind of position. So it's not unusual for that type of job.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

So you don't share the concern that the minister being able to relieve the chief administrator of his or her duties without cause should they choose to stand up to the minister or a government directive would have a negative impact on the independence of those tribunals. You don't see that as a concern?

[France Pégeot]

No. This organization will actually operate at arm's length from the Minister of Justice, so yes, it will be in the portfolio of the Minister of Justice, but it will operate at arm's length and it would have all of the authorities necessary to manage the organization.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

What are the administrative mechanisms that would give reality to that notion of their being arm's length? What is there to confirm that it wouldn't merely be a political appointment? After all, it's an at-pleasure appointment, reporting directly to the minister, designed no doubt to control costs but certainly having ramifications for independence. That's why the tribunals are so concerned.

You're saying, no, don't worry, it's not going to be like that because there are instruments that confirm the arm's length relationship. I'm asking what those instruments are.

[France Pégeot]

What I meant is that the organization—just like, for example, within the Minister of Justice portfolio you have the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, so it's the equivalent in the sense that this person is, yes, reporting through the Minister of Justice but is operating at arm's length.

If you look at section 9 of the legislation, it says:

The Chief Administrator is the chief executive officer of the Service and has the control and management of the Service and all matters connected with it.

So it gives full authority to this person to manage the service.