Good morning. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here with you today.
I'd like to deliver remarks on three aspects of the oil price crash for you today. First, I'll look at how the changes of the market have affected the outlook for oil sands projects. Second, I'll talk briefly about greenhouse gas policies and oil sands projects in light of the oil price crash. Then, if time allows, I'll add something on refining and upgrading as well.
As you know and as we discussed in the first panel, oil prices have declined considerably over the past nine months. Early on we had a little bit of an advantage in Canada, in particular for oil sands, with a weaker Canadian dollar, lower discounts, and cheaper diluent, which led to Canadian oil sands projects probably faring better than projects did on average globally. That's actually reversed now, so things have gotten a lot worse in the last little while for oil sands. It seems every time I write that they're okay, they get worse.
To understand the impacts of these prices on oil sands projects, I will go quickly through three aspects.
When you look at CAPP's oil sands production forecast, we think that's a reasonable benchmark for what industry has planned. You see about two million barrels a day of current production, about another one million barrels a day of production that we're expecting to come online, which is currently in construction, and then another two million barrels per day of forecasted growth projects. These would be projects that don't have significant capital already invested in them.
If you divide the existing operations into those three groups, you're at very little risk of seeing any of those shut down. To take a couple of simple examples, for a project like CNRL's Horizon, you're looking at a cost of production of about $38 per barrel today for a product that sells for about $60 a barrel. So you still have a healthy operating margin.
Suncor, from whom you heard earlier this morning, has pretty similar statistics. Their production costs—and they're in the high end of the oil sands producers, because they have a large integrated project—per barrel are about $35, and that barrel sells for about $60 to $70. If you go down through their existing in situ projects, they're at very little risk of actually shutting any of them down unless the oil prices get a lot worse.
New projects are a little bit of a different story. Like economists, we always have two hands, so I'll talk about two types. On the one hand, we have the projects for which significant capital has already been invested, and on the other hand we have the projects for which it hasn't been.
If you look at the ones with significant capital investment—and we saw a good example of this recently, again from Suncor, with the Fort Hills project—even though that's a relatively expensive project, it was worthwhile for them to continue that because the forward-looking view, even with lower oil prices, is still for a positive rate of return on investment.
This is also an area in which you can plainly see the impact of the Canadian dollar. We used to think of new mines as being projects for which you needed $85 to $100 WTI to make work. With today's Canadian dollar, you can probably make a new mine work somewhere between $65 and $70 WTI, if the Canadian dollar holds where it is right now. For a new in situ project, those numbers get even lower, down into the $50 to $65 a barrel range. If we're looking at the projects that are currently under development in which significant capital has been invested, those numbers get even lower still.
So what does that mean in terms of what you should expect? It means you should basically expect what you heard Mr. McMillan from CAPP talk about this morning—a pullback in future capital investment on new projects leading to a decrease in the rate of increase in oil production, if you can follow that double negative. So there will be less production than what you expected but more production than you have today.
Second, could a GHG policy disrupt this trend? Would it be crazy to introduce new policies on oil sands emissions?
I don't think so. If you look at the types of policies that have been proposed, whether for something like a 30-30 or 40-40 approach in Alberta or at the federal level, or even something like B.C.'s carbon tax, the margin you're talking about is, for a 30-30 approach, maybe 10¢ to 25¢ a barrel. If you take a B.C. carbon tax approach, it's maybe $1 per barrel at most.
I don' t know about you in this room, but I actually find it far less comforting to think of the fact that our oil sands industry is 25¢ a barrel away from disaster than I do to think of the prospects of a greenhouse gas policy. I think we're much better off if we have a credible greenhouse gas policy in the oil sands than we are if we have none at all.
Lastly, on refining—and you heard some thoughts on refining from Mr. McGowan this morning—it is true that refining margins hold up better, because they tend to reflect the cost of refining, and they don't tend to reflect the cost of crude. We're finding that margins have been more stable, but according to recent analysis that I've just pulled together over the last couple of weeks, the total return to shareholders, to governments, and to royalties would be higher by a factor of about 40% for extraction alone versus extraction plus refining per dollar invested.
Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to your questions.