We know that in the areas where the al Qaeda offshoots and the Islamic State operate, one of the ways in which they fund the operation is by asking for a per cent of turnover from the individual businesses within those areas, and there are teams of accountants who go into the businesses and work out what their annual turnover is. This appears to have come out of al Qaeda's operations back in Afghanistan after an Egyptian ran off with $10 million from the central fund. From that moment onwards, they've gone for auditing and accounting, and as they developed a team, that team has gone out and looked at other branches of the organization and estimated what their turnover is so that if you signed up to al Qaeda, whether it be al Qaeda in Yemen, al Qaeda in Mali, or whatever, you are supposed to repatriate money to the central organization. That money is audited. That money is accounted for. Those accountants will also look at the companies operating within the area.
What I'm trying to say is, the relationship between organized crime and terrorist organizations over a certain size needs to be understood in the same sort of way that organized crime can sometimes just be another business. It's just an illicit business and it's expected to pay its share of turnover as a revolutionary tax, or whatever you want to call it, in the same way as legitimate businesses.
If you're interested in this, just this week my colleagues and I produced a special issue of the journal Global Crime, which covers a number of case studies in different countries on the interface between organized crime and terrorism. We've done quite a bit of work on this and encouraged other people.