Thank you very much.
It's a pleasure to be here at the committee. I want to thank the committee very much for the invitation to come to present to you today and to answer your questions. One of the reasons why I felt it was particularly valuable to take you up on this invitation is that I believe we have a very serious issue and are in need of concerted federal effort and assistance in dealing with it. I really wanted to bring that message to the committee personally.
I would like to share with you a few remarks and a bit of a narrative about my experiences in becoming a new minister in British Columbia. In July, I was sworn in as Attorney General with responsibility for gambling. That was really when my eyes were opened about some of the activities that have been taking place in British Columbia.
It was on one of my first days as minister responsible for gambling that I was briefed by our provincial regulator as part of the briefings I received as the new minister responsible. The first words that I heard at that briefing from a member of our regulator, the gaming policy and enforcement branch, were, “I think we are going to blow your mind.”
Mr. Chair, I can say that my mind was, indeed, blown. The regulator walked me through extensive and overwhelming evidence of large-scale money laundering in Lower Mainland casinos. I was shown video and photographs of individuals wheeling large suitcases packed with $20 bills, others bringing stacks of cash to casino cages. I was astounded by the audacity of those involved. On a purely practical matter, $800,000 in twenties is very heavy. It looked like they were helping somebody move a box of books.
I was equally astounded that this activity had been taking place in British Columbia without an effective criminal, legal, regulatory, or policy response for almost a decade. There have been, to my knowledge, no related criminal charges or tax prosecutions to date related to the activity that I witnessed.
Suspicious cash transactions began climbing at B.C. casinos in 2009 following the defunding of B.C.'s provincial integrated casino policing team. Large, suspicious cash transactions continued unabated from 2009 until late 2017, when our new government instructed B.C. casinos that they should no longer accept large cash transactions when they didn't know where the cash was coming from. We're still not done yet in terms of solving this problem.
I retained anti-money-laundering expert Dr. Peter German, a former senior RCMP officer and the author of Canada's leading textbook on anti-money-laundering law, who has been investigating and reviewing what has happened in British Columbia. He will advise me in a report that I will receive at the end of the month about how the province, at the provincial level, can address this problem.
At the federal level, I would really like this committee to understand the colossal nature of the regulatory failure that took place and, frankly, may still be taking place in British Columbia. The issue in British Columbia is so notorious and so severe that I was briefed on an international intelligence community training session in which international intelligence members were taught about something called the Vancouver model of money laundering.
We are famous internationally—or, more accurately, we have become infamous—for money laundering.
In the Vancouver model of money laundering, a wealthy individual from China, a country with strict currency export controls, wants to gamble. A gangster will meet that gambler at a casino, offering cash in amounts as high as hundreds of thousands of dollars. In one transaction, it was $1.2 million in cash. The cash is the proceeds of gang crime. To pay for the cash, the gambler agrees to transfer money in China from his bank account into a bank account under the control of the gang. The gambler walks the illicit cash into the casino, completes a FINTRAC reporting form, buys chips, gambles, and on leaving, either cashes out, receiving a cheque, or carries the chips out of the casino.
In sum, the criminal gang has successfully laundered difficult-to-manage twenty-dollar bills, moving the money out of Canada while keeping their names off of FINTRAC forms. Those involved in the transaction can truthfully report that everyone is following all of the reporting rules. FINTRAC will aggressively audit and confirm that the reports have been made accurately.
The only real evidence of a problem is a guy lugging a hockey bag full of $20 bills into the casino. You might think that this alone would be enough to start a police investigation or a Canada Revenue Agency investigation. It has not been. B.C.'s casino policing team was funded again and resurrected with a better mandate in 2016 and is now, unsurprisingly but thankfully, involved in a massive transnational criminal investigation.
I'd like to thank those who work at FINTRAC. I believe they collect critically important information and ensure it is accurate. The issue is not their fault, but there is a problem. An anti-money-laundering system that rigorously enforces compliance with reporting but does not have an enforcement arm puts a sheep mask on a wolf's face. While I know it is not true, I picture submitted FINTRAC forms being picked up by a lonely person at a fax machine in a giant warehouse, who puts the reports into boxes, and the warehouse is filled with boxes from floor to ceiling as far as the eye can see. Although this is clearly not the actual situation, it may as well be true given the apparent lack of action in British Columbia taken with regard to casino money launderers.
Unfortunately, the impact of FINTRAC reporting in B.C. has been that any criticism of allowing massive cash transactions with money from unknown sources is answered simply by, “We comply with all federal anti-money-laundering reporting rules.” I have no confidence that any enforcement or investigation action would result from a report submitted this afternoon with the words “highly suspicious” in all caps and triple underlined. In fact, I believe the current reporting system actually reduces the possibility of action, because the individual completing the form would mistakenly believe that writing “highly suspicious” on the form and then submitting it was the same as reporting it to police. It is not the same.
Unfortunately, if FINTRAC has been concerned about a lack of action on its reports, it has been unable or unwilling to speak publicly about that lack of action. That needs to change. British Columbians take no comfort in the suggestion that this is somehow limited to casinos.
We will be asking Dr. German to take on a second phase, this time looking into real estate, following highly publicized reports of a link between money laundering and our real estate market in British Columbia. Dr. German has requested that I provide you with his interim federally focused recommendations, given the timing of your committee and the timing of his report. It's a little bit like getting the last page of the book without receiving the book itself. I do have the recommendations for the committee here for you today, Mr. Chair, but unfortunately I didn't receive them in time for them to be translated for the committee. I'm in your hands about the best way to ensure the committee receives them.
Important work with the federal government is happening behind the scenes. I'm grateful for that support from the federal government. I'm appearing here so that all members of federal parliament—and as much as possible, all Canadians—can understand why we are asking for more support from the Canada Revenue Agency, the RCMP, and other federal agencies. We certainly hope the federal Parliament supports any interventions that are proposed by the government.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.