Thank you for the question.
Let me step back to explain. What is in the proposed amendments is the legislative framework for setting out how the conversion process would work and the authorities under the Minister of Finance, the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, as well as the CDIC.
The whole concept here is around long-term debt securities. The nature of long-term debt securities, which are what would be bailed in under that scenario, can shift over time, so you're quite right that the definition could be adjusted over time.
The purpose of putting them in regulations and not in legislation is twofold. First, we need to consult with the industry precisely on the definition of what constitutes a long-term debt security—the nature of a debt security going over 400 days, the type of composition—and make sure that we have it stated in legislation precisely enough to capture what banks are going to have to do under contract law to issue these new securities. It needs to be quite precise.
We'll also need to have the certainty under which they can issue these, and that will come from legislation and regulations. Banks currently issue non-viability contingent capital, that instrument being under contract law. The industry is looking for more certainty, which is being provided by the act and by the regulations.
Deposits are not referenced in the legislation because they're not contemplated. Really, the framework here is long-term debt securities.
As we mentioned in our last discussion, the whole premise here is to keep a bank operating, to keep customers protected, and to retain deposits and attract new ones. That's the whole purpose of trying to keep a systemic institution serving its customers and the Canadian economy. That's what is at root attracting this level of oversight and this power. It's because the institution is so important to keep its deposits and its customers going that we have this tool.
To answer the latter part of your question, concerning the process and safeguards, in this instance we're entrusting that the process would work in the future. If there were a bank that potentially got into trouble, it would obviously be made known to the Superintendent of Financial Institutions and all the agencies that are involved. If we got to a point that there was deemed to potentially be non-viability of that institution—which means that there's a very significant, remote, circumstance in which their level of regulatory capital or losses would be such that the bank would technically be insolvent—the superintendent would go to the CDIC and basically indicate that there's a scenario of non-viability.
They would consult on what the appropriate remedy would be. As you can see in the act, there are various options in the tool kit for taking control of an institution: temporarily or over time, assets and liabilities, bail-in. It depends on the circumstance.
The superintendent would in turn go back to the Minister of Finance, who would have to come to the government authority to seek permission and authority to use one of those tools. The safeguard is built in that the Minister of Finance has a role and that the Governor in Council has a role. The Governor in Council would then approve which of the tools in the tool kit could be exercised for that bank under that scenario. That would be communicated to the CDIC, and then they would have the authority to move forward on one of those options around taking control and, depending on the scenario, executing bail-in.