There are obviously going to have to be parameters. We have a bunch of entities that are operating at close to full capacity. One of the tests, as with the other program, would be a revenue-drop threshold.
Obviously, you're going to have a situation where that threshold is going to be at a higher level with respect to grants that are coming in than would necessarily be the case with a loan program. Our sense, therefore, is that the primary qualification would be revenue laws. What we don't believe it should be related to is enterprise size in a traditional sense, because essentially everybody affected is in a like condition. There are also retailers who do own real property. In those instances, they may be able to actually securitize those assets in a way that rental tenants are not able to.
I think the difference with respect to the CECRA is that we've seen this as involving some assumption of risk and a haircut by the landlords, but with the bulk of rent obviously still being borne by the tenants, notwithstanding that many of them can't operate their physical facilities. Unlike a situation where what is in effect a grant under the CECRA—it's a forgivable loan—goes to the landlord, in this case our assumption is that it would be a debt to the tenant. Our point is that it should be a manageable debt because the challenge of trying to securitize what is in essence frozen inventory is extremely difficult. The cost of capital in that environment, even presuming that it's available, is going to be so high that it's going to be very difficult for entities to emerge.
Our view would be that the benefit that government can bring to this space is its lower cost of borrowing, and also its capacity to calibrate the repayment to the recovery period. It's assumed that everybody who is going to be viable is going to pay every cent back, but to try and get that in the commercial market is just not plausible for most retailers at this point.