In any event, I thought I would take my first few minutes to highlight some of the points that are made in the written submission.
In the submission, first of all, I recommend—and some of this won't be new to this committee. I know you've been meeting all week, and some of this may go over ground that you've been through before—that an independent committee be established to conduct a comprehensive review of the Canadian tax regime. I will come back to that in a second.
Then I comment on three separate issues: intergenerational transfers of shares, taxation of stock option benefits, and a proposal to limit deductible interest expense for large corporations. I'm not sure if MNP might have commented; I just came in at the end of their presentation. They or others may have touched on that.
First, I recommend that a comprehensive review of our tax regime be carried out by an independent and non-partisan committee. It has been over 50 years, as the members of the committee know, since the Carter commission issued its report in 1966. A detailed study is long overdue.
There are two reasons why we need a detailed study now. First, a lot of the rules in the Income Tax Act simply make no sense. My submission contains a few examples simply as illustration. I'll just highlight three of those. For example, individuals who receive dividends are entitled to credits for corporate taxes, even if the corporation has not paid any taxes. That doesn't make any sense.
Another example is that family members may be exempt from the TOSI rules, the income-sprinkling rules, provided the private corporation does not carry on a service business. The Canada Revenue Agency, the CRA, says that more than 75% of small businesses are service businesses and carry on service activities, so what we have is an exception for small business that almost no small businesses can access.
Third, our international tax rules allow multinationals to set up foreign subsidiaries in low-tax or zero-tax jurisdictions, even if the business activities continue to be carried on by Canadian resident employees of the Canadian parent company.
The tax legislation is just full of stuff, and it's time to revisit it.
The second reason we need a comprehensive review, in my view, is to look at the entire tax regime and try to figure out the tax mix and tax rates that are most likely to promote job creation and economic growth in the long term.
It doesn't necessarily mean a reduction in revenue base as a percentage of GDP, and I comment on that in my submission, but it does mean trying to get the rates in the mix correct. One really needs a committee that includes fiscal economists to do that.
The submission then comments on three specific issues.
First, our tax rules, as I think you've heard, often force a small-business owner to sell the business to an unrelated third party rather than to family members, something called the “84.1 trap”, referring to section 84.1 of the Income Tax Act. The Department of Finance has known about this for years. The Province of Quebec has introduced legislation, although it's pretty complex and poorly written legislation. It's time for the Department of Finance to fix those rules.
Second, on stock option benefits, draft legislation was issued—a notice of a ways and means motion was tabled in June—to put an annual limit of $200,000 on how much an individual can receive in stock option benefits and receive preferential tax rates. The rules got stalled. The government has said that it will tell us in budget 2020 how it intends to proceed. The draft rules are much too complex, and they provide tax results that are much too favourable for senior executives.
I've set out three recommendations in my submission to set how I think the rules should be fixed.
Finally, as part of its election platform, the Liberal Party proposed to limit the amount that a large corporation can deduct as interest expense to 30% of EBITDA, earnings before interest, etc. This is one of the OECD's base erosion initiatives, but this one should not be implemented by Canada. We already have two separate sets of rules that limit excessive debt leveraging—the United States does not, but we do—so it would be duplicative of restrictions that we already have in place, and the Department of Finance knows that.
In addition, these types of rules would be harmful to businesses that don't have robust earnings, such as start-ups and scale-ups, and they'd add another level of huge complexity to our tax legislation.
I welcome comments later on. Thank you, Mr. Chair.