Thank you, and thanks for having me back.
Because I've addressed this committee before, I'm going to follow up on previous discussions I've had with you. I'm going to focus pretty much exclusively on inflation and interest rates. As Mr. Macdonald said, it's low inflation and low interest rates that make all of this work, so it's worth understanding that a little better.
Now I'll turn to my prepared statement for the translators.
Rising commodity prices early in 2021 are fuelling speculation that inflationary pressures could surface faster than central banks anticipate. Central banks took extreme measures to bolster the economy after the pandemic began, lowering interest rates to historic lows and expanding their balance sheets substantially. This led some to accuse central banks of “printing money”, which risks rekindling inflation.
The money supply has long been at the centre of macroeconomics. This reflects a centuries-long reliance on the quantity theory of money to guide the economy. The quantity theory is based on the identity that the money supply and its velocity determine GDP. Assuming velocity is stable over time and output grows steadily, changes in the money supply would be reflected in prices. Milton Friedman’s famous statement that “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output” summarizes what many believe is the origin of inflation.
Applying quantity theory is not simple or straightforward. There is no universal definition of money. Velocity is the the rate at which money is spent, reflecting the number of times money is turned over while making the transactions that generate nominal GDP. A key tenet of the quantity theory is that velocity is stable, or at least predictable.
However, with interest rates approaching zero in both 2009 and 2020, central banks resorted to quantitative easing to boost the economy. QE involves central banks buying bonds, mortgages and other assets to inject money into the financial system. By adopting QE, once again central banks have become “quantity theorists”.
Canada had a brief experiment with QE in 2008-09; however, the money supply and private sector credit did not accelerate. Even the Fed’s greater use of QE did not spark faster money supply growth. We can say that in 2008-09 these experiments with QE did not disprove the quantity theory of money because the broad money supply did not expand rapidly.
QE failed to deliver its promise to boost output and raise inflation after the financial crisis partly because it could not control whether banks increased lending or whether money was spent on GDP and not on existing assets like housing and the stock market. Since QE did not trigger faster GDP growth, neither did it fuel inflation. A regional Fed president bemoaned in 2012 that “the historical relationships between the amount of reserves, the money supply, and the economy are unlikely to hold in the future”. I'm going to return to that quote in a minute.
In 2020, central banks rapidly resorted to even more QE, in Canada’s case mostly by buying federal debt to keep interest rates low while governments provided emergency pandemic relief. Unlike in 2008, however, the broad money supply soared from a 7% to a 30% growth. However, private sector credit demand has not accelerated.
Both prices and inflationary expectations are rising early in 2021, with the latter rising to 2.2% in the U.S. Economists have warned that the U.S. risks overheating because the Biden’s administration’s $1.9-trillion stimulus is arriving just as the economy reopens with the rapid distribution of their vaccines. Fed chair Jerome Powell cites a “flat Phillips curve” as one reason inflation will not take off. The Phillips curve is the trade-off between inflation and capacity utilization, and a flat one shows resource utilization does not affect inflation.
I'm going to skip a paragraph here.
Easy monetary policy was adopted to directly stimulate the economy and facilitate government borrowing needed to help people during the pandemic. Monetary policy is a tool to stabilize the economy in the short term and control inflation, not to bail out governments from the long-term consequences of their fiscal choices.
If the economy recovers better than expected and inflationary pressures or expectations begin to rise—and nobody knows how pent-up demand will respond to the reopening after an unprecedented pandemic—then central banks will have to choose whether to continue to keep interest rates low to enable ongoing fiscal stimulus or start to tighten. In such a circumstance, I have no doubt that they will focus on inflation. In that case, governments that are slow to withdraw fiscal stimulus will face an unwillingness from central banks to continue to make borrowing easy and cheap.
Central banks will not abandon decades of building confidence in their inflation targets. It would take years and probably decades to restore that confidence. The risk of higher interest rates is much greater than that of inflation. The cost of higher interest rates will quickly be felt by governments with large debt loads.
For example, in Canada the PBO estimates that a 1% rise in interest rates would increase federal costs by $4.5 billion in the first year and $12.8 billion by the fifth year.
Both the Fed and the Bank of Canada will tolerate whatever inflation occurs in 2021 as both transitory and salutary. Inflation will accelerate to at least 3% and probably more because of base period effects. Gasoline prices were unusually low last spring, so automatically that's going to raise inflation this year. As well, firms need to rebuild profit margins and balance sheets, especially in industries such as restaurants, travel, recreation and personal services, as Susie mentioned.
Customers are flush with government transfers and are therefore able to afford higher prices, but if inflation becomes embedded into behaviour and especially expectations in 2022 and 2023, central banks will then take decisive action.
Thank you.