Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the invitation to appear.
I will focus my opening remarks on four specific points.
The first point is that much public commentary in the lead-up to this budget has focused on the size of the federal deficit and whether it is too big. I'd like to provide some important perspectives on this question.
Canada's deficit is very small by global standards. The latest “Fiscal Monitor” report from the IMF, released last week, shows that Canada's general government operating balance is the second-smallest of any G20 country at just 0.7% of GDP—behind only Saudi Arabia—and it's smaller than any other G7 country.
OECD data suggests that Canada's general government deficit is very small. By its estimate, it's just 0.4% this year as a share of GDP. That's the seventh-smallest of any of the OECD's 38 member countries and one-ninth the size of the average OECD deficit.
The contrast between Canada and the United States on this matter is very instructive. The U.S. federal deficit is almost 10 times larger, relative to GDP, than Canada's. It's around 7% of GDP, adjusted for the cancellation of the Biden government's student loan proposal, yet the U.S. economy grew 2.1% in the second quarter while ours shrank. U.S. inflation has been comparable to Canada's and is, in fact, now slightly lower. The combination of expansionary fiscal support in the U.S. with monetary restraint is showing that the economy can be supported more strongly while inflation comes down.
The large deficits incurred during the worst stages of the pandemic—and for good reason—have been almost entirely eliminated. Canada's strong recovery from the pandemic, combined with the impact of nominal GDP growth on government revenues, has made budget repair faster and stronger than expected, and this will continue. The government is likely to outperform its official projections for revenue and other budget benchmarks in coming years.
In short, while Canada faces many significant challenges at present, the deficit is not one of them. Concern with the deficit is overshadowed by more pressing priorities, such as supporting Canadians through the cost of living crisis, the housing crisis, climate disasters and more.
The second point is that claims the federal deficit has been a significant cause of Canada's recent inflation are not credible.
This argument assumes that inflation resulted from excess aggregate demand in the domestic economy. This assumption is not valid for explaining inflation after the COVID pandemic, which was driven by a combination of supply-side shocks, shortages of key commodities, consumer desperation after the lockdowns and then an energy price shock. All of that was made worse by unusually high profit margins collected by Canadian businesses. Canadian corporate profits reached an all-time record share of Canadian GDP in 2022, even as our inflation surged.
Internationally, there is no correlation between the size of a country's deficit and its rate of inflation. Some countries with larger deficits than Canada's, such as Japan, have had slower inflation. Some countries with smaller deficits have had faster inflation. Generally, inflation has been a global phenomenon resulting from those shocks after the pandemic that I mentioned and bears no relationship to a country's deficit.
In the macroeconomic context, it is the size of a government's deficit in national accounts terms, not public accounts, that matters if you are concerned with aggregate demand. Public accounts measures include all kinds of non-cash accounting measures, which do not affect real spending power in the economy. In national accounts terms, the federal budget is already effectively balanced. In the latest quarter, there was a deficit of just 0.3% of GDP. A deficit of that size can have no meaningful impact on economy-wide price trends, and what you do in this budget will have no impact on Canadian inflation going forward.
The third point is that, notwithstanding the lack of connection between the deficit and inflation, there are things that fiscal policy can do to help bring inflation down, as well as alleviate its consequences for the hardest-hit Canadians.
We should not assume that inflation is just the Bank of Canada's job; fiscal policy has a role to play as well. The federal government can reduce cost pressures that emanate from the actions of private companies. Priorities in this regard would be an ambitious expansion of affordable and non-market housing, since the housing sector is a dominant cause of our inflation today, and a national pharmacare program to bring down the price of drugs for Canadians.
Continuing and expanding targeted fiscal supports for hard-hit Canadians, such as the GST credit and the Canada housing benefit, would help, as would incremental taxes on the profits of companies that have contributed to Canadian inflation through historically high profit margins. We've done that already for banks and insurance companies. We've also imposed a 2% tax on share buybacks, which is helpful but too small and should be continued and expanded.
Other industries that have contributed so much to Canadian inflation and enjoyed unusually high profits should also be targeted, including the oil and gas sector and supermarkets. Once we agree that the deficit has had no impact on post-COVID inflation, then the government can fulfill its responsibility to assist in reducing inflation and its effects through new programs like those.
The last point—I'm out of time—is that I would like to reinforce the importance of the made-in-Canada supports for clean-energy investments including in electric vehicles and battery plants in Canada. Those have had a tremendous impact on addressing investment and attracting new projects to Canada, helping to address the point that Ben made earlier about the need for more investment.
Thank you for your attention.