Thank you for the question, because it's important to clarify that that's not what we're suggesting.
We're suggesting that when certain mergers—and it would be a very small percentage of mergers in Canada—get over the thresholds that we set out in our submission to this committee, those certain mergers, which are mergers in highly concentrated industries that make them even more concentrated, are where there should be a structural presumption. Then, the company—we're not saying it's blocked entirely—has an opportunity in front of the court to prove that it's not anti-competitive. It's actually a very fair system, and it only applies to a very small percentage.
A good chunk of the mergers that we review at the bureau—and it is Ms. Pratt's team that does this every year, about 210 mergers per year—don't present competition problems. However, with regard to the ones that do, if they get through, they have an impact on the Canadian economy and on Canadian consumers for, conceivably, decades. That's why we need to have this kind of very robust merger law.