Thank you, Chair.
It's great to see so many of my colleagues this morning.
I'd like to make a couple of quick comments. On the related topic today of monetary policy, that was my speciality during my graduate studies. At the University of Toronto, I did my thesis on monetary policy, so it's very relevant to the world we live in. I also worked through and experienced the 2008-09 financial crash. I interviewed on Wall Street during the 1997 October crash. I worked through the ABCP, asset-backed commercial paper freeze-up here in Canada, which was a $30-billion freeze-up. I was also a survivor and worked through the events of 9/11 when I worked down in New York. Coming through COVID has been another experience here, now more on the practitioner, government side.
To the C.D. Howe Institute, as a monetarist, I've read everything from Friedman to von Hayek, and Dodge to Larry Summers most recently. I think the inflation we're dealing with here pertains to a lot of supply chain issues. You look at used vehicle prices, chips and new vehicle prices. What's happened there is very important.
I agree that we need very well-anchored inflation expectations. That is very important. Money is a store of value, a store of wealth for Canadians, but I would argue that global inflation has been largely caused by the supply chain global issues.
Mr. Robson, I think you would agree that we needed to have a bazooka-type response to the pandemic when, nearly overnight, a third of the Canadian economy and a large chunk of the world economy froze up. We needed to have an appropriate fiscal and monetary response.
I would define those two measures as appropriate, as an economist by training and as a practitioner in the global financial markets for 20 years before I became a member of Parliament, and having worked and lived through the other financial crises that occurred. Those responses were pertinent.
Would you not agree that the responses were pertinent? After that, we'll get to today.