Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I've been listening intently. It's been a very interesting conversation.
I want to seek some clarification on a few things that have been said. I think I'll start with Mr. Powell.
One of the concerns I share with Mr. Gray and the business community is the idea that when you put a pension plan in priority to secured creditors, secured creditors are going to look at whatever the deal is that they have before them and they're going to assess the risk. They're going to want to know exactly what they're subordinate to. Just like property taxes or any other items that may be payable under the current legislation in priority to a lender, they will look at that and make that assessment.
One of the questions that have come up is what evidence the business community has to say that lenders are going to back off, that lenders are going to decide not to lend in a particular sector or, if they do lend in a particular sector, that they're going to have to charge more because of the perceived inherent risk.
I want to go back to your opening statement, because you said something that I wasn't quite following. You talked about something that happened in 2005, and I'm not aware of it. You said that if this was going to be an aftermarket effect on risk for lenders, where is the evidence? I'm wondering if you could explain that argument to me again, because I want to make sure that I understand it. Was that legislation you were talking about something that put pensions in some sort of position pari passu or in priority to secured creditors?