Thank you very much.
Thank you for having invited me to come and testify today on the state of fiscal federalism in Canada.
Fiscal federalism is a fundamental aspect of our public policy and our federal system, which is indisputably one of the most decentralized on the planet. The way major federal transfers work, and their level of generosity, are nevertheless sources of considerable controversy across the country.
That's particularly true of the Canada Health Transfer, for which the provinces are demanding immediate increases, and the equalization program, which is being challenged politically, particularly by certain provincial governments that are not currently receiving equalization payments. If the provinces agree on the need to significantly increase the Canada Health Transfer, the disparities will further divide provincial premiers.
In spite of its sometimes controversial nature, equalization is needed in any country that has major economic disparities. That's why subsection 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, proclaims the following:
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
This imperative still applies today and equalization is therefore good. More generally, beyond equalization, the Government of Canada's fiscal transfers to the provinces and territories remain one of the pillars of our federal system, which could not work without them. This fiscal role of the Canadian government in our federal system is part of what makes the decentralization of many public services throughout the country possible. That is certainly the case for the equalization program. Without it, we might have a federation that is more centralized than it is today, and I believe it is important to pointing this out.
Moving forward, we must pay constant attention to the architecture of fiscal federalism and the need to adapt federal transfers to changing economic and fiscal circumstances. Fiscal federalism should be updated on a regular basis, even if the proposed changes are potentially controversial. Without constant adaptation, fiscal federalism is likely to fall victim to what a Yale political scientist, Jacob Hacker, calls “policy drift”, a logic according to which the failure to reform public policies might render them less effective over time.
To avoid policy drift in fiscal federalism, we should look for new ideas about how to improve the system. For instance, in a working paper published a year ago, University of Calgary economist Trevor Tombe and I outlined in “Three Policy Pathways for Federal Health-Care Funding in Canada” that there are alternatives to the status quo, namely demographic adjustments to the Canada health transfer and the possible advent of a new form of fiscal governance in Canada.
I think it's important to really think about how we could reform the system. Incrementalism is not necessarily a bad thing; it's a prudent thing, but sometimes we need to think outside the box and discuss broad options beyond the status quo.
Regarding equalization, the Government of Canada should create a new expert panel similar to the 2005-06 expert panel on equalization and territorial formula financing. Chaired by Alberta-based economist Al O'Brien, it submitted its report back in May 2006. These recommendations were implemented the following year.
Of course, a lot has changed since the equalization program was adopted in 2007, and there were also other changes to equalization in 2009. I think this is in part because we have changing circumstances, for example, the fact that the fiscal capacity of provinces, the gap among the provinces, has declined, especially since 2014. The landscape has evolved, and we need to re-assess the equalization formula and, frankly, re-assess fiscal federalism more generally.
In the longer term, the Government of Canada should explore the possibility of creating a permanent expert body that could provide regular advice to the federal government in the field of fiscal federalism. Such a permanent body already exists in other federal countries like Australia with its Commonwealth Grants Commission, which has existed since 1933, and could help lower the political temperature over equalization and other federal transfers, even if the allocation of fiscal resources will always remain contentious. There's nothing more political than money and the allocation of money in the federal system.
Regardless of who will be tasked with advising the Government of Canada over changes necessary to avoid policy drift and adapt our fiscal federalism system, we must look at the big picture beyond just individual transfers. For example, the interaction among equalization and the Canada social transfer and the Canada health transfer is really relevant. If we want to introduce changes in one transfer, we have to take into account what's happening in the two main transfers.
Thinking about reforming fiscal federalism—