I have a quick point of order if I may, Mr. Chair.
I am sorry to interrupt.
I just wondered if Mr. Perkins might be willing to entertain a question off of a point of order, because I know he referred earlier to the requirement of the government to have the confidence of the House of Commons. This is a subject that's of some particular fascination to me.
I think it's quite important. He's talked a lot about the fundamental principles of Westminster parliamentary democracies. Of course, this is a very important part of the Westminister system. He's talked a little bit about ministerial responsibility and, I'm pretty sure at one point, some of the extraordinary powers of the Prime Minister. Of course, one of the most extraordinary powers of the Prime Minister is the power to determine willy-nilly, if you will, whether the Prime Minister enjoys the confidence of the House or not, even without a vote in the House of Commons.
This is something that I think has been problematic. He talked about the U.K. being the kind of mother of the Westminster parliamentary system that we still look to for precedents, and they determined some time ago, several years ago now, that a Prime Minister should no longer have that power. In fact, if a Prime Minister does not observe a fixed election date, that Prime Minister would have to go to the House of Commons and get a vote of a two-thirds majority in order to be able to part ways, as it were, with a fixed election date as prescribed in law.
I just wondered if, in the course of his comments, he might be willing to talk a little bit about the confidence convention, some of the ways that this extraordinary power of the Prime Minister has been abused and whether he thinks that's something that the House of Commons should look to curtail.