Maybe.
Page 475 continues, here, on the United Kingdom: “While the Coalition Agreement” between Prime Minister David Cameron and the Liberal Democrats.... That's not unlike the costly coalition agreement we have now between the NDP and Liberals that is further exasperating this. I'm sorry. Sometimes I get corrected by the Liberals, as they prefer their name to go first. Here, for the sake of congeniality, I'll say “the costly Liberal-NDP coalition”. It's very similar to what Prime Minister Cameron was having to deal with.
It says:
While the Coalition Agreement does not directly address individual ministerial responsibility, it does introduce a few possible variations. For example, it is stipulated that Liberal Democrat ministers—
They had a mixed cabinet.
—cannot be removed by the prime minister without consulting the Liberal Democrat deputy prime minister.
Wow. You know, the leader of the NDP should have read this before he signed his costly coalition agreement. He could have been a more powerful deputy prime minister. Since the current Deputy Prime Minister has an attendance record of five days in the House of Commons since January, we know the effective deputy prime minister of this costly coalition is the leader of the NDP.
Let me read again what the leader of the NDP should have put in his agreement for the costly coalition: “It is stipulated that the Liberal Democrat ministers”—the version of the NDP here—“cannot be removed by the prime minister without consulting the Liberal Democrat deputy prime minister.” I actually called him “the Liberal Deputy Prime Minister”. There's no reason why the leader of the NDP couldn't have had that title. I think he should be pretty offended by the fact that it was not offered to him.
It continues:
Positions within individual departments have been shared between the coalition parties, with the suggestion that junior ministers can act as a “watchdog” over their coalition partners and potential veto points, which contrasts Westminster ideas of a dominant executive.
Veto.... I suspect some of that happens in the Wednesday morning NDP-Liberal caucus meetings.
On page 476, it goes on to say:
However, in emphasising unity, point 3.2 stresses that:
Consistent with the civil service code, all civil servants have a duty to support the Government as a whole. Special advisors may support an individual Minister in relation to their Government activities, but must at all times act in the interests of the Government as a whole.
While that's essentially in the costly coalition agreement, the NDP is required to report any shenanigans going on in committee that are against the government agenda, and so they have this sort of snoop policy in their costly coalition agreement. For a functioning opposition, it's a little hard sometimes in these committees to understand whether the NDP is actually operating as the opposition or operating as an arm of the costly coalition.
I think in this committee MP Blaikie is a fairly independent fellow, I suspect, like the colleague I share the fisheries committee with, Lisa Marie Barron. She is a fairly independent NDP member and I think she operates in a collegial way and probably isn't betraying any discussions on opposition tactics, but who knows here in this Westminster system, which is where all these things can come from.
“Ministerial Accountability for Departmental Actions Across Westminster Parliamentary Democracies”, an article by Dr. Brenton in the Australian Journal of Public Administration—for those who are just joining us, it's volume 73, number 4, and it's actually found on pages 467 to 481—says the following:
The United Kingdom has recently embraced—
Recently would be 2015.
—the idea of a Cabinet Manual, with the first edition published in 2011. It provides limited guidance on or insight into the scope of individual ministerial responsibility. For example, point 7.9 recognizes that: “Each permanent secretary supports the government minister who heads the department and who is accountable to Parliament for the department's actions and performance.”
It goes on to say:
Permanent secretaries—
I think those are the equivalent in Britain of deputy ministers.
—are responsible to the Cabinet Secretary—
That is the equivalent of our head of the Privy Council Office.
—or the Head of the Civil Service for the effective day-to-day management of the relevant department.
When you understand ministerial accountability and organizational behaviour, whether you're a business or you're in government, there's a limit to how much you can legislate or put in policy about people's own personal morals and ethics. You can't do everything. It's important to know that the tone is always set from the top in an organization, so this paper goes on to discuss, on page 476, the importance of the tone from the top in a section called Prime Ministerial Responsibility.
This paper, I think, will be insightful for those trying to understand why the “searching for Freeland” issue is happening with the five days' attendance in the House and her rejection of three invitations from this committee, because it comes also obviously from her direction—perhaps not her personal direction but the example set by the Prime Minister.
Here's what this academic paper says about this on page 476, for those reading from home:
While these codes and manuals are open and even vague in parts, they better capture the complexity of executive accountability than the NPM—
That was an acronym referred to in this paper earlier on, which I mentioned this morning.
—reforms and better reflect the political realities. They provide a basis for improving understandings of accountability in practice, if not actual accountability, and the role of the Prime Minister is appropriately emphasised.
While legislation underpinning the public service has often been used to drive or consolidate reforms, and public service codes of conduct articulate high standards and aspirations, ministerial codes are unsurprisingly less detailed and carefully worded. However they have effectively captured how the convention has evolved and is understood by significant political actors, and while they remain unenforceable—
That's because most of them aren't in law.
—they do debunk the myth that resignation, or even sanction, is at the heart of accountability. In many ways the codes have responded to, and arguably even reversed, some of the more radical elements of the NPM reform and accountability agenda by bringing the minister and the department closer together. Yet the ministerial codes and cabinet manuals do not strengthen accountability but rather recognise the current practice, which is still significant given misunderstandings of the convention.
It goes on to further state on page 476:
Returning to the initial questions, Bovens et al. (2008) public accountability assessment tool is presented in Table 3—
I spared everyone from my reading that in order to keep the journey alive.
—and the following key issues are addressed: why there has been a trend towards codification; how the trend developed and whether it is likely to continue; whether codification—
Codification is of open and accountable government, such as the one done by this government in 2015. That's codification.
—has transformed conventions to a more binding status—
“More binding”, perhaps, in some cases would be law.
—and whether accountability has improved.
As we know, there have been more ministerial resignations in the past. The more we impose these codes without teeth, the less we seem, in my mind, to get of ministerial accountability and resignations.
The paper goes on on page 476 to say:
Firstly, the trend towards codification can be mapped onto the public accountability assessment tool. As can be seen in the table, codification is a response to perceived failures of both ‘democratic’ and ‘constitutional’ perspectives of accountability, and a limited embrace of learning.
It is a shame and a condemnation, really, of our parliamentary system, that we've had to get to this extent to try to put in code ethical behaviour. You would think that people would naturally have it in their own set of moral standards, but this is the life we live now.
It goes on:
The original convention is so often misinterpreted and yet politically damaging. Oppositions seek ministerial ‘scalps’—
When we get in government and the opposition seeks my scalp, it won't be very robust. That's what God gave me.
—in the form of resignation, and promise to improve accountability through codes. While ministers appear much more likely to resist resignation—
That's true.
—this is actually not inconsistent with the convention, NPM reforms or the codes. What has changed is the issue of blame and the preparedness to accept blame.
That's an interesting statement. It goes on:
While NPM could be interpreted as a way to shift blame, at least for day‐to‐day operational matters, the codes are less definitive (although the New Zealand Cabinet Manual refers to this distinction). Politically, a further separation of the minister from the department in the codes would be intuitively reasonable. Yet there are other political risks, which explain the reversal of this strict separation in most codes. As Hood and Lodge [in 2006] argue, if civil servants are fired for government mistakes, they will be less likely to assist ministers during political controversies and more likely to act defensively and ensure that the minister can be blamed.
In a little while, I will go through Library of Parliament examples of some of those. With one of them, I have some familiarity from when I worked for Canada's foreign minister.
I'll go on on page 476. It says in the final paragraph of this page:
Secondly, the trend towards codification has generally developed through ‘official’ executive guidance (i.e. codes of conduct, guides, manuals, handbooks) more so than legislated, enforceable codes. Yet with each new iteration of a code, the application of the convention becomes less precise and more aspirational.
These codes and the ministers' responsibility to Parliament are at the heart of the amendment by Mr. Blaikie to try to get the minister here for at least two hours. I can understand the frustration of the committee in that she has not responded to three of the previous invitations to appear in this finding Freeland mystery.
At the top of page 478, the study continues:
Codification also appears to be leading to convergence as the parliamentary committees and the drafters of codes and legislation actively look and refer to the approaches of each other in attempting to establish a model. The difficulty, as with any convention, has been to codify a principle with enough detail, yet be flexible enough to be applied to different situations. Thus the common approach has been increased recognition of prime ministerial power, albeit not always in those explicit terms in every country. However, the fact that the codes are often authored or at least authorised by the prime minister further demonstrates the pre-eminence of the head of government in upholding individual ministerial responsibility.
This code of this government, from 2015, is referred to in all the mandate letters of the ministers—obviously, signed by the Prime Minister. In concurrence with this assertion in this study, it's even become more so now because it's built into a mandate letter signed by the Prime Minister, so it does come from the top.
To reiterate, it says:
Thus the common approach has been increased recognition of prime ministerial power, albeit not always in those explicit terms in every country. However, the fact that the codes are often authored or at least authorised by the prime minister—
This is the case in Canada.
—further demonstrates the pre-eminence of the head of government in upholding individual ministerial responsibility.
It appears that a trend has been established that each new government revises and updates, or endorses, an existing code, and this is likely to continue as it has become recognised practice—perhaps even a new convention.
There are similarities in this 2015 code by the newly elected Prime Minister of the day that, obviously, built on the excellent code of 2011 by one of Canada's greatest prime ministers, Stephen Harper, which was referred to in this study. Not that he.... To be fair to the academic who wrote this, the academic did not say that Stephen Harper is one of Canada's greatest prime ministers, but we, as Canadians, all know that to be true because I can't tell you how many times I hear from constituents how much they long for the days of Stephen Harper, given the performance of this government.
Page 478 of this report goes on—and I know everyone's finding this fascinating because it is an important issue in our basic parliamentary democracy. It says:
Thirdly, the legislated codes have come closest to transforming conventions into more rigid ‘C’onstitutional requirements. Again, the degree of recognised separation between the minister and the department provides the crucial evidence. What can be seen through both the NPM reforms and codification and legislation is the legal separation of the minister and the department, which is a significant evolution from the original convention, and consistent with the expansion of departments and changing modes of governance. However, while the NPM reforms sought to clearly and definitively separate the roles and responsibilities of ministers and agencies—at least theoretically— subsequent codes and legislation seem to recognise the practical difficulties of such a separation by not specifying such divisions. Instead the minister is effectively accountable for everything, but in providing an account to parliament, does not have to accept responsibility.
Are those not words that this government lives by? Let me read that again, just so you know that I think it could be changed into this government's motto. Actually, perhaps it will be their campaign slogan in the coming election:
Instead the minister is effectively accountable for everything, but in providing an account to parliament, does not have to accept responsibility.
We see that every day in question period, obviously, with the responses, not answers. I quite often have constituents who pose questions about why the government doesn't answer questions but just responds, and I basically say, “You'll have to ask the PMO that.”
This paper says:
The exception is New Zealand, which has retained its NPM-inspired legislation with only minor amendments, despite (or perhaps in spite of) radical changes to its electoral system that has further complicated the Westminster chain of accountability. New Zealand has also pioneered changes to the convention of collective accountability, with minor party ministers often sitting outside of cabinet and some parties pursuing policy objectives through power sharing agreements rather than ministries. There are other notable cross-country differences, including where conventions have remained largely intact rather than weakened by contemporary political changes. The convention of Accounting Officers (Permanent Secretaries and agency heads) appearing before parliament’s Public Accounts Committee in the United Kingdom developed before the convention of individual ministerial responsibility, and remains to this day. This convention has not been adopted in either Australia or New Zealand, although it could be argued that public servants perform a similar role in practice before estimates or similar committees in other countries. Accounting Officers have a much more limited role in Canada....
I referenced that earlier. Let me repeat that again: “Accounting Officers have a much more limited role in Canada, however there are frequent calls to emulate the Westminster model.”
In some instances we fall short there. We obviously fall short in the ministerial willingness to actually appear and answer questions, whether in the House or in this committee. There is a truancy of only five appearances by the minister since January in the House in question period. The costly wage that it generates with the half-trillion dollar projected budget in four years is that it's a $100 billion a day fee. That's what we get. Maybe it's a good thing she doesn't show up, or it might cost us more, at $100 billion a day.
According to this, not me, it says:
Finally, the most important question is whether changes to conventions surrounding ministerial responsibility have actually improved accountability. There is no straightforward answer. Bovens et al.’s (2008) public accountability assessment tool provides evaluation criteria and questions, which are addressed in Table 3.
Again, I didn't read table 3. Maybe I should go back, since it's referenced so many times. It's hard sometimes to translate a table into words. It continues:
As can be seen, the evidence is mixed. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that many important conventions have not been covered here and have not changed. For example, public service advice to ministers remains privileged in all countries, as does cabinet discussions and advice to the Queen or Queen’s representative.
I guess we are now saying the King, or the King's representative.
Breaching these conventions could arguably increase public accountability in one sense, but would affect other aspects of public accountability, possibly detrimentally. Of the conventions that have changed, it can be broadly argued that the virtue of accountability has weakened while accountability mechanisms have somewhat surprisingly improved.
The improvement is surprising given the usual ‘headline’ claims that ministers have become less accountable in contemporary politics, and ‘no longer’ accept responsibility of departmental actions.
I haven't seen much of that in our Parliament—accepting responsibility. It goes on:
Against the backdrop of an apparently increase in scandals involving ministers—
Of course, this was before 2015, so the number of ethics breaches and scandals aren't included in this paper.
On the top of page 479, the academic goes on to say:
—the main issue is often whether the minister had knowledge or direct involvement in departmental maladaminstration.
I would argue in Canada when a minister sole-sources contracts to friends, confidants, former co-workers and campaign workers without public scrutiny, gets caught in it not once but twice, and all that minister does is say “sorry”, that is not the appropriate responsibility for that minister in the departmental maladministration, as this paper calls those issues.
On page 479, it continues:
Generally, this is the basis of media and opposition pursuits for the ‘smoking gun’, and this is not detailed in any of the codes. However, ministers still have to account and may still be responsible for matters that they did not know about. Similarly, knowledge or direct involvement does not equate to blame. Rather, parliament has the right to ask about a minister’s knowledge or involvement, and the minister must not knowingly mislead the parliament.
According to these authors, that's “quite a low bar when viewed against historical precedent”.
If this author had witnessed what we've seen in the last few years, I would say that is actually quite a high bar compared to what we've seen in performance in Parliament.
He continues:
Yet the chain of ministerial responsibility could be said to have strengthened with inclusion of central commissions or a cabinet secretary (or the Treasury Board in the case of Canada), mediating between the public sector and the prime minister and cabinet. This is a significant improvement. Yet the diminution of public service tenure and the involvement of the prime minister and ministers in appointing and dismissing agency heads could also be seen as increasing control, and while theoretically increasing ministerial responsibility, it also increases politicisation.
You can say that again. It continues:
In terms of Parliament, its committees here generally become more empowered—
I guess they haven't spent much time here lately.
—and increased in prominence as a chief accountability mechanism, given that public servants appear before them. Voting trends away from the two major parties—
Well, that hasn't been an issue here for a long time.
—and the rise of new political actors in all key Westminster democracies has assisted in strengthening these accountability mechanisms, particularly as internal accountability with the major parties has arguably weakened. The roles, powers and investigations of Auditors-General and ombudsmen have also increased in many jurisdictions. However codes and legislation are yet to adequately ‘account’ for a range of other non-government and private sector actors or party political actors within this chain. Increasingly attention is being paid to other blurred politicised relationships, particularly the role of ministerial advisers (who are subject to different codes and legislation to public servants)....
Well, in Canada they're all subject to the code for public office holders. They're not that much different.
On page 479, the author continues:
Entwined in all of these changes are the role of the prime minister and the ‘presidentialisation’ of this role—which is in itself a significant change to the convention. Fundamentally, the prime minister is the most important link in the chain of accountability. Most of codes explicitly recognise that it is effectively the head of government rather than the parliament that ultimately adjudicates issues of accountability, and if appropriate, imposes sanctions.
We know sanctions have been few and far between for the Prime Minister, except when the person refused to interfere in an ongoing criminal charge activity for SNC-Lavalin. Then he felt the need to fire his Attorney General for not being willing intervene in a court case and to fire the Minister of Health, who also had the temerity to have the integrity to say that what the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada said was true. Apparently, truth to power in this government means the ability or the absolute likelihood of being fired from your job.
The author continues, “However, prime ministers are arguably less secure in their positions and the agenda is increasingly being set by actors with stronger accountability agendas.”
I don't know where he gets that from. It must be from Britain, where the parties have the ability to change their leaders, pick new leaders and hold them accountable.
Here in our Parliament, the only party with the courage to take advantage of the Federal Accountability Act is the Conservative Party of Canada, which is the only one that has given itself the power that's required after an election has voted to hold its leader accountable to caucus. Apparently, the Liberals, the NDP and the Bloc chose not the have the leader accountable to caucus, and you see the result. We know that, as a result of that accountability, we have an amazing new leader in the member for Carleton, who will be the next Prime Minister of Canada.
Now, the conclusion of this report, but a long way from the conclusion of my dissertation on ministerial accountability, is the following on page 479:
The convention of individual ministerial responsibility still exists as a convention, and in practice is commonly interpreted as answering genuine parliamentary questions without knowingly misleading.
We can't know whether, in our finding Freeland exercise, the Minister of Finance will be answering genuine parliamentary questions without knowingly misleading, because we can't pose the questions to her because she has refused the three requests from this committee to appear, which is what has led us to this terrible position of having to have this motion. It's insane, quite frankly.