Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Professor McDorman and I have worked together in various contexts over the years. We haven't had an opportunity to coordinate our opinions, but we've probably been over quite a bit of the same ground. I've followed NAFO and other organizations over the years. My first involvement in high-seas fisheries issues and in regional organizations was in the South Pacific, and to some extent in the Caribbean. During the 1980s and early 1990s, we were trying to help strengthen efforts to control the high-seas fishing of tuna. This was a slightly different situation, but it had similar problems.
Later I participated in establishing legal documents for the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organization, which turned out to be a bit of a dead letter. In 2003 I prepared a study on straddling stocks for the royal commission on strengthening Newfoundland and Labrador's place in Confederation. This was at the height of the argument over the so-called custodial management option.
I've had the opportunity to review previous testimony of hearings in this committee and in the Senate. In 2006, I appeared before the Senate committee on NAFO issues. I've tried to approach this from the perspective of what we might realistically have achieved, or hoped to achieve, five or ten years ago when we were looking at these same problems over and over again with NAFO. I'd like to know how the pluses and minuses of what we see now compares with what we hoped we might achieve before this process began.
I want to highlight a few critical issues in the amendments. It is a question of pros and cons. First, I would note that much of the amendment content is a process of modernizing the NAFO structure to be compatible with the United Nations fish stocks agreement. The amendments seek to bring NAFO in line with the principles and processes that are provided for in the UN agreement, which puts our FMOs, or fisheries management organizations, in a larger international setting. Professor McDorman and I are somewhat skeptical of some of the principles of ecosystem management and the precautionary approach. Actually, I'm less skeptical in some respects than he is. But we see some benefit in the ecosystem approach and the move to closed areas. It could have been done without it, but it is being done, and this is a positive step towards habitat management instead of just fish management.
We see some movement in incorporating flag-state obligations as an explicit part of the agreement. One of the huge failures of fisheries management in the high-seas areas has been the failure of flag states to properly regulate and control their vessels. Without going into details, the incorporation of the principles of the UN agreement provides the opportunity for more substantive use of dispute settlement procedures. It offers a way of going after countries that persistently refuse to control their vessels.
The port state obligations are incorporated—not much of a change there. But it's probably one of the areas in which both NAFO and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission have had their greatest success in dealing with the completely unregulated fisheries outside the membership. The objection procedure is still a problem. But at least now we see the provision of some criteria and a requirement to give reasons for objections. These reasons are limited to two categories: compatibility with the convention, and the possibility of discrimination against a particular country. It may not be everything we wanted, but it is undoubtedly a step beyond where we were.
Similarly, the dispute settlement process, which applies in a convoluted way to the objection procedure, is one of the things we were asking for years ago. Again, it may not be everything we want, but it provides the possibility of a compulsory dispute settlement process.
All of these are positives, although they depend on the political will of the countries involved to make them work.
There are still things I would have some questions about. We still have the objection process. I don't think it's likely that any fisheries management organization is going to completely get away from that. You still have the possibility that scientific advice can be ignored, but there is a requirement for collaboration. I don't think you want to move to the mandatory adoption of scientific advice. It's not done in most cases, and although it should be given serious attention, requiring it would not be the best move.
Also, we have the question of the two-thirds majority vote instead of the simple majority. I was quite concerned about this a few years ago when it was first proposed. I've seen counter-arguments since that have somewhat convinced me that this may play somewhat to Canada's advantage in a way I didn't expect. It may provide the opportunity to prevent measures being put through that we don't want, whereas I had thought of it primarily as an impediment to getting measures that we did want. I think that's open for argument.
The other issue that I know has been raised on this committee and certainly in the press and elsewhere is the question of the potential for measures to be applied within the Canadian 200-mile zone. I'm sure that's something both Professor McDorman and I would be happy to take questions on.
Those are the pluses and minuses as I see them. What I've tried to do is look at the outcome of these negotiations—and I would endorse what Professor McDorman has said, that these are not negotiations in which you can simply demand; you have to negotiate. I think we are farther ahead than we were with these amendments. I think a lot of people would justifiably argue we aren't far enough, but the choice is, in fact, as it has been put by Professor McDorman: at this point it's start over or accept the amendments we have.
Without going further than that, I'd be happy to take questions.