Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Telling professors they only have ten minutes to talk is a challenge. I have a few introductory notes, and I'll be happy to respond to questions. I know my colleague, Dean Saunders, has a few comments as well.
I want to point out to the committee that although I'm from the University of Victoria, as was established earlier, I grew up in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. I'm an east coast boy on the wrong damn coast, as I frequently say. Worse than that, I'm from Dalhousie, as is my colleague here. So if it seems odd to have a Pacific coast professor, I've got some good bona fides from the east coast and I've spent some time, of course, studying the apple in different ways.
I want to make it clear that obviously I'm not here defending the government in any way, shape, or form. I think the Government of Canada is quite happy that I'd never speak for the Government of Canada on any issue, and I suspect that will continue. I also want to point out to the committee that I was not part of the negotiating team in any way, so I have senses of the background but I don't know the precise nature in which the negotiations took place, what was presented, what wasn't presented. Also, I'm not aware of the direct trade-offs that would have been made. I am aware of the positions that have been clearly stated by various members of this committee already, having read some of the House committee reports. And of course I've been well apprised of views on many of these issues by the four wise men: Bob Applebaum, Scott Parsons, Earl Wiseman, and.... I'm sorry, I always forget the fourth one. He's wiser than the other three, I know. I apologize for that.
My focus on fisheries issues in recent years has been on institutional matters and institutional issues around fisheries organizations around the world. In 2005 I presented one of the lead papers on this topic at the 2005 St. John's conference that was sponsored by the Government of Canada. It was a look at the trends, the challenges, where we were going. The perspective I bring to the committee, I hope, is comparative. I've looked at and continue to look at what other fisheries agreements have been doing as a way of evaluating the NAFO amendments, since this does tend to show the state of play in the world on fisheries organizations. It also, I think, provides some indication of what is achievable in negotiations. If you look at what other organizations are doing and what is being done, it gives you some sense of what is achievable in any particular negotiation. Having said that, I am aware that all fisheries agreements have a different context, and of course the negotiations have a very different dynamic. So NAFO is both similar to others but is also different from others, and I'm keenly aware of that.
Some of the discussions, the approaches, and the attitudes that are often shown to NAFO, within the NAFO context regarding Canada's position, is that Canada should just get what it wants, since the resource matters the most to Canada and that a failure to achieve that result, that optimum outcome, is a failure of will or a failure of tactics. I fundamentally disagree with that. The NAFO negotiations are not easy. The international domain is beyond 200 nautical miles, and in the international domain one state has one vote, and Canada is having to negotiate on even ground with the European Union and with the other members of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. In my view, Canadian negotiators have been burdened for years by unrealistic expectations of what they can achieve regarding fisheries beyond 200 nautical miles. Hence, when they come back with something that may not be ideal, they are heavily criticized, not only in the NAFO amendment context but in many other contexts to do with NAFO.
Where does that leave us with regard to the NAFO amendments? You have two options, essentially. You adopt the NAFO amendments, which is fine and dandy, or you reject them. Rejecting the NAFO amendments means you go back to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization as it currently sits, as it currently operates, and as you know from the committee's reports going back many years—this committee, the Senate committee—NAFO has been very heavily criticized in terms of its abilities to control fishing and Canada's position within NAFO.
There is indication by some that in recent years NAFO has worked reasonably well. I don't challenge that; I don't have a particular perspective on that. Rejection inevitably will lead to a restart of negotiations. I guess one of the questions this committee could answer, and I have some views on it, is whether it's even remotely reasonable to expect a significantly different outcome. I don't know.
The other option, of course, is just to kill NAFO, walk away from NAFO, withdraw. The problem is that plays exactly into the international community's hands, because Canada, whether we like it or not, needs the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization more than the Europeans need the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization.
That gives you a sense of the negotiating dynamic that takes place.
Those are my brief comments. Thank you for the time.