I'll just tell you a little bit about the FRCC and what we are.
In 1993, following the collapse of the northern cod, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans created the FRCC to provide advice. So we're an advisory council, and we were established to provide an opportunity for harvesters to have input into the management and science of fisheries.
We're an arm's-length advisory body for east coast fisheries. There's a PFRCC that's responsible for the west coast. We provide advice publicly to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.
We're comprised of 12 members. We have harvesters, scientists, processors, aboriginal people. We also have provincial representatives from each province of Atlantic Canada, who are ex officio members of the council.
The strength of the council is basically the diversity in the membership. Also we have the opportunity to go to the fishing communities and consult with them and learn what they have to say. We go directly to the fishermen themselves. Often they say, “It's great to see you guys, because we finally have an opportunity to provide input in the process.” That doesn't often get done just through DFO.
Also, we provide a long-term strategic framework. So we provide advice that is basically the “what” that should be done--this is what should be done, and you, DFO and industry, determine how to do it. The “how to” we try to leave for DFO, because we don't implement the recommendations we provide. We simply provide the advice, and the report is stand-alone.
To touch on the 2007 lobster report, council was mandated by the minister to review the 1995 report. The FRCC wrote a 1995 report on lobster, a conservation framework, and then in 2007 we were asked to look at what has happened since 1995, give an update and then provide advice looking ahead to the future.
We consulted with the fishing industry. We had 20 public consultations throughout Atlantic Canada--all the provinces, in specific areas. We timed it according to their fisheries. It was set in two stages, because we wanted to ensure that fishermen had ample opportunity to come and talk to us. We also received over 85 written briefs. This is the most the council has ever seen. There was a lot of interest in giving us information, because it's so valuable. A $600 million industry touches a lot of communities.
The consultations were very focused and constructive. We received information during these consultations that we weren't quite clear on, so we went for clarification. We set up a three-day workshop. We invited 35 or so fishermen from across Atlantic Canada and discussed those issues thoroughly to get a good opinion.
As far as the review of the 1995 framework is concerned, we found that very little had been done since 1995 in reducing capacity, reducing effort, and minimizing risk. So the 1995 report and the toolbox within are still very useful today.
There has been some carapace size increases, or minimum legal size increases, but they were slight in most areas. But there are some areas that did engage and did very well to improve their conservation situation. Some of those were in Newfoundland and in the Quebec region. The Quebec region is a leader when it comes to conservation frameworks in the Maggies and the Gaspé region. I'll talk a little bit about that.
Why did Quebec take on this challenge? It's mainly because of the strong leadership in the industry. They had a vision. DFO had that same vision and they worked together and made it happen. They didn't quit. They had a lot of push-back, but they kept to it, they kept on their vision and kept focused on the objectives, and they got it done.
The cooperation between DFO and industry was good. What they did was go gradually instead of having a huge shift. Roger Simon, who is the area manager in the Magdalen Islands, said that we would increase the minimum legal size by a credit-card thickness per year. He said that we had all kinds of trouble, but that we had it made. We increased six or seven millimetres. Now they're landing larger lobsters with more value, and they have reduced some of the effort by reducing traps. It's explained in the report.
They adopted and adapted the 1995 report. When we went to consult with them on the 2007 report, they raised the 1995 report. That was their bible. They followed that, and I think that's why they were so successful. They were successful enough that they have had two ten-year plans. Very few fishing areas have ten-year conservation plans, and they were able to do that.
The thrust of the 2000 report, this one here, which we passed out, is that it's all about managing risk. We found that the risks are higher and that the situation is more risky, I guess. We need more information. For a fishery that's worth over $600 million, we do not even have correct landing information or true landing information. We need to increase egg production, factor in ecosystem considerations--the exploitation rate has to be reduced--and improve compliance. We heard a lot about non-compliance in this fishery. It's sad that it's still a big factor. It was in 1995 and it still is today, or it was two years ago.
In the fishery, as you'll see, if you're planning to go out and talk to fishermen, there's a large dependence on lobster. Lobster is the main fishery for many inshore fishermen. There used to be a groundfish fishery. There used to be others, but right now there's not a whole lot, and everybody is focusing on lobster.
Landings remain high, and I have a graph that talks about that, but the effort is increasing. Compliance is low and investment is high, so economic sustainability could very well be at risk, and with the lack of good information, it's that much riskier.
On fishing effort, when we looked at fishing effort and saw what happened in 1995 and then in 2007, we asked ourselves why the effort was increasing. Why is that? We tried to look at the drivers. What is driving this effort up? The main reason is competition. The fishery system, the lobster fishery in Atlantic Canada, is set up as an input control, and competition is very fierce. There's overcapitalization. Employment insurance is also a factor keeping people in the fishery who otherwise might leave.
So we provided options to reduce effort. Again, this is the “what”. What should be done to reduce effort? How? Input controls are one way. Buyouts are another. Output control is another. There are territorial user rights fisheries, or TURF, and transferable effort allocations.
Each area is very diverse in Atlantic Canada. The fisheries are different, and therefore, one shoe doesn't always fit all, so it's important that DFO and industry work together to find the solution that fits best.
On the science, the advice we provide is to get better information, maintain the focus on increased egg production, assess stock structure, consider the connectivity of lobster fishing areas, set exploitation rate targets, and build upon organizations such as the FSRS in Nova Scotia, in which fishermen and scientists work together to find scientific information that's very necessary.
Under the topic management and compliance, as I said earlier, compliance, or lack of, was a dominant topic in the consultation. There are still a lot of illegal traps out there fishing. There are still people selling undersized lobsters, and penalties are just basically too low--this is what fishermen have been telling us. Harvesters are generally poorly organized. They don't speak in one voice. So the advice we provide to the minister is to please work together with industry and set up a shore-based monitoring program. If we can at least know what's coming out of the water--the size of the fish, the landings, the volumes--then we will have a better understanding of where things are going and how to assess in terms of change.
A change of attitude is required. There's a basic lack of understanding in the fishery that the fishermen have the most to gain and the most to lose by being responsible and accountable. This is something that needs to change. Harvesters need to get organized. It's not just having a group. It's speaking in one voice and having plans and moving toward that.
The other issue we raise in terms of advice is a sanctions tribunal. Going through the courts is a very slow, arduous process for both DFO and industry. We feel that if it were dealt with by a few people in the industry, with a swift and severe fine or sanction, it would be more powerful. And the industry asks us for this.
This concludes my brief overview of the report. We'd be very happy to respond to questions and comments. I'm sure we'll have some.
Thank you very much.