Excuse me as well. I'm not exactly at my best right now. We're in the middle of fishing season, and I've just spent three days on two different boats trying to harvest lobster and snow crab at the same time. I was up until two o'clock in the morning trying to write what I was going to say to you folks today.
I have a little bit of a benefit because I've probably been at this business longer than any DFO or other person. My uncle started fishing when the first permits were issued in 1978; I started in 1979, and I've been in this fishery for a very long time. I've been working with the executive of the association and leading it pretty well since 1996, through the growth and expansion, the collapses, and the regrowth.
My name is Gordon MacDonald. I've been well addressed in the earlier presentations. I'm the managing director of the Area 23 Snow Crab Fishermen's Association. We're a collective of the traditional fishermen who have been around since the fishery was started and the aboriginal fleets that have been part of us since their being made permanent in the fleet.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members, for coming to Cape Breton. That certainly makes it a lot easier. Welcome to our home.
We're here to discuss what's become one of Canada's most successfully managed fisheries, the eastern Nova Scotia snow crab fishery. This fishery's been active for over 30 years, and it has proven to have highly variable biomass levels, as have all snow crab fisheries throughout the world. In Alaska and the gulf there are high fluctuations. Biomass gets very high, and then it drops.
In area 23 this resource, as such, has proven to both require and respond to good management practices, the foundation of which is found through the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's fundamental reliance on conservation through the reliance on fishermen as owners of the fishery resource. Because they're most tied to it, they suffer most or benefit most from the decisions that are made. If you can put that in their hands and give them a long-term feel, then you will achieve greater success than any level of policing or upper-hand management can achieve.
The snow crab fishery has progressed from an effort-based competitive fishery to a fishery managed by quotas that were implemented to avoid a stock collapse of the kind that was experienced in the mid-1980s. Quotas were set at the behest of the fishermen. The value had gone up in the 1990s, the price was around $3 a pound, the effort was going high, and we'd just gone through the collapse in the mid-1980s; the fishermen said, “We're going to drive this right back into the ground, and it's worth something. We need to protect this, and quotas will take care of that.”
However, when DFO implemented the quotas, they used a ten-year average that also included the collapse period, so they were set at a relatively low level. If you average zero into your numbers, it gets to be that. With a relatively low quota, the science then came on board to advise what the biomass levels were. They used something called a Leslie analysis, which pretty well says that if your catch rates are high and drop off rapidly, the resource can't handle the pressure, so the stock is in decline.
The fishermen had very little need for effort, because the season was long enough and the quotas were low enough that it didn't really matter. One played into the other, and the net result was that the scientific recommendation was that the stock was in collapse. The fishermen were going, “You're crazy. It's easier to catch these things than it ever has been.”
That said, DFO offered the industry the opportunity to use this trawl survey that had been done in the gulf. They'd bring the survey, at a quarter-million dollar price, if we paid the money, which we did. It's one of the examples of a fishing industry that has led for a long time in the proper types of management, from the recognition of collapse to the need for quotas to the need to then bring more science. They put their own money where their mouth is.
When the trawl survey came, they discovered that in actual fact the fishermen were right: the biomass had been skyrocketing during the whole period of time that we had been allocated quotas at low levels and told that those quotas were declining.
The resource was initially treated as a built-up biomass. The total allowable catches were increased for the traditional fleet, but they set aside 65% of what had been 100% traditional fleet fishery and gave that 65% away to new temporary access, which was divided among new participants and aboriginal fleets.
The idea was that this was a built-up biomass; it was there. We'd just gone through a cod collapse, there was no money, the lobster fishery was poor in a lot of areas, and fishermen were starving. There was a need to help. This was a bonanza.
The problem, of course, if you recognize snow crab biomass problems, is that it can be very high and it will drop very low. The idea was that we would bring in temporary participants and share in times of abundance, but when the abundance went down, the temporary participants would then exit, and that would provide a level of stability for the existing participants.
In 2002, after the Marshall decision, the aboriginal communities were created as full participants. Their temporary access was converted to permanent access. They were key pieces. The snow crab licences were key pieces to the Marshall agreements, because it was the fishery that had the largest economic value. There were all kinds of other parts to it, but these were key pieces.
This expanded the traditional fleet by 54%, from 24 to 37 licences, and it met with no protests by the permanent fleet. We welcomed the aboriginal fleet. We recognized that with the size of the biomass, the expansion was available. There was no compensation by DFO or anything for the extra inclusion into our fleet.
By 2004, in area 23 there were over 300 temporary quota holders and only 37 traditional aboriginal licence holders, and politics began to interfere with the best management practices and science advice. As we, societally, have failed to learn from history as understood in the tragedy of the comments on the cod fishery, existing participants would do anything to remain as the biomass showed its first signs of reduction. We had lost recruitment levels coming in. There was no sign of a future, and the biomass was headed for a steady fall, based on the independent trawl survey.
At the threshold of the time, 90% of the quota increases would go to the temporary fleet, because we were sharing at the times of abundance when we were up at a particular level; however, if there was any reduction, 90% of the reduction would also come from the temporary fleet as the resource went down. There was a recommendation for a 10% reduction in the TAC in 2004, and 90% was to come from the temporary fleet. Further, with poor scientific prognosis, the effort to convert temporary access into permanent access was about as rampant as you can imagine.
Sharing in times of abundance and traditional fleet protection in times of low abundance was gone. In a strange bout of math, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans actually treated the aboriginal communities as if they were temporary in 2004--after providing permanent access in 2002--and assessed them a 90% share of the reduction and then blended that through the permanent fleet. The net drop of 10% should have been shared 10% by the permanent fleet and 90% by the temporary fleet, but it was actually 39% for the permanent fleet and 61% for the temporary fleet. It's interesting, because it will play as we go along.
Further, in 2005 the minister of the day tasked the panel to implement new permanent access. We have serious concerns of abuse with this type of tool and its independence. Still, a large number of recommendations were implemented, including the conversion of all temporary access into permanent access, again with no compensation for the founding fishermen who invested significantly to bring this fishery to its development. As in the story of the little red hen, when the bread was ready, everyone was hungry; prior to that, there was no interest in effort or participation.
I'm sorry; I'll go more quickly.