This was the formula that we favoured and that existed between 1995 and 2002. There was sharing when the stock and the viability of the industry could sustain it. When the stock was going down, the viability was going down. The last-in, first-out principle was applied, and the new entrants were not part of it.
This has been our understanding all along, and this formula worked very well.
If you go to figures 16 and 17--it's a very useful exercise. For the decrease of the stock in the first cycle, on figure 16--you will see 1997, 1998, and 1999. In 1997 the TAC was 15,400. There was some sharing and the crabbers got 13,000 tonnes. But in 1998 and 1999 it was judged that the viability of the traditional fleet needed this amount of crab, which is close to 12,000 tonnes, and there was no sharing and no crisis. There was no problem. Nobody criticized DFO for that. It worked well, and the industry as a whole was totally capable of going through that phase.
If you look at figure 17, and you look at how things work when you have overcapacity installed in such an important fashion.... In 2008, in order for the traditional fleet to get 13,000 tonnes, we needed to support a TAC of 20,000 tonnes to 21,000 tonnes. That's the problem with overcapacity.
People have a tendency to think you just set the TAC. That's not the way it works in real life. You have to provide a sufficient, sustainable amount of quota for people to be viable. Sustainability has two prongs: the stock and the viability. Sustainable development is two words. You have “development” in there, and you cannot have development without having an economic viability that is independent of the taxpayers' money. So here you have a good example.
In 2008 we supported a quota of 20,000 tonnes, because we were at that level. We were right there. We needed 13,000 tonnes. If the overcapacity had not been there, we would have supported much less, as we did in 1997, 1998, and in 2009. Then in 2010, all of a sudden we're down to 5,000 tonnes. This is the problem. I showed you that the crabbers did not benefit from that excessive fishery between 2003 and 2009. They were the ones who in the 1990s invested millions of dollars, $10 million in the science and management of the fishery. They built this beautiful fishery, this beautiful stock. Then, after 2003, when there were good grapes toamorcer, the department said, it's not going to go to you, it's going to go to your neighbour. So they gave it to the neighbour. Worse, now that we're going down, when we're in the bottom hole, we're penalized. The fleet would normally need 13,000 tonnes and it's down to 5,000 tonnes.
We're not against sharing. We have said that many times. We're totally for sustainable development principles and policies. DFO does not respect the Government of Canada's sustainable policy, and they don't even respect their own policy for good management. We need a good third-party analysis of this. That's why we support the Auditor General's intervention. If the Auditor General shows us that we're in the wrong, we will accept that. But we need that.
I just want to finish. The problem we have now is this year. The department told you, “We gave them flexibility.” That's a blatant lie. I'm sorry. Crabbers in the southern gulf have no access to anything else: no lobster, no herring, no scallops. Ask any DFO people in the gulf. If you're a crabber, try to get a lobster licence.
They say, “We gave them flexibility to join together.” Listen, we have family enterprises that date for generations, where they have employees on their boats. These boats take four to five crew members, regulated by Transport Canada. This is not an amateur fishery. The department says, “Okay we're going to cut you down, we're going to give the quota...allow the fishermen's organization to launder money from their crab to pay for their own things, and you're going to lay off your crew members and join another fisherman.” That type of joining together might be good for a very small inshore fishery.... I'm sorry.