Often a risk analysis is associated with it. But again, in 2009 we didn't have the framework. We hadn't done enough of the work at that point to provide the minister with as clear recommendations as we did in 2010, regarding a precautionary approach and what the critical levels of population would be, where we'd be very concerned that we would have long-term damage to the stocks. That didn't exist in 2009; it does now.
We do provide some risk assessments. Where we have the capacity to do so, we provide that information. While obviously a higher TAC in a downward cycle is more inherently risky than a lower TAC, having said that, there are people who bear that risk, and that's the industry. They have very strong views, and we did not, in 2009, have a view that the decision would lead to an irreversible crash of the stock. That wasn't the case.
There was a decision to be taken by the minister. It had to be based on all the information, and the decision that was taken was not one that would lead to an irreversible crash of the stock. So it is a decision the minister must take, has very little time to take.
There was a question on timing. Those are the difficult decisions. The more divisive the views and the more difficult the decisions, the more the minister may have to consider a wide variety of views on which to make those decisions at the same time the season is fast approaching.
We do risk analysis, but I would say that there was no advice to the minister that any decision that would be taken in terms of those options that were available to the minister would lead to the inevitable collapse of the stock.