Thank you, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee for giving me this opportunity to speak to you in the context of your review of the Fisheries Act.
As the Chair mentioned, I am currently an assistant professor of law at the University of Calgary. I want to point out that before that, however, I was actually a federal public servant here in Ottawa where I spent several years as counsel, practising environmental and natural resources law under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, as well as sometimes a policy officer at Environment Canada. I mention that only to say that although most of my presentation today is based on my work as an academic, my perspective on some of these issues is informed by my former experience as both an environmental law practitioner and a public servant.
In my presentation today, I hope to accomplish three things. We're going to talk about the changes to the act in 2012 and highlight some of the specific wording that's changed, and spend a bit of time—although I think both my colleagues here and Dr. Favaro have done a good job of it—talking about the lack of understanding in terms of the rationale for those changes. Then I'm going to dive deeply into the implementation of the section 35 regime over the past 15 years. If I have one major goal here, it's to demonstrate to you that any suggestion that this act was overly onerous or unduly protective of fish habitat simply doesn't hold up. Then if I have time left, I'll get to some of my specific recommendations. Of course, everything else that I'm presenting today is in a formal brief that I had submitted to committee last week. I understand it's in translation right now, but I do encourage you to refer to it when it's ready.
With respect to section 35, although it's written as a prohibition, it's important for the committee to understand that this has always been more of a regulatory regime. This is in the sense that, although prohibited, impacts to fish habitat, whether under the former or current wording, could always be authorized by the minister under section 35(2). Before 2012, this regulatory regime operated as follows: DFO would receive inquiries or requests for authorization from proponents, individuals, or corporations, and these were referred to as referrals. It would then review them to see if a harmful alteration, disruption, or destruction, or HADD—you'll all be versed in the terminology of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans by the time this is done—was likely to occur. When it deemed projects low-risk, it would provide advice to proponents in the form of a specific letter, what they called a letter of advice. It would do this or it would direct the proponents to its website or various regional websites where it had what were called operational statements. These were generic letters of advice, essentially, that allowed proponents to understand what the best practices are and how to mitigate impacts. The sum effect of those two policy-based tools was that those proponents were not subjected to the regulatory regime. They were taken out of the authorization stream and told essentially to do their best and go off and go forth and don't both us anymore.
If the department could conclude that a HADD was unavoidable, those projects were then brought into the authorization scheme and a section 35 authorization would be issued. At the time and until 2012, that requirement for an authorization triggered an environmental assessment under the previous Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.
Bill C-38 received royal assent in 2012, as noted by my colleagues and on page 3 of my deck, which you have a copy of as well. The idea at the time was that in fact this regime was too onerous and unduly protective. At the time, a couple of examples were given including a music jamboree in my home province of Saskatchewan where the flood plain was flooded with walleye, which are important recreational fish.
In terms of the main changes, on this deck, you see essentially a side-by-side comparison. Before, the section 35—and Dr. Favaro did a good job here, but just to reiterate—applied to works and undertakings, now it applies to works, undertakings, and activities. This was a broadening of the act. Before it prohibited HADD, now it prohibits the permanent alteration or destruction of fish habitat, and the prohibition was merged with the previous stand-alone prohibition against destruction of fish.
Finally, whereas it used to apply to all fish and fish habitat, it now only applies to fish and their habitat that are part of, or support, commercial, recreational, and aboriginal fisheries.
In addition to these legislative changes, there have been changes to the manner in which DFO does its business. Operational statements that I referred to before have been eliminated, so DFO no longer has any way of tracking those low-risk projects. DFO has had its budget reduced by $80 million in 2012 and another $100 million in 2015.
The next six slides are really intended to give you an overview of what this regime has looked like over the past 15 years. In my view, they fundamentally undermine any suggestion that this regime has ever been too onerous on proponents or excessively protective of fish. On the contrary, the picture that emerges is one of near abdication of the federal responsibility with respect to Canada's fishery resources.
In this figure, what we see in the blue is the number of referrals that DFO would receive in any given year. Red is the number of authorizations issued. Importantly, the red is on the right axis, so it's a scale of order less than the number of referrals on the left. At a high point, in around 2003-04, DFO was receiving roughly 14,000 referrals, of which fewer than 700, or 5%, were deemed to require an authorization. Presently DFO receives just 3,500 referrals, and of those, only 75 were issued authorizations in 2014-15.
I also want to bring your attention to two periods that are statistically significant on this figure.
The first is post-2012. We see that decline in the number of referrals and number of authorizations. Note that this happened notwithstanding the fact that the changes were not actually brought into force until the end of 2013. The strong signal from the changes with the introduction of Bills C-38 and C-45 essentially sent a signal to proponents that they were not to be as preoccupied with this legislation as they had been.
The other period that I want to spend some time on is when there was the first significant drop in authorization and referral activity, and that's between 2004 and 2006. Around this time, DFO implemented what was called the environmental process modernization program. This was part of the Smart regulatory agenda that was very popular at the beginning of the 2000s.
The cornerstone of this was DFO's risk management framework. This is the way DFO was triaging projects and deciding which ones would receive authorizations and which ones would not.
The main feature of this matrix is, of course, the green shaded area. This is the low-risk area. Pursuant to this assessment, which is based on the sensitivity of fish habitat and the scale of negative effects, DFO would decide that, in this case, roughly 60% of projects would fall in the low-risk category.
Importantly, that's not no risk, and that's not no impact. It simply means that in taking a risk-based approach DFO decided, in this case, that the department would not subject these projects to authorization, and would rather deal with them with those policy-based documents that I referred to before, letters of advice and operational statements. Importantly also, of course, when it did this, no EA pursuant to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act was triggered.
Figure 2 is another example of figure 1. The blue space is the number of referrals, and you see that declining, as does the number of letters of advice—that's the green space. But what you see popping up in around 2006-07 is that orange space. That is the operational statements and class authorizations.
I've combined all of those into that purple space. What you see, essentially, is that while the number of referrals declined, the overall activity on the watershed actually probably remained pretty consistent. You have to keep in mind that the numbers are a bit lower, but notification was voluntary only, so they probably didn't catch all of the use of and reliance on these operational statements. Long story short, there was the same amount of activity on the watershed but much less involvement, proportionately, by DFO in supervising those impacts.
At the same time that DFO was significantly reducing the regulatory burden both on itself and also on proponents, unfortunately compliance and enforcement fell off a cliff. Here you have a map of warnings in the orange and enforcement charges in the red, and what you see clearly in 2005-06 is that DFO goes from issuing roughly 200 warnings and laying close to 50 charges to last year issuing five warnings with zero charges.
I don't have data going all the way back, but beginning at around 2008-09 the department started to track enforcement hours. Here we see, again, that following 2012 there is a massive decrease in enforcement hours dedicated to the fish habitat protection provisions, or now the fisheries protection provisions.
In terms of the next couple of slides—I don't know if I have time to get into this now, and we can spend some time, maybe, in the question period—essentially what we wanted to do was figure out how is it that DFO, in terms of those 2012 changes, went to roughly a 60% further reduction in authorization activity. Was it this issue of the harm? Was it the question of harm? Or was it the imposition of this fisheries requirement?
Again, without getting into details, my research showed that the bulk of it was actually just that strong signal sent to proponents that this act doesn't matter any more, which resulted in a massive reduction in the number of referrals DFO was getting.
It certainly couldn't be explained by the change in harm, and this goes back again to the implementation of this risk-based approach. There might have been the suggestion that the act was overly protective and all these harmful and temporary disruptions were being caught. When we looked at 2012 authorizations, only a fraction of those were for harmful alteration destruction. So those things were already being risk-managed out of the regime. What we see over time, then, by the time we get to 2014, as the graph here shows, is a reduction in the amount of authorization activity.
What we then tried to do is plot all of these authorizations, 2012, 2013, 2014, on a map to see if there was a change in the pattern. Before, the act applied to all fish and fish habitat. Is it possible that now that there's a fisheries requirement it would somehow change the distribution? Some biologists had suggested that all of northern Canada would essentially be left unprotected. We didn't find any change in pattern, other than the fact that there were fewer authorizations—that's the light blue—and the pattern resembled the previous pattern. Of course, what was most startling was that what this suggested was that even in 2012, most of Canada's northern wilderness, freshwater lakes, streams and such, were not receiving protection.
I just want to highlight that spot on that map that you see. That's covering northern B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and parts of Ontario. So according to this map, and according to DFO's authorization activity over a period of 18 months, May to October, 2012, 2013, 2014, there were roughly six instances of impacts to fish habitat. Of course, that doesn't square with the evidence that my colleagues have provided, and it doesn't square with industrial activity on the watershed according to various kinds of facts and figures. Again, that's all provided.
I see that my time is up, so I'm going to wrap it up by simply saying I agree with my fellow witnesses that we need to return, probably, to the previous HADD provision, but we can do a lot more to regulate and address cumulative impacts on the watershed, more transparency, a public registry for authorizations, for applications, for monitoring data. Again, I can spend more time during question period on that.