I think my contention truly is that if you put everything into context—remember, Marshall II was, as you're saying, a companion decision to Marshall I—you have to remember that the facts of Marshall II are the facts of Marshall I. It involves the activities of Donald Marshall, Jr. and all of the facts surrounding what he was doing. When you read Marshall II and what it is saying, in a lot of ways it is simply expounding on what the Supreme Court very directly says are fundamental tenets of the way that all treaty and aboriginal rights litigation are looked at.
When we talk about whether the federal government ultimately has the authority to look out for things like conservation and public safety, it absolutely says that. What they're saying in Marshall II is that this was part and parcel of what Marshall I is all about as well. Marshall I cannot stand for the proposition that the federal government does not have ultimately the ability to regulate for things like conservation and public safety.
What Marshall II then also says, though, is that we're not minimizing the task of the federal government when it looks at regulations. It has to justify its regulations. Are its regulations truly directing themselves towards consultation and public safety? Are the regulations the minimum of infringement on rights to reach the federal government's goals in what it wants to do with its regulations? When it talks about the Badger case in Marshall II, all of those are still the existing and normal ways that we would look at federal government action when it comes to the way they would look at justification.
I'm just making the ultimate argument that this idea that a new case—a companion case—a few months later, based on the exact same facts as the first case, could somehow come up with a different conclusion than the first case did doesn't have merit.