Thank you for having me here today.
I'm currently an independent contractor and I'm here in my role as senior policy adviser for Ecotrust Canada. I also work with Coastal First Nations to support the development of their community-based fisheries, a key aspect of the fisheries resource reconciliation agreement you heard Paul Kariya speak to you about on Monday.
I've spent 27 years supporting fish harvesters and fishing communities, and I believe fisheries as a renewable resource can be well managed for environmental, social, cultural and economic objectives. Licence policy is one of the key things that affect our ability to realize this.
This is my third time testifying on this subject; the first was in early 2019. I want to thank this committee for keeping this topic on the table and continuing to support the people and communities of the coasts, plural.
In preparing for today, I went through licence reports again. I had a moment when I questioned why we have to continue to show the government the evidence of foreign ownership and corporate concentration in B.C. fisheries. We know there's foreign ownership. We know there's corporate concentration. There's been much information shared on this. We've heard of companies that link back to foreign parent companies; global companies that continue, even to this day, to buy up smaller local operators to consolidate and control the supply; cash exchanges from offshore buyers to avoid tax, or worse; licences and off-loading facilities owned by offshore interests, including those linked to groups like the Big Circle Boys of money-laundering fame; full vertical integration of supply chains and cartel-like control of markets with no transparency; and blank cheques at the licence broker to outbid any local operator who tries to buy in.
We've heard this information, and more. We've seen evidence and have been told how dangerous it is for those in the industry to provide details for fear of punitive action.
What is so problematic, though, is that we do not know the full scope of who owns licences and quotas in B.C. or where owners are from, because anyone can buy a licence or quota and anyone can sign an agreement for someone else to operate it, and for any fee. We do not track this information. We do not know the true picture of who is making money from B.C. fishing access. The beneficial ownership survey will not provide us with answers on beneficial ownership, because it did not ask the licence-holder whether they owned the licence. In B.C., the licence-holders often do not own them.
We heard DFO explain the protections against foreign ownership in Atlantic Canada. In B.C., we don't limit processor, foreign or corporate ownership of licences and we haven't even touched the mess of trying to track quota ownership.
What I want to say today is that in my opinion, focusing on the ownership being foreign and corporate isn't actually the heart of the point. I certainly have no interest in fanning anti-Asian or any “anti-” sentiments. What I care about is whether the fishery is working as it should be—benefiting those who are on the deck of the boat and the communities of the coast, rebuilding first nations' access, revitalizing their fishing fleets and supporting societal values for B.C. and Canada. If the current system resulted in these outcomes being achievable for fishermen, first nations and coastal communities, I would not be here fighting for change.
The fact is, however, that under the current regime, it is doing the opposite. Fishing enterprises are failing; good fishing crews are extremely hard to find; skippers have a huge amount of risk and work to secure a viable season if they even can; and new fishermen can't afford to buy into the fishery—new fishermen are rare, period. We are losing our fleets and we are losing the benefits of the fish being pulled out of the water, and it is in large part because we're losing control of access.
The point is the indisputable negative impacts of the current policy. Breaking that down, the landed value of fish is not getting to the fish harvesters, and their fishing enterprises are unstable, lack security and are hard to keep viable.
Why? It is because fish harvesters who run fishing enterprises are increasingly renters of access, not owners. From year to year, they have to take on the risk and cost of fishing with no security of access or price.
Why? It is because fishing licences and quotas are way outside the range of affordability, not just because fish harvesters can't get that kind of capital but also because, even if they did, they will never make enough money through fishing to pay it off in their working lifetime.
Why is it so high? There are many reasons for this. The first one is that we have no fleet separation or owner-operator rules. Anyone can buy a licence.
Why would others buy a licence if the fishing return on investment isn't worth the cost of the licence? It's because they're not solely benefiting from the fishing ROI. If you have deep pockets, are further up the value chain and have access to fish markets, then you can pay more for licences. If you control enough supply, you can control the value chain or, even worse, you have other nefarious activities that make this investment even more lucrative. This situation perpetuates itself, because even those buyers who do not want the huge asset investments in access must buy into the system to stay competitive with these other players.
The lack of oversight and control on who can buy and operate B.C. fishing licences and quota in B.C. are crushing our fleet; it is eliminating viable owner-operators; and it is putting pressure on the smaller land-based operators to consolidate and amass access themselves, at great cost.