Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here.
I am the research director for the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters, which is a national human resources sector council for the fish-harvesting industry. The comments I'm making here, however, are my own views and opinions.
I've been working with the council since its foundation in the mid-1990s. We've been tracking economic performance, the labour market and labour supply trends in the industry since that time. I've been paying close attention to the fisheries on both coasts and what's going on in them. I've provided you with a presentation that has some numbers in it about comparing the socio-economic outcomes of the industries on the two coasts. I won't go into the details; maybe we'll have time for discussion around that.
Basically, fishing incomes in the fishery in British Columbia have grown since the great recession. We're using tax filer data here up until 2019, before the pandemic. After inflation, incomes in the B.C. fishery did improve, but only at about a third of the rate of the east coast fishery.
The harvester workforce in British Columbia is the second-oldest, next to Newfoundland and Labrador, but much older than what we see in the Maritimes. We have an aging workforce and a paucity of young people coming into the industry. We have a situation where.... When we look at landed value issues and so on, one of the things that jump out at me from the numbers most dramatically is that in the Atlantic region the total harvester income—income earned from fishing employment and contributing to local economies in the Atlantic region—represents 37% of total landed value. That share of the total value of the fish being landed remains with harvesters in their communities. In British Columbia, the proportion is 29%, significantly less. If there was the same proportion of total landed value being returned to fish harvesters as employment income, there would be an increase of $6,000 in the average income of fish harvesters in British Columbia. It's just one measure of how the fisheries are structured. The different licensing systems and industry structures produce very different socio-economic incomes.
Mr. Hardie referred to the omelette, the famous omelette. I'll make the argument that we don't have an omelette situation here; we have a failing policy system that needs to be fixed. Questions, I know, have been raised in previous testimony about whether that can be done or how it can be done. There is no cheap and easy way to do it. We're pretty far down what I believe to be the wrong road, so there's no easy way to get back.
However, there are two simple, straightforward models that we can see in operation in other regions, other countries, for fixing it. The obvious one is the PIIFCAF model, where DFO's minister issues licences every year. The minister has the authority to simply say that over a fixed period of time—seven years in the PIIFCAF case—all those licences have to be in the hands of working fish harvesters. That sets in place a market process whereby licences and quotas will change hands. People who aren't working harvesters will have to find buyers at prices that buyers can afford, etc.
The second option is a different ownership or licence structure altogether. We can see this in Maine in the very successful lobster fishery or in the very successful small-boat inshore fishery in countries like France, in Europe, where the licences are not tradeable commodities. The fish harvesters don't own the licences. They have long-term use of them through either just granting procedures or leasing arrangements, etc.
Similar to a PIIFCAF kind of time period, we could, in British Columbia, go through a process whereby all licences return to the ownership of the Crown and then are made available to working harvesters on either a lease-to-own basis or a leasing basis at affordable lease rates. I can go into some detail about what that might look like financially.
There are, however, two caveats around either of these kinds of approaches to solving this problem. One is that neither option will work unless harvesters are able to buy licences and quotas at fair market value for a working fish-harvesting enterprise. At the moment, most licences and quotas, certainly in British Columbia, are not trading at fair market value from the perspective of having to pay for them and finance them as a working harvesting enterprise. So—