Thank you for the question.
Honourable Chair, I think the fundamental principle, again, is one of finding that correct balance where you can give information to the public that is actionable for them, so they can take that information and turn that into an action they can take to protect themselves. I think it's very clear, in reviewing the circumstances of last summer, that while there was a tragic loss of life of 22 people, when one looks at the totality of the health information, the vast majority of those illnesses and more dire consequences were the result of exposures of those individuals to the food source before CFIA was even aware there was a potential food contamination issue. The incubation period was one where the exposure had taken place before we were brought to the table.
In exercising the efforts from the 6th of August to the 16th, with regard to the sharing of information, when one looks at the evidence, in terms of what information we had available, what information Toronto Public Health had available, the reality is that we were all collectively working to find that solution as quickly as possible. The CFIA, on the 13th of August, took the initiative to bring the community together when we became aware of secondary investigations beyond the primary investigation by Toronto Public Health. We started to make sure that everybody was sharing the information they had in as timely a way as possible and that this information could be used by everybody around the table within the scope of their regulatory and jurisdictional authorities.
It concerns me that there is a suggestion that we were in any way obstructive to the work of other jurisdictions. I think that suggestion is most unfortunate and disrespectful, given the body of evidence that has been assembled around that. The reality is that from our perspective, the decision to go to recall late on the 16th, early on the 17th, was arrived at when all we knew was that we had L. mono and we could confirm there was a contamination at a production source. We didn't have the PFGE pattern. Because of that, we couldn't even confirm that this product linked to illnesses with a common PFGE pattern. That was seven days later, after the recall was issued.
So again, I believe that when one looks at the actions that were taken, with the evidence that was known at the time--two illnesses up until August 6, a second pair of illnesses on August 12--we were investigating four illnesses, and from that point forward, within four days we had done a recall. Against any international event I can find over the past number of years, international standards such as they are, people would look at that and say that was an amazing level of investigation, an amazing early determination, and the appropriate call in terms of a recall, to do that as early as they did it.