Thank you, Madam Chair.
My thanks to our guests.
It's nice to see you again. Even in politics, sometimes we have occasion to say “I told you so”. I'm not saying this to you.
I have a case in my office from a victim of crime who had a complaint about Corrections Canada. I have a very thick file, if you're interested. The whole case was around reporting a complaint, and the people who were the subject of the complaint were the ones doing the investigation. It was one cover-up after another. Now I look at chapter 11, and you talk of Corrections Canada.
As a result of this complaint, we made it a priority in my office, and I started developing private member's bills to address the issue of Corrections Canada. I saw Corrections Canada mobilize against my private member's bill. I had many visits from them in my office. They attended committees. They did everything to kill these private member's bills. One part of those private member's bills that they were most concerned about was the creation of a board of directors, yet now we see everything you were able to discover.
When you have a complaint with Corrections Canada...they don't have a board of directors. They have one person in charge, a person whom I think they call a commissioner. The complainant, my constituent, this mother of a victim of crime—which makes her a victim also—persisted. I was pushing so hard here in Ottawa that, all of a sudden, she told me, “I can't talk about it anymore.” I don't have to be a lawyer to know that they settled, they paid, and the condition was that she couldn't talk about it anymore.
I know they are doing a lot of this, and it may be a reasonable practice. It may be the way we address complaints in law cases, but I call the fact that they're not accountable to anybody a crime. What came out of all of this? The one person in charge of Corrections Canada was moved—probably promoted, because that's how you compensate for weaknesses in a corporation of this size when you don't have a board of directors. But the new person coming in doesn't have a clue what's going on around them.
I'd like to ask you three questions. First of all, did you find evidence of employee perks around the ombudsman—the correctional investigator, as you call that person? It's been suggested in the media. I don't base anything on what I hear in the media, but I'm asking you if you found evidence of unusual perks. If so, have those people been charged?
The RCMP can take fifteen years to investigate this, but to me, when an audit determines unethical behaviour, well, unethical behaviour in government is theft. Could you tell us if the correctional investigator has been charged?
The next one is a two-part question. Can you give me some logic as to why Corrections Canada would not be subject to having a board of directors overseeing the operation, instead of one person with more power than the Prime Minister when it comes to talking about information in Corrections Canada, information that they refuse to give to the minister, information that they refuse to give to anyone in Parliament? They hide behind the fact that it's the Privacy Act that prevents them from divulging anything about Suzack. In his case, he was being transferred from maximum to medium security within two years when he had life. It's stuff like this, but they refuse to give information to the minister.
I'd like to tap your expertise. I think I know why they resist, but could you give us a bit of information as to how this would change your job if you had someone accountable to talk to, and the minister's job, if, when there was a problem, he could talk to the appointed board, which would at least fear to be replaced? The system, the way we have it now, is full of people who are promoted when they get in trouble.