I agree that the public appointments commission is a very good idea, in principle. To add some conceptual clarity here, we should separate three different issues. One is the independence of the Governor in Council in making appointments. The second is the independence of the Governor in Council in removing appointments. The third is the ongoing operations of the particular agency or the functions of the office-holder.
On the removal question, we have judicial oversight according to the principles I've explained. On the operational front, what we want in most cases is independence, particularly where quasi-judicial functions are being performed by the agency. So we don't necessarily want oversight from Parliament or the executive branch, but again there is judicial oversight in terms of standards of judicial review that apply to operational decisions taken by administrative agencies.
But the judicial oversight that exists in the removal process, procedural fairness, substantive obligations, and operational functions doesn't exist in the context of appointments. So the judiciary doesn't play a role in appointing office-holders, and that's why I think it's so important that we have a parliamentary process in that context, whereas it's less important in the removal and the operational context. In fact, there may be negative consequences of parliamentary involvement in the removal and operational context.