Good morning, Madam Chair.
Good morning, everyone.
I thank you for your invitation to be here. It's an invitation that is difficult to refuse. It is gratifying to me to know that members of Parliament are interested in the report and recommendations that were made about two years ago by the commission of inquiry over which I presided.
Let me begin by giving you some background, and I hope you'll forgive me if I take time to say things that you may already know.
By an order in council dated February 19, 2004, I was given the task of conducting an inquiry into the sponsorship program and advertising activities of the Government of Canada, which had been the subject of a very critical report by the Auditor General of Canada.
The terms of reference expressly required me not only to investigate the facts that caused the mismanagement and corruption dealt with in the commission's first report, which was dated November 1, 2005, but I was also required to make recommendations, based on the factual findings of the first report, on a series of issues that were detailed in the terms of reference. They included the respective responsibilities and accountabilities of ministers and public servants, as recommended by the Auditor General; whistle-blowing; access to information legislation; and “the adequacy of the current accountability framework with respect to Crown corporations”.
Finally, the commission was asked--and I think this goes to the heart of what was required of it--to make recommendations to prevent mismanagement of this kind happening in the future.
Although the first part of the commission's mandate was to investigate what had gone wrong and to identify who was responsible for the errors and mismanagement that had been uncovered, this part of the commission's work drew a huge amount of public and media attention. But I always thought that in the long run the second part of our mandate was more important, because no one can change the past, but we can learn from past errors and take steps to avoid them in the future. And I thought that was the principal purpose of the commission of inquiry.
So even while the commission was completing the first part of its mandate by public hearings and the preparation of its report, we were working very hard on the second part.
Because I have never pretended to be an expert in matters of public administration, I recruited some of the best minds in all of Canada to work with me and for the commission. They formed an advisory committee composed of prominent Canadians with broad and varied experience in public policy.
I also engaged the services of Dr. Donald Savoie, a professor at the University of Moncton and a very respected authority on Canadian government. He directed a research program that resulted in the preparation of 17 studies by prominent academics on various subjects related to our mandate.
These studies, which assisted me very greatly in the preparation of the recommendations, are appended to the second report, dated February 1, 2006. And in case you haven't seen them, here they are. I think they are a notable contribution to the literature on Canadian government, and they certainly were of assistance to me, as I said.
The advisory committee travelled across Canada and held round-table discussions--I was with them at these times--in a number of cities with groups of experienced and knowledgeable persons whose advice and comments were valuable contributions to our thinking.
The commission sought the opinions of ordinary Canadians through its website, and we were agreeably surprised by the number and quality of the responses.
All of this is to say that the commission's second report and recommendations are not the work of one individual. They represent the accumulated experience and wisdom of noted academics, politicians, former public servants, journalists, and the public in general. I suggest, for this reason, that the report and recommendations deserved the government's attention and careful consideration.
You will also remember that between the date of the first report, which was delivered on November 1, 2005, and the second report, which is dated February 1, 2006, a general election occurred. It resulted in a change of government. The new government had campaigned on a platform that promised that it would, as its first piece of legislation, introduce an accountability act that would deal with the abuses uncovered by the commission's hearings and described in its first report.
The new government kept its promise, and the Federal Accountability Act is the result. That legislation, when it was first proposed, had been, I believe, already drafted and decided upon before the commission's second report was delivered into the hands of the newly elected Prime Minister. Still, I expected that in due course the recommendations contained in our report would at some future time be studied and at least to some degree acted upon.
Unfortunately, that was not the case. I never received any acknowledgment of receipt of my report.
Recommendations 4 and 13 prompted a very negative reaction on the part of an impressive number of officials and others. The Prime Minister announced publicly that those two recommendations would not be followed. I was invited to come to Ottawa shortly after the tabling of my report to meet with the new chairman of Treasury Board in order to discuss my recommendations. But the minister in question indicated to me, during our meeting, that the government's policy was to table as quickly as possible before Parliament its bill, that had already been drafted, and that any implementation of the recommendations contained in the commission's report would be put off until later.
I had expected that any administration would take the time to study, discuss and reflect before doing anything whatsoever. This is the reason why I had recommended that a report on the measures taken as a follow-up to the recommendations be tabled before Parliament within 24 months of receiving the recommendations. That was recommendation 19.
I thought that it was sufficient time to allow for an in-depth study of each of the issues.
The two-year delay has gone by and no report has been deposited. I'm still waiting to hear what the government thinks of the commission's other recommendations. No one has communicated with me in any way, except your committee, for which I'm grateful.
Some of the recommendations, at least to some degree, were dealt with by the Federal Accountability Act, but the basic problem described in the report has not been dealt with. That problem is the growing imbalance between the executive side of the government, represented by the Prime Minister and his cabinet, and the legislative side, represented by Parliament.
The report and the academic studies supporting it make the case that over the years there has been a greater and greater concentration of power and authority in the executive, and a corresponding diminution of the role of members of Parliament. This problem is made more acute by the expansion of the Prime Minister's Office, which has grown in size rapidly in recent years and seems to have an ever-increasing influence on government policy and decision-making.
It should be remembered that the political staff in the Prime Minister's Office are not elected. They are not subject to any rules or laws of which I am aware. And they have the ear of the most important and powerful person in Canadian government.
I suggest that this trend is a danger to Canadian democracy, and leaves the door wide open to the kind of political interference in the day-to-day administration of government programs that led to what is commonly called the sponsorship scandal.
The recommendations in the report of February 1, 2006, attempt to remedy this problem. I don't propose to discuss, in these preliminary remarks, each of the 18 recommendations in the report, but I'm happy to do so if you ask me to during questions.
Thank you for your attention and for having listened to me.