Thank you very much, Mr. Silva.
In terms of the relationship between the parliamentary budget officer and the Congressional Budget Office, I think there are things we can learn from the way the Congressional Budget Office operates, but we have to take into account the fact that it operates in a very different system. I also wish to highlight—there was some work done and I don't know if it was made available to you—that before I arrived, the Library of Parliament did a review of budget offices in parliamentary-like settings and congressional settings across the world.
So while the Congressional Budget Office is one of the first offices set up in the mid-1970s, a number of other countries have actually moved forward to create the kind of capacity to support the oversight function. This includes a wide range of countries, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Korea, and some others. But the Congressional Budget Office was definitely the first one. It has been in operation since the mid-1970s.
One thing that is pretty impressive about that office is the quality of its advice. It has maintained a perception of providing independent high-quality advice pretty much from the beginning, but again it operates in a congressional system that is very different from a Westminster system. In the congressional system, the executive provides a budget, but both chambers of congress can also provide alternative budgets, and there's a negotiation. So in a congressional budget system like that, there's a lot of need to provide alternative budget capacity.
You will not get that capacity from the parliamentary budget officer, not with the resources that have been set aside, but also for the good reason that we operate in a very different system. It's the government, the executive, that brings forward the budget. The parliamentary budget officer, in that capacity, will help provide the appropriate challenge in the appropriate areas in the mandate that has been specified, particularly with respect to those forecasts you've alluded to, but also with the downstream estimates-related issues.
This is a five-year appointment. Five years from now, if the parliamentary budget office is on such solid footing that it continues to thrive over a number of years, I'd be very proud. That would certainly be a great accomplishment.
In terms of independence and what we mean by independence and how it will relate to the way we do economic and fiscal forecasts right now, I think you could probably say—in relation to a question that was put earlier by another member of this committee—that we may actually have the best practice in the OECD right now, with respect to forecasts, just in terms of the transparency around forecasts.
The question then becomes, what is the role of the parliamentary budget officer, and have we not already solved this issue? I think you have to go back to the importance of forecasts. Forecasts are very important public policy tools, very important fiscal planning tools, and notwithstanding the fact that we have a lot of transparency around fiscal forecasting now, we live in a very risky environment and particularly an environment where there's a lot of downside-related risk.
So I think providing independent advice in the context of where we see those risks, in terms of the fiscal forecast now going forward and what its implication could be for budgetary choices and fiscal planning, would be an important provision of advice. In terms of the protocols and when will they be in place, we're looking to have them in place in the fall, and we would like to have them approved by a number of members of both sides in both the House and the Senate.